Freedom of Association

with regard to Political Parties and Civil Society in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf: A literature review

By

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I. Introduction

This report is a review of literature on freedom of association with regard to civil society and political parties in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf. Attention is also paid to Islamic movements and groups, and youth and gender. This introduction outlines the format of the review, and clarifies the scope and framework. Section II defines freedom of association and highlights regional trends and debates in the literature with regard to the role of civil society, political institutions, Islamic NGOs and movements and, nominally (as very littler literature was found on it), the role of youth in democratic development in the Arab world.

In Section III I recommend ways in which gaps in research can be addressed. Appendix A lists regional and international organizations working on the issue of freedom of association (with regard to civil society and political parties). Where available descriptions of projects are provided. The list is restricted to those organizations and projects mentioned in the literature reviewed and is not, thus, exhaustive. Appendix B provides a summary of selected countries' political and governmental mechanisms that foster or constrain freedom of association. Appendix C provides selected country profiles of the state of freedom of association. At the end of the report is a list of references, as well as a further list of relevant works for further study.

The review examines the literature in terms of the efficacy of civil societies and political parties in democratization and liberalization processes in the Arab world, Iran and Turkey. The review reflects assumptions in the literature that both state and social structures are important determinants of social and political change processes (see Moghadam 2004). I confer, also, with analyses that underline the importance of examining civil society in relation to more overtly political processes and contexts.

Searches of journal articles and books were conducted through IDRC library databases. Internet searches were also conducted. The following questions guided the selection of literature reviewed and the information sought: What is the state of civil society and political parties in the region, and what is their relationship to processes of democratization and liberalization? Is a vibrant civil society necessary but not sufficient for attaining political democratization? Is the existence of political parties an essential feature and valid indicator of democratic government? What happens to the effectiveness and autonomy of political parties when they join governments in the region? How broadly or specifically does freedom of association need to be defined, implemented, and monitored to ensure vibrant civil societies and political parties? What is the role of Islamist movements and Islamic NGOs in society-state relations? Are Islamist movements a 'threat' to democratic development? If not, what role can they play in pro-democracy processes? What role do youth play in pro-democracy movements and institutions, and are they incorporated into pro-democracy programs and approaches?

II. Freedom of association – A review of the literature

Democratization:

The autonomy and effectiveness of civil societies and political parties are key indicators of state-society relations and, hence, of processes of democratization. There is much debate surrounding the question of what characteristics in particular render civil societies and political parties agents of change and democratization.[1] Michael Hudson notes that democratization, in part, involves a decrease in the state's power to be arbitrary and exclusive (Hudson 1988:157).

The democratic ideal is certainly relevant to the region, and its adherents can be found at all levels of society and government. For example, Qatar's foreign minister, Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani, explained his support for Al-Jazeera satellite television channel on CBS's *60 Minutes*, thus:

> I think [Arab] people are not used… to hearing things which they don't like, especially the top people, including me. However, democracy has started. Either the leaders like it, or they don't like it. Either you open the door, or they break the door. It's a matter of time, in my opinion (Kéchichian 2004:44).

A handful of regimes in the Middle East have had a peaceful change of regime through free elections, which is considered the 'acid test' of democracy (Tachau 1994:xvi). But there is a general absence of free elections in the Arab world, and the problem of democracy in the region goes beyond peaceful regime change and electoral politics (see Ghalioun 2004).

Despite the frankness of Al Thani's words above, mechanisms and institutions of democratization and liberalization are, by and large, adopted by Arab governments as means of securing their authoritarian rule. Hudson's definition does not apply to most Arab countries. As Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger conclude in their study on regime change, "there is no such thing as democracy or democratization in the Arab world today" (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:372). In practice, this means that the state "remains strong enough to revert to more authoritarian measures if required" and is reluctant to allow civil society too much autonomy (see Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995b:336).

In much of the literature, modernization, 'individualism' and the emergence of democratic institutions are often taken for granted as necessary conditions for civil society (Kamali 2001:457; see also Alexander 1998, and Gellner 1994). Authors such as Masoud Kamali point out, though, that the modernization programs in the region have been selective and, except sporadically, incompatible with democratization. The result has been isolated states, and the emergence of 'modern' civil societies that remain marginalized, in opposition to the state, and ineffective in terms of "engaging in real democratic games" (Kamali 2001:478-79).

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[1] Democratization is the transition of a nondemocratic political system to a democratic polity. Democracy is understood here as a political system in which all effective positions of government power are attained through competition at regular intervals, and where there is a high degree of political participation, and civil and political liberties (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:387, n.1).

Similarly, Burhan Ghalioun notes that modernization from above in the Arab world has increased both the authoritarian nature of states and the fragmentation of society. He states:

> Even as it reinforces centralized power by equipping it with new technical means of organization, management, and control, modernization undermines older sources of social solidarity and cohesion, leaving individuals helpless and adrift. Hence the state becomes stronger as it modernizes, while society grows more fragile (Ghalioun 2004:128).

Albrecht and Schlumberger argue that it is important to examine both factors of democratization as well as the factors that enable Arab regimes to persist in their authoritarianism (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). Centralization of power has been the dominant feature of Arab states (apart from Lebanon). The regimes that have replaced the postindependence regimes do not have the trust and support of the populace. Rather, in Burhan Ghalioun's words,

> These newer regimes enjoy no popular support. They serve only the interests of the clans who hold power, they communicate in no way whatsoever with their citizenries, and they depend for their survival solely upon coercion and multiple security services. These regimes go beyond dictatorship; they put the state in the service of elites corrupted against the nation (Ghalioun 2004:127)

Ghalioun argues that the "stagnation of power," meaning the absence of turnover or renewal of ruling elites, is the cause of the failure of these regimes (Ghalioun 2004:127).

The Arab world is notable for the persistence of its authoritarian regimes, when other regions have experienced a decline of dictatorships (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:373). Also, unlike in other regions of the world, the revolt by civil society against authoritarianism has been delayed in the Arab world (Ghalioun 2004:128). One reason for this delay has been the influence of Western strategic interests in the region. Ghalioun argues that the bolstering of repressive regimes by the West in order to secure its interests, along with oil and mineral rents and remittances from nationals working abroad, has enabled Arab regimes to ignore public opinion and avoid improving their governance or seeking popular support (Ghalioun 2004:129). As a result, regimes became autonomous from their populations and "decades of tyranny and exclusion have left Arab civil societies highly disorganized" (Ghalioun 2004:129). The disarray of civil societies, then, is seen as linked to the unconditional Western support for existing regimes. And this link, Ghalioun contends, explains the difficulty in transitioning to democratic states and societies in the Middle East (Ghalioun 2004:129).

Civil societies and political parties nonetheless function in contexts of authoritarian states and often take forms that are shaped by their environments (Tachau 1994:xvi). Demands for greater and effective political participation are evident in the region (Tachau 1994:xv). In the 1980s and early 1990s, there were indications of growing pluralism in Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, and Yemen. Hudson notes that these signs were ignored or overlooked by Western academics and journalists (Hudson 1991:407-22; referenced in Tachau 1994:xv). Experiments with political liberalization by Arab regimes, and a "renewed drive" to ward liberalization in the late 1980s to the mid-1990s have been a major focus of scholarly literature since the early 1990s (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:373). Multiparty elections, a lessening of restrictions on the media, increased levels of individual freedoms, and the proliferation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) became the focus of studies.

The literature evolved from ad hoc studies to attempts to systematically compare factors of liberalization and democratization of political systems across the region. The latter is reflected in two volumes edited by Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble (see Korany, Brynen and Nobel 1998, and Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995a). Contributors to the volumes examine the interrelationship between culture and politics, civil society, the political economy of Arab authoritarianism and reform, and regional and international forces. Patterns identified include initial political openings of regimes followed by their resistance to any 'deepening' or democratization of the reform process (for example, in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Kuwait, and the transition to Palestinian self-government) (Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995b:336). This resistance to democratization, note Brynen, Korany, and Noble:

> is further reinforced in many cases by the fear that the existing regime ultimately stands as the only guarantor of political stability. Secularists fear the rise of Islamist influence; Islamists fear an Algerian-style clampdown; communal minorities fear majoritarianism (Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995b:336).

These constraints are particularly strong in monarchies, and in societies divided by deep social cleavages and where no consensus exists over possible alternatives to the presiding political order (Brynen, Korany and Noble 1995b:336). One of the key factors in stalling political liberalization is identified by Amy Hawthorne as the alliances that are forged between pro-democracy groups and repressive regimes (most notably but not exclusively in Algeria and Tunisia) in order to stave off demands of Islamist groups (Hawthorne 2004:13; see also Garon 2003).[2]

These and other constraints to democratization have a direct bearing on the efficacy of civil societies. The question of how to create or foster a confluence of forces to support democratization is at the basis of much of the literature on civil societies. Current attempts to establish a democratic government in Iraq have served to highlight questions of democratization, and the form and roles therein of civil societies, elections, political parties, Islamist movements, constitutions and other political entities. The following section defines freedom of association and underlines the contingent nature of the right to form and join associations.

Definition and legal framework of the right to freedom of association:

The European Commission has defined freedom of association as "a general capacity for the citizens to join, without interference by the State, in associations in order to attain various ends" (Human Rights First 1997). While all the major international and regional treaties on

[2] Islamist groups hope to seize political power and recognize state power as a necessary step in realizing their goal of establishing Muslim society and polity. Notably, the spectrum of political Islam is broad, with only a few Islamic groups being fundamentalist. The term fundamentalist, coined in the early twentieth century to describe a strand of Protestant Christians in the United States, implies passive observance of a literal reading of sacred scripture. On the other hand, the term Islamist refers to groups that are trying to adapt tenets of Islam to changing times and circumstances. The term Islamist is favoured in the literature as it is seen to better reflect the forward-looking positions of these groups in their attempts to bring about reconstruction of the social order (Wright 1996:n.p.).

human rights underline the right to freedom of association, it remains unclear what precise rights are required in order to guarantee the free association of individuals to join and run organizations. A Human Rights First study indicates that if freedom of association stops at the right to form and join an association, "governments could restrict the ability of groups to operate freely. They might interfere with the internal decisions and organization of the association, with devastating consequences" (Human Rights First 1997). Indeed, the right to associate with others and form or join associations is linked to freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of movement, and also freedom from human rights violations.

Freedom of association involves the right to join, form, and withdraw membership from groups, associations and partnerships of different kinds. It can also involve the right of associations to maintain control over their membership (to avoid government control). It requires, then,

> the non-interference of the state in the formation and in the affairs of associations that function within the scope of law. It also requires the assistance of the state in creating and maintaining an environment that is conducive to the exercise of the right to free association (Bello 2003:1).

The legislative protection of freedom of association can be meaningless if there is no practical protection of other rights and of fundamental human rights. A recurring theme in the literature is that freedom of association needs to be accompanied by accountable government institutions and coordinated efforts to secure various other freedoms.

In terms of its legal specificities, extensive discussion of the critical elements of the right to freedom of association has occurred in the context of International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions and interpretations. For example, the right to affiliate with other national and international organizations is specifically guaranteed to trade unions in ILO Convention 87 (Article 5) (Human Rights First 1997). A Human Rights First study asserts that the particular provisions in ILO conventions and interpretations need to be extended to the right of freedom of association found in "traditional" human rights law (Human Rights First 1997). The discussion put forth in their report provides a potentially useful guiding framework for international donor promotion of freedom of association (and informs some of the recommendations included in this review). For example, it notes that:

> Registration is frequently, although not universally, required in order for an NGO to attain legal personality. It is therefore critical for NGOs that the registration process is not so burdensome that it, in effect, denies the right to association at all. Instead it should be quick, straightforward, cheap and subject to independent judicial review (Human Rights First 1997).

The guarantee of straightforward registration is the first of three types of legal provisions recommended by Leon Iris and Karla Simon in their study of enabling environments needed to protect nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The other two are:

- Laws that prevent undue interference by the state; and
- Laws that allow access to funds from private sources, the state, or economic activities (Irish and Simon 1999:2).

The authors emphasize the need for such legal safeguards to abide by international standards for transparency and self-governance, and human rights norms. It is these wider standards and norms that are seen to potentially guard against increasingly sophisticated attempts by governments to restrict the operations of organizations, particularly human rights NGOs, through legal and quasi-legal controls.

The attempt on the part of governments to restrict or control the work of civil society organizations is exemplified in Tunisia's amendment to its law on associations. The amendment provides for the right of any "individual to join an association provided that he or she subscribe to its principles." This seemingly benign change in the law has been condemned by the Tunisian League for Human Rights as it is seen to permit the ruling party to take control of the League.[3] Such laws speak to the need for NGOs to retain legal control over the membership and management of the organizations (Human Rights First 1997).

In sum, the right to freedom of association needs to be developed in terms of its legal specificities and provisions to provide better protection to nongovernmental organizations worldwide (Human Rights First 1997). But, as will be more clear below, the authoritarian political institutions of the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf can render these legal provisions meaningless. Some of the factors that constrain or protect the right to freedom of association are discussed below.

What is the state of the right to freedom of association in the Arab world?

The Arab Human Development Report 2003 tells us that:

> Regulations governing the freedom to form associations that were laid down in the colonial period endorsed the rule of free assembly, provided that the founding organizers informed the competent authorities of the association's creation. The situation today is that, except for those older laws, all other amendments governing freedom of association made in the post independence and national liberation era are restriction-oriented (UNDP 2003:154).

Restrictions on freedom of association in the Arab world include legal constraints on associations and publications (UNDP 2003:154). Common reasons given by states in their denial of registration of NGOs, are the apparent "political" nature of the organization, or the fact that its aims are too similar to those of other NGOs (Human Rights First 1997). In addition, legal guarantees in place to protect associational life, including constitutions, become invalidated during times of war and under emergency law (which has been in place continually in Egypt since 1981, and in Syria and Lebanon at different times) (AbuKhalil 2002:843). A state of emergency releases the state from the need for constitutional or legal

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[3] International Constitutional Law (ICL) provides English translations of constitutional documents and cross-references these and other materials for quick comparison of constitutional provisions. The link: http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/index.html

accountability. The separation of authorities is undermined and legal guarantees that protect individuals from state aggression are no longer upheld (UNDP 2003:155).

Most Arab states have signed international conventions that protect freedom of association such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. And, with the exception single-party states and Saudi Arabia, which does not have a constitution *per se*, Arab states "endorse freedom" in their constitutions (UNDP 2003:153). Many have also introduced clauses that provide for the founding of associations and organizing general assemblies. But, the actual practice and protection of freedom of association in the Arab world is severely hindered by the erratic nature of the application of laws and the hegemony of political power. There is a failure in the region to "reconcile the interests of the government with the rights of the people and the exigencies of state security with the principles of freedom" (UNDP 2003:153-54).

International conventions, then, have not entered the legal culture of Arab states or been incorporated into national legislation (UNDP 2003:152).[4] Further, an independent and transparent judiciary is a fundamental guarantor in the protection of the freedom of association, and many Arab judiciaries are not independent of executive branches of government.

There is also perhaps a lack of awareness on the part of governments with regard to the role and functioning of civil society organizations. Lisa Anderson notes that during the trial of Saadeddin Ibrahim, Egyptian sociologist and chair of the Ibn Khaldun Centre for Development Studies in Cairo, proceedings reflected a general lack of awareness of the role of research centres, with witnesses asked to clarify the role of a board of directors, program evaluations, audits, and external funding (Anderson 2004:7). Anderson quotes one analyst as noting that, "if it weren't for foreign funding for scientific and social research in Egypt, we wouldn't have any" (Anderson 2004:7).

In terms of the right to join or form political parties, in the Gulf states political parties are banned, with Yemen being the exception. Political parties operate informally in Kuwait. In the Middle East and North Africa, there has been a proliferation of political parties in the last two decades, and a history of political party activism. Nonetheless, political parties face legal and political constraints that seriously limit their ability to mobilize and attain political power. Some of these constraints are discussed below (see also Appendix B for regional overview of political and governmental mechanisms).

In sum, the right to join and form associations in the region is highly constrained. As noted by May Kassem, in the Arab world generally the weakness of civil society is closely linked to the authoritarian nature of political systems in the region (Kassem 2004:87). The following

[4] The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) guarantees freedom of association and defines the parameters within which governments can restrict or regulate NGOs. Articles 20 and 21 guarantee the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association and stipulate they can be restricted only when restriction is lawful and serves legitimate interests in national security, public safety, public morals or health, or the rights or freedoms of others. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is also widely accepted and states that everyone has a right to "freedom of peaceful assembly and association" and that no one can be compelled to join an association (Simon 1999:2). See also Carolina Rodriguez Bello's paper which outlines in more detail relevant human rights mechanisms (Bello n.d.).

sections outline discussions in the literature on the roles and efficacy of civil societies, political parties, and Islamic NGOs and movements in democratic development.

Assessing the efficacy of civil societies:

Freedom of association, the right to join associations without interference from the state, enables the development of citizen organizations and movements that function as conduits between individuals and the state—in other words, civil society. But, the precise definition of civil society remains contentious. In addition, ascertaining the conditions that are necessary for its survival in the context of the Middle East, North Africa and the Gulf, is rife with assumptions about the nature of democratic change, the effectiveness of democratic state reforms and liberalization, and the role of religion in public life. For example, some definitions of civil society are also not reconcilable with Islamic organizations or movements (Kamali 2001:457). These issues in the literature are brought out in the discussion below.

In general terms, civil society is widely viewed as: "the zone of voluntary associative life beyond family and clan affiliations but separate from the state and the market" (Hawthorne 2004:5, n2). Augustus Richard Norton suggests this would include clubs, guilds, syndicates, federations, unions, parties and groups that "come together to provide a buffer between the state and citizen" (Norton 1995:7). Religious organizations, advocacy and interest groups, research institutions, as well as *informal* political, social, and religious movements are also viewed as within the realm of civil society. For Amy Hawthorne, the media and political parties are not part of civil society (Hawthorne 2004:5). Nonetheless, political parties, government institutions (such as an independent judiciary), and legal frameworks that enable or constrain freedom of association and freedom of expression remain important factors in assessing the efficacy of civil societies.

Norton's assertion that "if democracy—as it is known in the West—has a home, it is in civil society" (Norton 1995:7) is reflected in much of the literature that examines civil society in the context of transitions to democracy. Civil society organizations are seen as "building blocks for a future democratic state and society" (Clark 1995:167; see also Keane 1988:407-430). Individual rights and democratic practices are seen as growing from an established civil society (Davis, pending 2006). In the context of Iraq, support to civil society is seen as a means of healing the social effects of prolonged political repression and contributing to peace building and conflict resolution (see Sheikhany 2000:n.p.).

Nonetheless, there is a lack of systematic analysis that measures the correlation between democracy and civil society (see Abootalebi 1998). The assumption of an automatic link between civil societies and processes of democratization is being revisited in studies that attempt to grapple with the slow and contradictory results accruing from two decades of donor support to civil society institutions in developing countries. There are also calls to widen conceptualizations of civil society beyond organizational activism. Mass protests, community activism, what is termed "social Islamism" and quiet encroachment (illegal means of gaining access to local resources) are examined in trying to understand the loci and forces of social and political change (see, for instance, Bayat 2002; Sadiki 2000). Diane Singerman and A. Bayat examine, respectively, the informal networks in Cairo and the ways in which squatters, the unemployed, and street vendors activate passive networks in Iran

(Singerman 1995; Bayat 1997). Larbi Sadiki examines links between popular uprisings and democratization in Jordan and Sudan (Sadidi 2000).

These studies attempt to identify forces of change and democratic openings. Sadiki, for example, contends that food protest was a "leading factor" in democratic reform in Sudan and Jordan at different times (Sadiki 2000:75). She suggests there is a "strong correlation" between anti-government *khubz* (bread) riots and political liberalizations in Sudan (1985), Algeria (1988), and Jordan (1989), despite the fact that the resulting political reforms were carried out by the states as a means of manipulating the public and defusing crises of legitimacy (Sadiki 2000:88-89). In Algeria, civil society during the 1980s is seen to have played a part in political liberalization but Entelis contends that pressure from below in the form of bread riots were instrumental in bridging the gap between independent civil society organizations and closed state institutions (Entelis 1996:50).

Notwithstanding the importance of closely examining different forms of civil protest for democratization openings, it is clear from the literature that whether one defines civil societies narrowly or more broadly, they have not led to democratization in the Arab world (see Hawthorne 2004:10). Civil societies have proliferated in some countries of the Arab world as a result of top-down liberalization but, despite wide hopes, they are not a causal factor in the liberalization that has taken place (Hawthorne 2004:10). In several countries, the emergence of civil society organizations such as human rights organizations has resulted in increased restrictions established by states on the work and autonomy of NGOs. Naomi Sakr's study of civil society, media and accountability in the Arab world purports that extremely tight restrictions on nongovernmental organizations "have been introduced in reaction to the emergence of civil society groups" (Sakr 2002:11).

Julia Pitner highlights the increasing aggressiveness with which governments in the region are attempting to undermine and discredit NGO efforts, targeting human rights NGOs in particular (Pitner 2005:2). Suppression and cooptation are the two means by which states restrict the ability of NGOs to contest political power. In the words of Albrecht and Schlumberger,

> Nongovernmental organizations as independent agents of the aggregation and articulation of societal interests have been transformed into tools of co-optative control. True, some nonprofit organizations have initially gone largely unnoticed both by Arab regimes and Western donors. Yet, as soon as such organizations try to aggregate and articulate interests autonomously, the regimes usually suppress or co-opt them and their leaders (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:383).

Co-optation is achieved through legislation such as that being considered in Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine which will enable the states and Palestinian Authority to monitor foreign funding of NGOs (Egypt already has legislation in place in that regard) (Pitner 2005:4). Indeed, as Albrecht and Schlumberger point out, "in no other region have trade unions, syndicates, and professional associations been penetrated as deeply and profoundly by authoritarian rule as in the Arab world" (Albrecht and Schlumberger 204:386). Pitner and others also highlight the imposition of bureaucratization and international funders' agendas on NGOs as a factor in hampering the responsiveness of NGOs to local needs and concerns (Pitner 2005:4).

Another means of co-optation is the creation by states of parallel organizations that resemble independent NGOs (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:383; Pitner 2005:2). For example, the Tunisian government created Jeune Medecine sans Frontières and various other 'sans Frontiere' organizations that attempt to get invited to international human rights conferences; at the same time, the Tunisian government denies travel visas to representatives of legitimate NGOs (Pitner 2005:2).

Civil societies in the Arab world have not, then, been able to stave off authoritarianism or affect the balance of power (Hawthorne 2004:10). Egypt provides a case in point. In 1999, Law 153 came into force there and was invalidated in 2002. But, despite an NGO campaign, in June 2002, a revised, more restricted version of the law was passed by the People's Assembly. It was seen as a response by the government to NGO criticism of the state, and was more restrictive than its predecessor, Law No. 32. Under Law 153, all NGOs not officially registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs are illegal. Members of unauthorized organizations are deemed criminal offenders, and registered NGOs must fulfill numerous requirements, including accepting onto their board an official from the Ministry of Social Affairs, and refraining from all activities of a 'political nature.' Also, all external funds must go through the Ministry of Social Affairs before dispensed to NGOs (Grunert 2003:140). And, membership in organizations or networks outside the country is prohibited without prior government permission. Donor institutions are also required to register with the Egyptian government (Grunert 2003:141,148; see also Langohr 2004:194-195, who notes the Egyptian government's attempt, through Law 153, to legislate fewer restrictions on 'good,' that is apolitical, NGOs while tightening restrictions on oppositional advocacy organizations).

In Egypt, as elsewhere in the Arab world, civil society organizations must devote a great deal of energy to secure their own future as they remain vulnerable to state interference (Sakr 2002:12-13). Nonetheless, and despite the fact that donors themselves are hampered by restrictive legislation (see Grunert with regard to Egypt, 2003:143), civil societies in the Arab world have a particular appeal to international donors as they are assumed to play a vital role in the difficult challenge of promoting democracy (Hawthorne 2004:5). The concept of civil society also has significance for Arab societies and is intensely debated as it represents, in Sara Roy's words, "an attempt on the part of the Arab citizen to deal with the issues of political repression and personal oppression" (Roy 1996:221)

Hawthorne notes that donors wrongly assume that civil societies are apolitical. Hawthorne also contends that as a concept, civil society is defined too narrowly as comprising nonprofit organizations that resemble those in donors' own countries. Religious organizations, social movements, and non-NGO forms of associative life (such as those mentioned above) tend to be downplayed or ignored by donors (Hawthorne 2004:5, 14). Also sometimes overlooked is the fact that civil society organizations are not inherently supportive of democratic change. As Hawthorne states,

> Civil society organizations are not inherently counterhegemonic or liberal; particularly in authoritarian environments, civil society can be dominated by apolitical, progovernment, or even illiberal groups that fulfill roles other than democratization (Hawthorne 2004:11).

Hence, as John Entelis states, it is quite possible to have a viable, even dynamic, civil society without having any progress toward the formation of autonomous political organizations that are able to challenge the hegemony of state power. The growth of civil society, then, is not sufficient "to guarantee the emergence of either political liberalism or political democracy" (Entelis 1996:47). Similarly, Masoud Kamali contends that individualism or democratic institutions are not necessary for civil society (Kamali 2001:458).

Thus, precisely how or whether the promotion of civil society is meant to *lead* to democracy is a contentious issue. In the Philippines, Latin America, and Eastern European countries, civil societies have articulated democratic alternatives to the status quo, promoted and disseminated democratic values of participation and collective action, carved out independent political space, spread the idea of democracy within society, and mobilized millions of citizens against repressive regimes (Hawthorne 2004:5). Civil society organizations in these regions managed to maintain a degree of autonomy that enabled them to emerge as a challenge to the ruling power (see Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:386).

The important factor of autonomy does not exist for civil society organizations in the Arab world. There are non-co-opted Islamist groups (discussed below) but other than these, "there are absolutely no social forces with significant organizational capacities that could be said to be independent from their respective regimes in terms of finance, organization, and personnel" (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:386). The efficacy of civil societies is limited by the lack of respect for social autonomy and acceptance of dissention on the part of states in the region (Al-Sayyid 1995:271).

With an important qualification, Hawthorne asserts that civil society can contribute to democratization of authoritarian regimes and help sustain newly established democratic systems *under the right conditions* (Hawthorne 2004:5, n3). In order for civil society to have a democratizing effect in authoritarian contexts--be able to act as a counterweight to state power and shape social attitudes--a critical mass of organizations and movements must have three attributes. These are autonomy from the regime, a pro-democracy agenda, and the ability to build coalitions with other sectors of civil society and other forces such as political parties, to push for democratic change. Civil society in the Arab world does not yet have these attributes (Hawthorne 2004:5, 11).

Rather, ruling regimes in the Arab world manipulate the system to their own advantage. As Ehtashami notes, they:

> Apply the law to regulate access to levers of power, and to control participation of political forces. They, in effect, use the civil law to exert control of the political process. Unchecked, such practices can easily transform a transitional step towards democracy into an 'elected authoritarian' regime in which elections become no more than a hollow shell for disguising de-liberalization (Ehtashami 2004:102).

This risk is particularly apparent in the absence of true multiparty systems. Pro-democracy groups tend to lobby through personal contacts in government, and do not have broad popular support in the Arab world. Civil society groups such as trade unions, professional syndicates, and chambers of commerce and industry (as well as political parties, as discussed below) focus on access to decision-makers rather than on being forums for competing programs or ideas (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:383).

Weak and fragmented civil societies in the Arab world are only partly a result of regimes' repression and manipulation. They also stem from a lack of shared vision and a deep polarization between those who wish to Islamicize society and those who see civil society as the way to ward against this (see Hawthorne 2004:13), as described below. Thus, in addition to the constraints presented by the socio-political context in which civil societies emerge and function, civil society organizations themselves are often reluctant to take actions that could jeopardize their precarious status. As a result, the ability of civil societies in the Arab world to promote democracy and challenge the political status quo is largely nonexistent in the region (Hawthorne 2004:13).

Another argument in the literature with regard to the success of civil societies to promote democracy asserts the importance of the democratic functioning and ideologies of organizations. Janine Astrid Clark's analysis of Islamic health clinics in Cairo illustrates how the clinics have been seen by analysts as potentially fulfilling a "bottom-up" role in national processes of democratization. This assumption stems in part from the fact that these clinics foster greater informal participation than their non-Islamic counterparts. But, crucially, "they are not providing the building blocks" for a democratic state or society as "Islamic clinics are not actively or consciously engaged in establishing any form of an alternative conception of state and society at the grassroots or national levels" (Clark 1995:167). Clark's conclusion is echoed by Brynen, Korany, and Noble, who note that the "synergistic interconnections that democratic consolidation requires" is such that civil associations that are authoritarian are not in a position to inculcate values of democratic participation (Brynen, Korany and Noble 1998:275).

Hawthorne identifies five sectors of civil society in the Arab world. Islamic groups are the largest and most active sector. The second sector includes service organizations that provide loans, job training, educational assistance, and community development, which compliment or substitute for state services (Hawthorne 2004:7). The third sector includes membership-based professional organizations such as labour unions, professional syndicates, and chambers of commerce. These provide economic and social services to their members and are among the largest NGOs in many Arab countries. The fourth sector are associations that aim to foster solidarity and provide services among neighbours, relatives and colleagues. These include artists' and writers' societies and youth organizations. In the Gulf countries, this sector also includes *diwaniyyas*, which are private gatherings of relatives, friends, and colleagues that serve as forums for socializing, conducting business and (to a limited extent) discussing politics. Unlike service organizations that are highly regulated by the government, these associations tend to be self-funded and have little relations with governments (Hawthorne 2004:7-8).

The fifth sector is the newest and smallest and is most often thought of as making up 'Arab civil society' by outside promoters of democracy (Hawthorne 2004:8). These organizations are 'pro-democracy' organizations in that they seek to promote democratic change, carry out democracy education programs often targeted at marginalized groups such as women and youth, and press Arab governments to adhere to international democratic norms. They also mobilize citizens to vote, run for office, and observe elections; they fight corruption, research political issues, and lobby for changes in laws and government practices (Hawthorne 2004:8).

The existence of pro-democracy groups, functioning in a democratic nature, is not in itself sufficient to create bottom-up change. Hawthorne notes that particular factors are required to enable pro-democracy groups to challenge regimes. These include: economic growth which could lessen organizations' financial dependence on regimes; charismatic leadership; access to the media; political liberalization of regimes; and the emergence of a liberal Islamic trend. A liberal Islamic trend could lead to coalitions across sectors. Currently, many states bolster Islamic groups as a counterweight to secular opposition groups, and *vice versa* (Hawthorne 2004:13-14).

The nature and efficacy of civil society in the Arab world exists along a spectrum, at one end of which is Oman, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE. A handful of civil society groups have emerged recently in Syria, though they have been repressed by the authorities. In general, these states prohibit the establishment of independent citizen organizations, allowing only state-run citizen organizations, *Diwaniyyas*, semiofficial Islamic charities, and quasi-official research institutes (Hawthorne 2004:8). Oil and gas wealth in the Gulf states noted above has removed the need for service NGOs and for foreign aid which has been a factor in their proliferation.

At the other end of the spectrum are Kuwait, Bahrain, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinian territories. Autonomy from states is curbed in a number of ways in the region. Labour union leaders are appointed by the state; think tanks receive funding from the state; and, more nefariously, Hawthorne notes, security services have created 'nongovernmental' organizations that duplicate the work of independent groups and evade detection of foreign donors who have difficulty telling the organizations apart (as noted above, with regard to Tunisia) (Hawthorne 2004:11; Pitner 2005:2). Most commonly, regimes have neutralized groups by threats of repression or the removal of funding and political protection (Hawthorne 2004:11).

As a result, the priorities of most unions, professional associations, and mutual aid societies focus on their members' interests rather than activism (Hawthorne 2004:12). Informal groups do resist state power in the Arab world (as noted above), but their informality makes them ineffective in garnering broad support. By contrast, service NGOs and community groups in South Africa, the Philippines and many Latin American countries were able to pursue the dual goals of development and democratic political change and mobilized the public to both ends (Hawthorne 2004:12). The following table presents an overview of the state of civil society in the region, drawing on Hawthorne's and other authors' analyses.

Table 1: Civil Society Trajectory

Oman, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the UAE - states prohibit the establishment of independent citizen organizations; civil society consists of *Diwaniyyas,* semiofficial Islamic charities, quasi-official research institutes (Nonetheless, Qatar has stood firm in hosting Al Jazeera satellite television channel, which has spawned other channels in the region, and official protests from its neighbours.)
Kuwait, Bahrain - a smattering of NGO Islamic societies, professional associations, clubs and pro-democracy groups (In Bahrain, Muntada Forum, a group of liberal intellectuals and businessmen, Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR), General Organization for Youth and Sports (GOYS), Al-Uruba Club have all been barred from public gatherings)
Tunisia - very large service NGOs and a few labour unions and professional associations; a few pro-democracy groups exist but suffer state harassment and have a precarious legal status; Islamic organizations are tied to the government (as a result of the government's attempts eradicate an Islamic opposition movement and other independent Islamic activity)
Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen - civil society activity across all five sectors, including active, independent, opposition, and government-connected Islamic organizations; professional associations, mutual aid societies and a small number of pro-democracy groups - The independence of NGOs is questionable though Egypt, Jordan, and Yemen are recipients of large amounts of foreign aid to large service-NGO sectors; Egypt and Yeman have many aid societies for migrant workers
Morocco, Lebanon, Palestinian Territories - many diverse and active civil society organizations. In Morocco this is due to a long history of political pluralism; war and occupation in Lebanon and Palestine contributed to political pluralism, expressed in associational life. - Civil society in the Palestinian territories is the largest and most sophisticated in the Arab world

Iraq, Iran and Turkey are not included in the above summary but are described below. Briefly, in Iraq, there are numerous religious and secular organizations forming, and 150 newspapers encouraging debate and galvanizing participation. Iraq's tradition of industrialization and secularism provided a context which favoured a powerful labour movement. The 1971 labour code was pro-union and conformed with ILO conventions. In 1979, the unions became a front for the government (many former GFTU leaders executed or imprisoned and many fled into exile). A new labour code in 1987 removed the right of public sector employees to form trade unions. After Saddam Hussein's regime fell, trade unionists in exile began to return; those imprisoned were freed, and others emerged from working underground. Moves are underway by union activists to rebuild the Iraqi trade union movement. In addition to the union confederations, there are large and active professional associations in Iraq and Kurdistan of teachers, journalists, doctors and lawyers.

Civil society in Kurdistan was marked, until 1991, by a complete lack of associational networks independent of the state. Any social, cultural, or political organization in Iraq that did not reflect the regime's ideology was forbidden. With the resettlement of Kurds in 1991, NGOs took the form of relief services such as health centres, schools, and food distribution. A lack of capacity or experience, though, meant that corruption and the diversion of funds were common; NGOs competed for donor funds and adopted donor agendas (Sheikhany 2000:n.p.). In 1996, many donors withdrew their support and many local NGOs disappeared. There is mutual suspicion surrounding NGO, donor, and wider community relations, although the role of NGOs has contributed to the limited grown of civil society amongst Kurds. Sheikhany calls for the international community to support the rebuilding of civil society along with reconciling conflicts between Kurdish political parties (Sheikhany 2000:n.p.).

Iran has a long history of a strong civil society. Recently, a 'new generation' of NGOs emerged that address women's issues, the environment, children, health and training (Sayyah 2003). Kazemi notes that "in spite of all regime attempts to control civil society and undermine institutions of reform, the final outcome is not necessarily determined" (Kazemi 2003:92). Women and youth are seen as the critical catalysts of any future pro-democracy movement. Youth are not organized in opposition to the regime, though women's groups proliferate. Indeed, the large middle class in Iran and women's increasing levels of education mean that women are set to play a potentially important role in civil society and reform movements into the future (Moghadam 2004:464).

Turkey is unique in the region in that its supreme court decisions give precedence to international conventions on human rights over Turkish law, which is itself being massively overhauled to meet EU eligibility criteria.

It is clear from the literature that the democratizing role of civil societies is vital and necessary. But, as noted above, various factors contribute to the limited efficacy of civil societies. While many studies focus on attributes of civil societies themselves, others point to conditions in the wider polity that are key to the efficacy of civil societies. The following section examines more closely some of the conceptual links made by analysts between civil societies, political parties, and democratization.

Links between civil society, political parties, and democratization:

Notably, the literature on civil societies assumes the existence of a state, and a state that is bound by law (Roy 1996:223). Civil society also "regards pluralism as a 'primary good,' extolling difference and diversity" (Roy 1996:223). It assumes a common set of values, and social behaviour guided by an ethical vision of social life, and the valuation and protection of individual rights (Roy 1996:223). The extent to which these conditions exist and are adhered varies considerably between states in the region. For one, as Sara Roy points out, the assumption of a state does not exist in the West Bank and Gaza, and the conditions that enable and constrain autonomous organizations differ markedly between the West Bank and Gaza (Roy 1996:228).

Increasingly, it is these wider conditions that are drawing the attention of analysts. For example, Albrecht and Schlumberger usefully examine the particularities of authoritarianism for insight into how autonomy of NGOs is rendered impossible (Albrecht and Schlemberger 2004). There is a great need, the authors argue, for in-depth case studies of the mechanisms, institutions, and relations that maintain authoritarian states (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). More broadly still, Carapaco highlights the confluence of international factors that contribute to both "the NGO phenomena" and its limited efficacy. Specifically, she notes, there is the correspondence between support for civil society and the privatization orthodoxy of macroeconomic and national reforms (such as those crafted by the IMF and implemented by Arab states) (Carapico 2000). The ways in which this correspondence affects, and potentially threatens, the efficacy of 'bottom-up' approaches of civil societies is pointed out as increasingly pertinent in the context of globalization of economies and political influences. (For example, policies that promote a decrease in public spending on education and health care, also promote the proliferation of civil society organizations, which are seen as being able to fill the resultant gap in social spending.)

Several critiques assert the need to examine the links between civil society and political institutions (see Goodson and Radwan 1997; Hawthorne 2004:14; and Abootalebi 1998), and political parties themselves as agents of democratization (see Doherty 2001 and Langohr 2004). Hawthorne calls for a shift in focus away from civil societies and toward the relationship of different parts of civil society to citizens and governments (Hawthorne 2004:14). And Ali Abootalebi contends that:

> The literature on democracy and democratization has paid scant attention to the state's crucial role vis-à-vis its society. The socioeconomic requisites for democracy are often emphasized, but the distribution of power resources among social groups, and the degree of concentration of power in the state relative to the society has been given less attention (Abootalebi 1998:n.p.).

Ivan Doherty, former general secretary of the Fine Gael Party in Ireland, and director of political party programs at the National Democratic Institute, argues greater attention needs to be paid political parties and parliaments themselves, which are the forums that must ultimately address the interests of those very civil society groups (Doherty 2001). Kassem also contends that the role of political parties in integrating and assimilating various social forces in society renders them important means by which political development and stability are achieved (Kassem 2004:49).

Doherty points out, also, that the reluctance of funders of international development programs to address the needs of political party organizations ultimately threatens "the democratic equilibrium" of societies in transition from authoritarian to democratic political systems. He states:

> Many private and public donors feel that it is more virtuous to be a member of a civic organization than a party and that participating in party activity must wait until there is a certain level of societal development. There is a grave danger in such an approach. Strengthening civic organizations, which represent the demand side of the political equation, without providing commensurate assistance to the political organizations that must aggregate the interests of those very groups, ultimately damages the democratic equilibrium (Doherty 2001:25).

Vickie Langohr's study is noteworthy in that she purports that both NGOs and political parties "should be seen as part of a larger topography of opposition" (Langohr 204:182). Langohr argues that for nongovernmental organizations to take on the role of primary opposition within Arab societies in fact decreases the chances for democratization. She explains thus:

> These organizations generally advocate the interests of a specific group or the importance of a particular principle, such as respect for human rights, making them ill-equipped to mobilize a much broader set of constituencies around the larger goal of regime change. Perhaps most important, as groups almost entirely dependent on foreign funding, they often have strong support abroad but shallow roots at home, allowing them to be more easily discredited by hostile governments than parties would be…it is time for scholarly and policy analysis of Arab democratization to focus less on nongovernmental organizations and more on the importance of developing viable political parties (Langohr 2004:182).

Notably, political parties and other mass organizations have not been a proven means of gaining control of governments in the region and in some cases regimes have not felt the need for political parties to maintain control. In other cases, mass political involvement is met by repression (Tachau 1994:xv). Nonetheless, political parties attempt to (or at least claim to, as noted below) represent the masses. And their proliferation in the region in recent years has contributed to a greater focus on them as agents of democratization. The following section draws on literatures on political parties in the Arab world, Iran, and Turkey for insight into trends and developments.

Political parties in the Middle East and North Africa:

Political parties are associated with democratic political systems and, generally speaking, "parties of whatever type, in whatever kind of system, regardless of the specific tactics they employ, strive to—or at least claim to—represent the masses" (Tachau 1994:xiii-xiv). In the politics of states in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf, the role of the masses as been poorly institutionalized. The populace has played only a peripheral role in the political systems of the region (Tachau 1994:xv). But, parties can and do function in environments that are not democratic. Not surprisingly, given the repressive and nonconsensual forms of political systems in the Middle East and North Africa, political parties take a variety of forms (Tachau 1994:xxvi).

Two trends can be identified, and these are that political parties have proliferated in the Middle East and North Africa in the last two decades. And support for nationalist parties has waned and been eclipsed by Islamist parties, which are now the region's most dynamic political parties (see Tachau 1994). The increasing support for Islamist parties has also coincided with a shift in opposition politics away from leftist parties and toward religious movements or organizations.

Political parties are seen to have four characteristics: continuity or longevity; operating locally but institutionally linked to national level; a drive to seek government power, either alone or in coalition; and the objective of popular support (LaPalombara and Weiner 1966; cited in Tachau 1994:xiii). Political parties in the Arab world do not always have these characteristics and their roles have been varied. (While a distinction is made between political parties and factions, Palestinian factions of the PLO function as political parties and are treated as such in the literature (Tachau 1994:xix).)

Political parties have been instrumental in mobilizing liberation movements and leading the struggle for independence (Turkey,s Republican People's Party, Algeria's National Liberation Front, the *Wafd* in Egypt, the *Dustur* and *Neo-Dustur* in Tunisia, and the *Istiqlal* in Morocco) (Tachau 1994:xvi). Many regimes are dominated by secular nationalist parties such as Syria, Libya, Egypt and, until recently, Iraq). Lebanese parties are most often identified with religo-ethnic groups, and those which appear to be secular in ideology often have a membership base that is clearly sectarian (Tachau 1994:298).

Kuwaiti parties are sometimes characterized as 'proto-parties' as they are severely constrained. The newest parties to gain popular followings are, as mentioned above, those carrying the banner of resurgent Islam (Tachau 1994:xvi). The Muslim Brotherhood and smaller Islamic groups in Egypt and Jordan are constrained in the ways they can participate in the political process. Although the 1989 Jordanian elections resulted in sizable gains in the national parliament by Muslim Brotherhood candidates (Tachau 1994:xvii-xviii). Communist parties have also played significant roles in the region, though they have weakened with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

The roles of political parties in the Middle East and North Africa are shaped by certain particularities of the region. These include the fragility of states, and a lack of consensus regarding the identity of states (whether it should be pan-Arab, Islamist, or secular, for example). Pan-Arabism, now in decline, produced chapters of pan-Arab parties in various states. And Islamist parties and movements straddle national boundaries (such as the Muslim Brotherhood with chapters in Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Palestine) (Tachau 1994:xvii-xviii). Another characteristic of the region that shapes the form and role of political parties is the strong loyalty to ethnic, tribal, clan, sectarian, and *zu'ama'* (leader). In the context of the long-standing authority structure of patrimonialism, along with pre-existing patron-client relationships, the political party can reinforce traditional relationships. As Tachau notes,

> The party thus becomes a new political instrument of traditional local notables; or, alternatively, the party serves to rechannel a set of traditional relationships. This phenomenon is particularly evident in Lebanon and in the more traditional regions of Turkey, as well as throughout the Arab world and in Iran (Tachau 1994:xx).

In attempting to understand the relative popularity and efficacy of parties and movements, it is useful to examine how well parties function as conduits between the government and masses. In this regard, Ellen M. Lust-Okar's research on Jordanian political parties helpfully distinguishes between the strength of parties themselves and the strength of the political-party system. While the first component, party strength, refers to the ability of parties to legislate and implement policies, the second component, the strength of the political-party system determines whether political parties can be active partners in policy-making. The strength of the political-party system, then, is critical in determining how well parties can function as conduits between the government and the masses (Lust-Okar:2001:545).

Both strong parties and strong political-party systems are necessary for the prospects of democratization (Lust-Okar 2001:547). Lust-Okar notes that,

> Ideally, political parties play an important role in governance by transmitting public preferences to the government. When they successfully join government, political-party elites are also important participants in the formulation of policies. Finally, parties play an important role in expressing and promoting government policies to the people. In short, effective political parties enhance the communication between the masses and the government, and they should play an active role in shaping government policies (Lust-Okar 2001:546).

Jordanian parties in the 1950s and 1990s failed to play this role. Martial law was imposed in the interim and political parties were banned. About 90 parties applied to register for official status in 1991 (Tachau 1994:267). Links between the parties and the masses were weak both in the 1950s and the 1990s. Moreover, "political liberalization in Jordan was a defensive move, intended to shore up the monarchy, it was not a reaction to the pressures of already well-mobilized political parties" (Lust-Okar 2001:546). Jordanian parties, though apparently in decline, have not experienced a significant change in terms of their effectiveness in acting as a conduit between the public and the palace (Lust-Okar:2001:546).

Morocco provides another noteworthy 'case' in examining the efficacy of political parties. Despite dozens of parties active in its parliament since 1977, they could not turn their political strength into real power. The monarchy remains central and the political system "malleable" (Tachau 1994:394). This was illustrated by the 1993 elections, which resulted in significant gains by opposition parties. The king invited the parties into government but stipulated that the major positions of prime minister, minister of the interior, and minister of foreign affairs would not be open to them. The parties chose to boycott the government entirely, leaving their ability to mobilize in question (Tachau 1994:396-97). Tachau notes that,

> So long as Morocco continues to have a king as its actual head of state, he will undoubtedly continue the long-standing strategy of using parties as legitimizing mechanisms with limited autonomy and mobilizational capacity (Tachau 1994:394).

Marginalization of political parties and restrictions on their real powers means they often function underground and in opposition to the government. For example, from the 1970s to 90s, opposition parties worked underground with the goal of overthrowing the Qadhafi regime. Tachau notes that there is also a history of factionalism and fragility of political community in the region which has spawned deep-rooted distrust of political parties as they are seen as a threat to national solidarity and integrity (Tachau 1994:xxiii). The public appeal

of secular parties is weak, and they are perceived to be corrupt and/or co-opted by the government. Mass mobilization and protests are often unconnected to political party strength and organization. Other factors have brought people to the streets (with regard to Jordan see Lust-Okar 2001:553-54).

Like civil societies, political parties require an amenable context in order to place their representatives in government. This context is a competitive multiparty system (Kassem 2004:49). But, in the region, the opening up of political systems toward creating multipartyism has been at times a means by the regime to stave off crises or *luttes de clans*, such as was the case in Algeria in 1989 (Tachau 1994:20). Another factor that enables opposition parties to gain enough seats to participate in government is proportional representation, "a long-term demand of most Arab oppositions that is almost never granted" (Langohr 2004:189-190).

Restrictions and constraints abound on the formation of parties. As a result, some political parties have formed NGOs and put their concerns forward through civil society activism. In other instances, parties have formed NGOs (see Langohr 2004:191-192, with regard to the Palestinian context). Goodson and Radwan note that opposition parties are often weak, poorly organized and internally authoritarian (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7). Their popular base is often severely restricted. Exceptions include regional parties, for example Iran's Kurdish and Azerbijani parties, which do represent their constituencies' concerns. Regional parties (such as the Kurdish and Azerbaijan in Iran, and the Berber party in Algeria) are also more connected to their constituencies than are ruling and secular opposition parties (Tachau 1994:140).

Opposition parties in Morocco, Yemen and Algeria won over 30 percent of parliamentary seats in the 1990s (Langohr 2004:188). Opposition parties in Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestine are weaker and win fewer seats in parliament. In terms of how to account for why opposition parties manage to win significant numbers of seats in some regimes and not in others, Langohr suggests that different types of authoritarian regimes allow for different types of oppositional participation. Liberalizing monarchies such as Morocco and Jordan derive their legitimacy from the perception they are above politics. They thus allow large numbers of smaller parties that they can manage (Langohr 2004:189).

Considerable representation of opposition parties in Algeria was the result, notes Langohr, of the adoption of proportional representation; and Algeria remains the only presidential system where there is significant representation by opposition parties (Langohr 2004:190). In each of these countries, though, opposition parties have little legislative influence. Electoral fraud, outright repression of candidates, and limited access to the media and the public are contributing factors to weak opposition parties (Langohr 2004:188).

Three other factors play in important role in the weakness of opposition parties in the region, according to Langohr, and these are incomplete parliamentarization, the prevalence of independent candidacy among nonruling party candidates, and financial fragility (Langohr 2004:189). Incomplete parliamentarization refers to deviations from parliamentary procedure or obstruction of elected representatives in parliament. These practices, Langohr notes, undermine the influence of opposition parties.

Most opposition seats are won by independents or by Islamist parties, while secular opposition parties generally win very few seats in parliaments in the region. The prevalence of independent candidates means that party programs and alternative programs to the ruling parties are not developed (Langohr 2004:189). Independent candidacy, Langohr notes, is both a cause and effect of weak opposition parties. In some instances, candidates are committed to opposing the regime but are not inspired by existing opposition parties. Because of the difficulty in attaining party registration, they run as independents. In other instances, independents are simply influential or popular individuals who are interested in gaining a parliamentary seat but not interested in contributing to an alternative political program (Langohr 2004:191). In the latter instance, candidates are often then co-opted into the ruling party (see Kasem 2004, with regard to Egypt).

Financial fragility of parties stems largely from the disconnection of parties from upper class interests and contrasts with the relative abundance of funding available to nongovernmental organizations (Langohr 2004:191).

Restrictions faced by opposition parties serves to render them ineffective, which has contributed to widespread disaffection and voter apathy. While Islamic movements face the most restrictions in terms of their participation in government, they are also the most responsive to the concerns of the population (in Egypt their response to the 1992 earthquake in Cairo made this eminently apparent to the public and government alike). As a result, Islamist movements or parties have more appeal and are considered to have more integrity. Islamist movements and parties also benefit from being more connected to the everyday concerns of their constituents. Some, such as Hizbullah and al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah in Lebanon, have been able to perform well in municipal elections after having built up strong constituencies through social welfare services (Hamzeh 2000:751). (This and other factors in their popular appeal are examined in more detail in the section below on Islamic movements and democratization.)

Interestingly, Tachau notes that leftist parties have faced harsher measures from socialist secular ruling parties than from Islamist ones, which would seem to be their more obvious opponent (Tachau 1994:xviii-xix). Also, as mentioned above, alliances are forged pro-democracy groups and parties and repressive regimes. These "dangerous alliances," which are meant to stave off demands of Islamist groups, stall processes of political liberalization in the region (Hawthorne 2004:13; see also Garon 2003).

Political participation in Gulf states:

Gulf countries that have had parliamentary elections include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman. Only in Bahrain has there been parliamentary elections with universal suffrage (with the exception of the Bedouin who remain stateless). In Kuwait, only men vote in parliamentary elections and the electorate makes up only 17 percent of the population (Valenti 2003:1). In Qatar, there have only been municipal elections, with men and women voting in these. In Oman, parliamentary elections have been held with eligible male and female voters making up only 3 percent of the population (Valenti 2003:1). Despite some limited movement in terms of electoral politics, the regimes of the Gulf have been "unabashedly autocratic," in Nathan Brown's terms and, "with the exception of short

periods in Bahrain and longer periods in Kuwait, liberal democratic institutions and practices have generally not even existed on a nominal level" (Brown 1997:129).

With the exception of Yemen, political parties are banned in the region, although they function informally in Kuwait. Full parliamentary democracy in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain is not expected in the near future (Herb 2002:47). In fact, the limited democratization of governments in the Gulf, in the form of popular elections, has produced illiberal policies. Ruling families are generally more liberal than Islamists who stand to gain in electoral politics (Herb 2002:42). Abdullah Juma Alhaj's piece on the Omani political elite provides an analysis of the challenges faced by Gulf states in general and the Omani political elite in particular. Specifically, the pace change, if too fast, can give rise to counter-modernization movements (Alhaj 2000:97-110). On the other hand, real democratic reform is also a demand of Islamist movements. For example, the largest Shiite group sat out the Bahraini 2002 parliamentary elections, calling them a sham as the new parliament would have no power to legislate without the consent of the king (Sengupta 2002:n.p.).

Herb suggests that Parliamentary life "does seem to promote some degree of moderation among Islamists" (Herb 2002:42). Parliamentary elections in the Gulf indicate that Islamists have a stake in defending the rights of association and the liberal freedoms of parliamentary life. The ruling families in the Gulf are very deeply ensconced, though, leaving little room for the exercise of real power by popularly elected representatives and little possibility, also, that parliamentary reform will lead to real legislative powers for elected bodies (Herb 2002:47).

Islamic movements and democratization:

Islamic groups are the largest and most active and widespread sector of associative life in the Arab world (Hawthorne 2004:6). But, their importance as civil society organizations and movements is not always understood. The growth of Islamic organizations and movements in the Middle East and North Africa can partly be understood in the context of failed modernization programs. When the land reform and industrialization of modernization programs failed, one of the un-planned results was urbanization. Poor farmers and agricultural workers migrated to cities and became marginalized urban poor. Their concerns were taken up not by the new civil society groups but by religious groups (Kamali 2001:471).

Besides the lack of balanced socioeconomic development in the region, the rise of Islamic revivalist movements in the Middle East is also tied to other crises that beset the region, such as the Arab defeats by Israel and the "disorienting psychocultural impact" of Westernization (Hamzeh 1993). The victory of the Muslim cause in Iran gave further impetus to Islamic movements in the region (Hamzeh 1993). Abootalebi notes that,

> The popularity of Islam in the 1980s is largely a reflection of the bankruptcy of other alternatives posed to resolve social ills than some inevitable preference for authoritarianism or anti-democratic society. It is economic crisis, coupled with a crisis of legitimacy in most Muslim states, that has encouraged and strengthened religious opposition (Aboutalebi 1998:n.p.).

In this context, Islamic movements have replaced nationalist parties in the Arab world as the most dynamic political groups. But, like secular parties, they are usually restricted through legislation and political institutions from exercising real political power. Authors note that

these restrictions which have precluded effective public participation, together with the brutal repression of political protests and the, contributed to both public apathy and the growth of Muslim extremism in the region. In Ghalioun's words,

> the system was locked down so tightly that the forces of contestation had no choice other than letting themselves be crushed or becoming insurgents against the order that was oppressing them. If the vast bulk of the population has resigned itself to staying out of politics, other parties—a minority to be sure—have not hesitated to take up arms in order to topple the established order in the name of a more just order (Ghalioun 2002:130).

Ghalioun and others discount the argument that Arab 'culture' explains the upsurge of violence on the part of Islamic insurgents. Rather, the failure of Arab democratization movements in the 1980s, "gave birth to the Islamist fundamentalist tidal wave" and the defeats of those movements led to armed extremist Islamism (Ghalioun 2002:120).

Islamist groups have made inroads into several Arab governments. Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Yemen, and Kuwait have had Islamist groups as leading opposition parties (Hamzeh 2000:740). Tachau notes that although Islamist parties had not gained more than 15 percent of electoral votes in these countries (by the mid-1990s), their "very presence on the spectrum of political parties has undoubtedly served to pull other formally secular parties somewhat in their direction" (Tachau 1994:xxi). In Palestine, Hamas "seems to" have accepted the trade-off of arms for parliamentary seats, and has fully participated in the debate on a revised election law prior to the presidential election of this year (Shikaki 2004:59-61).

The resurgence of Islamist movements in the 1980s was more marked in countries in which the regime failed to develop a mass base, the police became prominent in controlling the citizenry, and the masses did not benefit from economic prosperity (Richards and Waterbury 1990:432-33; cited in Rachau 1994:xxi). The popularity of Islamist movements and parties in the region is attributed less to "an upsurge of piety" than to "intense dissatisfaction with the perceived flaws and failures of existing regimes" (Tachau 1994:xxi). Islamist parties and movements are widely supported because they are viewed as effective vehicles for expressing frustration and despair. Islam, also, is the only major political doctrine that is indigenous and cannot be labeled as 'foreign' and can, thus, more persuasively claim 'authenticity' in the search for political identity (Tachau 1994:xxi).

In Jordan, a shift in popular support for Islamist movements occurred in the mid-1980s, at a time when political parties were banned (Tachau 1994:266-67). In Lebanon, the conditions that influence the political participation of Islamist movements is examined by Nizar Hamzeh in several studies (Hamzeh 2001; Hamzeh 2000; Hamzeh 1994; Hamzeh 1993; Hamzeh and Dekmejian 1996). One of his conclusions is that Islamist groups that provide social welfare services to their communities are more likely to become involved in local politics than those who do not provide such services. Secondly, a federal system in which municipalities enjoy autonomy is more favourable to Islamist groups than one in which municipalities are controlled by the central government. The third point, which is echoed in the work of May Kassem with regard to the Egyptian context, is that the more intense the political, social and economic crises, and the more repressive the actions of the government against Islamists, the greater the likelihood that Islamists are to resort to violence (Hamzeh

2000:741; Kassem 2004). Kassem suggests, further, that the less critical the political, social and economic crises, and the more that Islamists are coopted by the regime, the less likely Islamist groups are to resort to violent means (Kassem 2004).

Similarly, Lisa Anderson notes that "The absence of a reliable, transparent institutional framework for political opposition to work within not only hampers the routinization of opposition of all kinds but magnifies the profile and broadens the constituency of 'rejectionist' or 'disloyal' parties" (Anderson 1997:19). Again with regard to Egypt, Kassem asserts that the 'rejectionist' approach of the political system and the repressive tactics of suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Jama' al-Islamiya, and other Islamist groups, is "largely responsible for the prevailing Islamist challenge that contemporary Egypt faces" (Kassem 2004:133).

With regard to the social appeal of Islamist groups, Mark Tessler and Jolene Jesse examine gender differences in the support for Islamist movements in Egypt, Kuwait, and Palestine. They note that "support for Islamist organizations does not necessarily come from those who hold conservative views about the status of women" (Tessler and Jesse 1996:215). Further, Kuwaiti women's support for Islamist movements stems from an "anti-establishment Islamist orientation" that is similar to Egyptian men's support for Islamist movements and contrasts with Kuwaiti men's religious-based support (Tessler and Jesse 1996:215). This sociological perspective might reinforce the view, as stated by Carapico, that:

> For civilians to generate a civilizing influence does not imply their unanimous a priori endorsement of liberal Enlightenment ideals; rather, civic potential lies in the very breadth and diversity of models and ideologies alive in the body politic (Carapico 1995:243).

Carapico, of course, touches on a widespread debate in the literature on whether Islam and democracy are compatible. According to one school of thought,

> Islamist groups cannot become loyal opposition parties because those who are in actual control are not individuals who believe in political rules, but are people who believe in religious principles that ban the exercise of democracy (Hamzeh 2000:740).[5]

The other school of thought maintains that a distinction should be made between Islamic extremists and moderates or pragmatists—the latter being social and political movements that will presumably be forced to rethink their ideology when dealing with the practicalities of politics like competing for votes (Hamzeh 2000:740-41).[6] While there may be elements of truth in both schools of thinking, the political context and institutions through which Islamists participate in the political process is all important.

Some authors underline the importance of constitutionalism—the establishment of sovereignty of the people and the subservience of government and leaders to the constitution—in the effort to ensure that opening up the political system does not lead to

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[5] This school includes the writings of Daniel Pipes, Bernard Lewis, Martin Kramer, and Oliver Roy.

[6] This school of thought is reflected in the writings of John Esposito, Mumtaz Ahmad, and Lisa Anderson. See Esposito (2001) for an overview of debates on the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

Islamists use of electoral politics to gain power in order to undermine the system itself (Ehtashami 2004; Zakaria 2003; UNDP 2004; Brown 2002). Constitutionalism is seen as ensuring accountable government, formed through elections, respect for and adherence to principles of human rights, mechanisms to ensure the implementation of the constitution, an independent judiciary, and an absence of extra-constitutional government (Ehtashami 2004:97, 108 n.22; Zakaria 2003:38). Indeed, the *Arab Human Development Report 2004* asserts that:

> the best insurance against this risk [of the use of electoral politics to undermine pluralism] is to strengthen constitutional principles and clauses to safeguard society from abuses of majority power, and to secure at the outset the commitment of all political movements to respect those measures (UNDP 2004:71).

Ehtashami reminds us that most Muslim states have adopted western-style constitutions and secular attitudes towards institutional structures, with Turkey going the furthest, having declared itself a secular republic in its constitution (Ehtashami 2004:98). Indeed, the constitutional framework governing most Muslim states is "inspired and wedded to European constitutional law" (Ehtashami 2004:98). Religious courts preside mostly over personal status matters for which Islamic Sharia law is applied. Sharia law is also used as a means of underpinning the cultural identity of such states (Ehtashami 2004:98).

On the other hand, As'ad AbuKhalil importantly points out that constitutions in the Arab world "are only adhered to insofar as they provide political rationalizations and justifications for actions and polities of the government" (AbuKhalil 2002:843). Regimes, he argues, adopt constitutions as a façade of accountability. Further, as mentioned above, under states of emergency, constitutions are suspended. The state of war with Israel has been used as a rationale by Arab regimes to suspend constitutional and parliamentary life in the name of the battle for Palestine (AbuKhalil 2002:843). And Nathan Brown acknowledges that judicial institutions "operate as only a very weak check (and sometimes as a great facilitator) of executive authority" in Egypt at different times and in Kuwait, for example (Brown 1997:179).

Thus, the debate continues with regard to whether institutions and processes that can ensure accountable government in fact produce these results in the Arab world or whether they indeed serve to bolster authoritarianism. The tentative steps toward parliamentary governments in the Gulf have brought this contradiction to the fore. For example, the Kuwaiti parliament is dominated by Islamist groups that are less liberal than the ruling monarchs (Herb 2002). Arguably, parliamentary systems serve to moderate Islamist groups since their electoral success depends on the protection of a wider set of freedoms (of speech and association, for example) (Herb 2002).

As mentioned above, Islamist parties in the region are more successful than their secular counterparts. Jenny While's ethnography of Islamist mobilization in Turkey shows how Islamist parties (like Islamic NGOs in the region) are successful because they engage in "vernacular politics" which she defines as "value-centered political process rooted in local culture, interpersonal relations, and community networks" (White 2002:27). White argues that Islamist parties transform politics into something that is integral to local values and cultural idioms of everyday life.

Islamic NGOs:

While Islamist groups seek to participate in political processes, Islamic NGOs, sometimes referred to as 'social Islam' or Islamic social institutions (ISIs), do not engage in formal politics or political lobbying, but are devoted to development issues and cultural awareness (Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2003:2). As Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji Farouki rightly point out, the sphere of politics is much broader than the state and parliamentary and party politics, and includes symbolic struggles over the rules that guide people's social lives (Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2000:3). It is these struggles that powerfully link Islamic NGOs to the wider political sphere and to wider questions of the form and processes of democratization.

Islamic NGOs are usually locally organized, though form part of a network of institutions and groups that provide a variety of services in the following areas: relief and charity work; preschool, primary, and elementary education; education and rehabilitation of physically and mentally disabled children and adults; income-generating projects; literacy training; the care of orphans and the elderly; youth and sports activities; health care; loans; and even match-making services. Like other NGOs, Islamic NGOs are restricted by strict legal codes governing their work and prohibiting their operation in the political arena.

The charitable work of Islamic NGOs in Jordan is nonetheless inherently political when one defines the political beyond institutions, actors and actions that directly engage the state or public policy. Islamic NGOs in Jordan use seemingly apolitical networks and social networks as vehicles of political participation toward determining the distribution of goods and services (Wiktorowicz and Farouki 2000). From their study of the al-Afaf Charitable Society in Jordan, Wicktorowitcz and Farouki point out that Islamic NGO programs such as the provision of interest-free loans, matchmaking services, and seminars and publications do not seem political on the surface, but are part of a broader cultural struggle over values that is itself inherently political (Wicktorowitcz and Farouki 2000:10).

Janine Clark's research on ISIs in Egypt, Yemen and Jordan also provides insight into the nature of the social networks in which these institutions are embedded. Her research, she asserts, "has important theoretical and empirical significance for understanding the types of participants in social movements, how people participate, and the extensiveness of that participation" (Clark 2004:942). Clark refutes the general assumption that Islamic organizations foster strong ties with the poor through their patron-client networks. In fact, she argues, the organizations strengthen and expand middle-class networks. The poor are not integrated into the moderate Islamic institutions, which leads Clark to ask the important question of whether they are vulnerable to recruitment by other more radical Islamist organizations and movements (Clark 2004:966).

But, unlike the adoption of a pro-democracy agenda by Christian churches in Latin America, Eastern Europe and South Korea (which were instrumental in civil societies' ability to push for democracy), Islamic organizations in the Arab world have been ambivalent toward democracy. There are Islamic NGOs and Islamists that try to demonstrate links between Islam and democracy but these groups and individuals lack popular following (Hawthorne

2004:12). Some Islamic NGOs emphasize themes of justice, participation, and reform but hold negative positions with regard to the rotation of power, and women's and minority rights. Others focus on transforming society through social and spiritual change (Hawthorne 2004:13).

In Gaza, a shift from ideological to pragmatic approaches is identified on the part of Islamic NGOs. Roy states that "there is now a clear pattern of professionalization among Islamic NGOs. With the shift in emphasis to the social sector, the Islamic movement appears to be moving toward a more pragmatic and non-confrontational philosophy" (Roy 2000:n.p.). Although the context of each country is unique, Roy identifies some patterns in Islamic NGO organizing that are useful indicators to watch for in other contexts in the region. She notes, for example, that Islamic institutions in Gaza do not typically work with non-Islamic institutions (though there are exceptions). Further, like secular NGOs, Islamic NGOs are very competitive and territorial and have very little interest in collaborating with other Islamic or non-Islamic NGOs. Notably, Islamic institutions in Gaza do not work within a comprehensive social program or 'master plan' at the macro level. This reflects, Roy notes, a lack of long-range thinking or planning in terms of program planning. Further, conflict between Islamic and non-Islamic institutions reflects competition for limited economic resources, rather than ideological differences in approach (Roy 2000:n.p.).

In Gaza, the goal of Islamic NGOs "is not the creation of an Islamic society so much as the building of a society that is more Islamic, a society imbued with Islamic values as a form of protection against all forms of aggression, and as the basis for growth and progress" (Roy 2000:n.p.). The "discourse of empowerment" is particularly significant for contexts such as Gaza and Iraq. Ehteshami notes that the particular challenges of transitions processes makes "the organized uncertainty of democracy" much less appealing to a weary electorate than the certainty that is provided by familiar religious-based messages about the purity of religious leadership and divine law (Ehteshami 2004:106). Amitai Etzioni cautions that, "the social disorder that prevails in these countries is so severe that many citizens yearn for the forceful order that existed during the days of tyranny–misbegotten longings that illustrate the threat of social anarchy and the difficulty of attending to it (Etzioni 2004:n.p.).

What role for youth?

Considering the demographics of the Middle East, North Africa, and the Gulf, there is surprisingly little analysis of the role of youth in political change in the region. About two-thirds of the population of the Middle East (and presumably it is similar in North Africa and the Gulf) are under the age of 25 (Stratton 2005:22). This segment of the population is more educated than it has been at any other time in history. The MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region experienced the highest rate of expansion in educational attainment in the world between 1980 and 2000 (Stratton 2005:23).

At the same time, there are clear links between levels of conflict in a country, and high levels of unemployment among youth. As Stratton points out, when unemployment is high among youth, which is the case in most MENA countries, there is the potential for strife. In Iraq, unemployment among young Sunnis is as high as 80 percent. This includes many of the 400,000 former Iraqi soldiers, almost all under 30, who are being overlooked by American

contractors who prefer to hire workers from Bangladesh and India (Stratton 2005:22-23). Youth have historically played a central role in political movements and transition periods. In Gaza in particular, their participation has resulted in high levels of trauma (Roy 1996:251).

Youth represent a segment of society that cuts across all classes and that can, hence, play a vital and constructive role in the transition period that Arab states are in. It will be important to watch for and support civil society organizations that focus on youth or that are run by youth and political parties that are able to incorporate the concerns and participation of young people.

Threads in the literature:

One 'thread' running through much of the literature on civil society is the assertion that democratization requires a vibrant civil society, the rule of law, and the protection of human rights. Further, vibrant civil societies can exist separate from authoritarian realms of control, but in such contexts (for example, in Iran), they do not contribute to democratization. Vibrant and responsive civil societies are particularly vital for transitions to democracy in the Arab world, Iran and Turkey (a point that is underlined in the UNDP's *Arab Human Development Report 2004*, p. 63).

Electoral politics are insufficient to ensure governments do not use laws to reinforce their authoritarian proclivities. The right to freedom of association is linked to the freedom of expression and opinion, freedom of peaceful assembly, freedom of movement, and also freedom from human rights violations. Writers point out that the right to freedom of association needs to be developed in terms of its legal specificities to provide better protection to nongovernmental organizations, and that Arab regimes need to abide by international standards for transparency, self-governance, and human rights norms.

Civil societies in the Arab world have not been able to reverse regimes' authoritarianism or affect the wider balance of power (Hawthorn 2004:10). Arab regimes attempt to discredit or co-opt NGOs with increasing sophistication (Hawthorne 2004:10). Many of the several thousand registered NGOs in Egypt are actually 'GO-NGOs' (government organized NGOs) or 'DO-NGOs' (donor-organized NGOs) (Carapico 2000). At the same time, authors note that the important characteristic of autonomy is not a straightforward aspect to measure (Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004:383). A serious shortcoming of studies on civil society is the lack of empirical studies that systematically measure and establish any correlation between democracy and civil society (Abootalebi 1998:n.p.).

Along with NGOs, political parties are also vital agents of democratization. Moreover, the focus on and large amount of funding provided to NGOs by donors as compared to that provided to political parties, may actually undermine democratization processes. Civil society organizations favoured by donors (in particular, human rights organizations) do not have deep roots in their societies and are vulnerable to increased government restrictions and repression. On the other hand, political parties have the potential to mobilize larger segments of the population and create programs and support for political alternatives.

Islamist parties in the region are more successful than their secular counterparts and, along with Islamic NGOs, are able to 'tap into' individuals' daily cultural and spiritual realities more so than their secular counterparts. Bridges are needed between secular and Islamist parties and movements. A clear gap in the literature involves the role of youth, either in civil societies or in the increasing marginalization of some sectors of society.

III. Recommendations

Linking civil society and democratization to wider and underlying problems:

- Much research on civil societies has focused on NGOs (and on human rights NGOs in particular) and on their capacities for change. More research is needed on more sporadic activism (including riots) and on sectors of society that are the most marginalized (the poor, squatters, etc.). While these groups often do not have the capacity to organize and effect social or political change, they have been a link between civil society demands and states.

- Empirical studies are needed to more systematically examine the correlation between democracy and civil society. Such studies could focus on, for example, the distribution of power resources within states (see the framework argued for by Abootalebi, 1998) or the particularities of authoritarianism which make it so resistant to popular contestation (see Ghalioun 2004, and Albrecht and Schlumberger 2004). Additionally, research is needed on the ways in which 'bottom-up' processes of civil society are hindered by privatization of social services advocated by macroeconomic policies.

Building dialogue:

Donors need to continue playing a monitoring role, and strengthen their ability to build dialogue and partnerships with both government and nongovernment actors over the long term.

- There is a need to support research that examines links between secular and Islamist groups.

- Research and programs are needed that address social, economic, and political rifts between different segments of the society.

Fostering legal protection:

- Research and exchange of expertise on drafting legislation may be helpful. Laws need to be developed that, for example, limit restrictions on local organizations' access to foreign funds.

- Visits or training of Arab legislators provided in countries that have active and autonomous civil societies may be fruitful to provide them with a more exploratory and comprehensive sense of the workings of government-society relations.

Political parties and political party-systems:

Fostering links between civil society and political structures needs to focus on political parties as conduits of popular concerns and demands. The following recommendations reflect the need for more research into the particular institutional context in which political parties operate in individual countries. These recommendations also reflect the need to work within and across several realms—political parties themselves, political institutions, and the links between parties and civil society. It is important to investigate, for example, areas of political openings within individual countries for such things as legislative advice and training to government. Specifically,

- Research would be useful on the kinds of legislative changes needed in individual countries to ensure the autonomy and effectiveness of political parties. How can legislative support be provided to governments?

- What are the organizational needs of political parties and how can these be addressed through regional or international exchanges of training and expertise?

- Links between civil society and political structures, including political parties, need to be more closely examined:
  - How well are party politics serving the interests of civil society?
  - What room is there to foster links?
  - How can parties be supported in their attempts to create alternative political programs?

Islamist movements:

- More research is needed on the links between Islamist movements and various sectors of society in different countries. For example, what are the trends with regard to youth participation in Islamic NGOs and movements? What are the patterns of participation of the poor? Is there a link between individuals' participation in Islamist NGOs and their participation in wider politics?

- There is useful research on Islamist movements in Lebanon and their involvement in municipal politics. This kind of research would be useful in different contexts toward understanding and the role of municipal politics in generating wider political participation of the population as a whole.

- More research is needed on the specificity of Islamist movements in different contexts. For example, what determines whether they constitute a force of order and moderation rather than extremisms as is often the perception? Studies such as Tessler and Jesse (1996) might be followed up in different contexts to understand their very different bases of support.

Youth:

- Research is needed on civil society organizations that focus on youth.

- Research is also needed with regard to the attempts of political parties to incorporate the concerns and participation of young people in the region.

- Research and analysis on youth-run organizations or programs and on sectors where they can be fostered is particularly important, given the participatory benefits that these organizations create. The benefits of youth-run programs for psychologically traumatized youths would be useful to examine (particularly with regard to youth in Gaza).

- There is also a need for research into whether urban and rural poor youth are being recruited into more radical Islamist groups (given that Islamic NGOs and societies enhance networks of the middle class and are not as strong as previously perceived in terms of engaging poor sectors of societies).

APPENDIX A:
Middle East regional and international organizations working on issues of freedom of association, drawn from the literature reviewed

Bahrain

NGOs	Source	Projects	General Info
Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR)	Kéchichian 2004		Lead by Abdul-Hadi al-Khawajah, a prominent Shia representative who returned from exile in 2001; barred, along with the GOYS, Al-Uruba Club administrators and other intellectuals, from public gatherings after challenging Manama to accept dialogue
Geneal Organization for youth and Sports (GOYS)	Kéchichian 2004		
Al-Uruba Club	Kéchichian 2004		

Egypt

NGOs	Source	Projects	General Info
Almishkat Centre for Research, Egypt	www.almishkat.org		Director: Nader Fergany; an independent, non-commercial institution devoted to advancing knowledge on contemporary Egypt, and Arab countries, through research in the social sciences, with emphasis on human development. Fields of research emphasis include: knowledge acquisition (education/learning and research/development), employment, governance and welfare (poverty).

Iraq

Organization	Source	Projects	General Info
The Research Triangle Institute	http://www.rti.org/page.cfm?nav=356&objectid=91AD4ED9-F623-4C93-8CCF98BA9F7C82F5	Local Governance Project	**Purpose**: Strengthen the management skills and capacity of civic institutions and local administrations to improve the delivery of essential municipal services such as water, health care, public sanitation, and economic governance. Includes training in communications, conflict resolution, leadership skills, and political analysis. -began work in Iraq in April 2003 under a contract with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). RTI implements USAID's Local Governance Project (LGP), which aims to improve the quality of governance and public services in towns, cities, and regions and to help Iraqi citizens make concrete improvements in the neighborhoods where they live.
International Republican Institute (IRI)	http://www.iri.org/countries.asp?id=7539148391	Since the summer of 2003, partnered with other non-governmental organizations to improve civic and political rights of ordinary Iraqis. Activities include political party training seminars, youth-oriented conferences, public opinion research—with the aim of engaging all aspects of civic society as a collective whole.	

		Iraqi Foundation for Development and Democracy (IFDD)	Headed by Ghassan Atiyyah, Iraqi dissident and publisher of the oppositionist periodical The Iraqi File. IFDD is a regionally based NGO supporting democracy and development in Iraq by fostering dialogue between decision-makers and citizens on social, economic, and political issues. A primary goal is to bring together people of diverse ethnic, religious, political and tribal backgrounds to build consensus on finding solutions to the issues most important to the Iraqi people and for assisting in the promotion of freedom and democracy. Has convened several conferences, featuring: -Brad Smith, Chief of Staff to Congressman David Drier, on the operational concepts and procedures of national caucus systems. Participants included academics, journalists, attorneys, and politicians. -Larry Diamond of the Hoover Institute, addressing the TAL in relation to civil and political movements. Also convened the Supreme Council of Iraqi Tribes, 500 of the most influential sheikhs in Iraq. They report that: "These leaders, whose tribes cross ethnic and sectarian lines, agreed unanimously to uphold the concepts of democracy and national unity and offered their support to the technocrat-staffed Transitional Government. Dr. Atiyyah is currently in consultations with the Emir of Bahrain regarding the funding and organization of an Iraqi National Reconciliation Conference which would provide a larger forum for debate, thereby facilitating the relationship-building necessary for a unified Iraq."
National Democratic Institute			Engaged with Iraqi democrats since 1999; established an in-country presence in June 2003 -programs in Iraq focus on civil society development, political party strengthening, assistance with the formation of a democratic legislature and executive branch of government, supporting women's political participation and helping ensure an open and fair electoral process. Civil society work: -assists civil society groups in developing basic organizational structures and strategic plans for becoming actively involved in the political process including monitoring elections and the drafting of the constitution. -helps partner organizations develop a collective voice so that they can play an

			intermediary role between citizens and public officials. -NDI's political party program has goal of building coalitions and strengthening political parties that represent a democratic middle. Since January 2004, has provided training to more than 90 parties from around the country on issues including party organization, leadership, voter outreach, communication, fundraising and budgeting. Other political party training includes campaign academies and workshops providing hands-on training specifically on message development and dissemination. -governance program aims to strengthen legislative and executive branches; support constitutional development. Organizing training on parliamentary procedures and legislative drafting; make available international comparative resources in support of the constitutional process. -program to strengthen women's political participation in Iraq is designed to foster an environment in which women are viewed as credible and effective leaders; works with political parties and civil society organizations in developing concrete, organic strategies for including women in political structures; continues to build a network for women political activists that provides a forum for assistance across party lines and gives women the skills to present themselves as professional and competitive candidates. -provided training to women members of the Interim National Council in legislative process. -election program.
UK Department for International Development	http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/iraqupdate/feb05.pdf	Political Participation Fund	Human rights training-- Civic education project: TV, radio and newspaper ads on the democratic process in Iraq; a campaign to support "bigger concepts such as the return of sovereignty, reconstruction, support for the army and police, minority rights and public probity"; support to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior managed by DFID
Women for Women International - Iraq	http://www.womenforwomen.org/owiraq.htm		Established in July 2003; providing direct aid, rights awareness, leadership education, vocational skills to 600 women in Baghdad, Hillah and Karbala. -facilitating a Coordinating Council for local women's NGOs; holding training workshops on forming and running an NGO; planning to develop women's centres throughout country to provide leadership workshops and vocational skills training; Trasitional

			Protective Services program being developed to assist women who were raped, tortured and/or kidnapped "during the previous regime."
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU)			
United States Institute of Peace	http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr124.html	Received $10 million from Congress for programs to prevent sectarian violence, promote the rule of law, train and educate a new generation of Iraqi leaders, and prepare American civilians for assignment in Iraq. -organized training for Iraqi diplomats, military, and police officials at the National Defense University that focused on negotiation, consensus, and team-building skills. Over two years, plans to train 750 senior Iraqi officials. Also organizing training workshops for developing Iraqi leaders at the provincial level, with an emphasis on conflict management skills and coalition building with pragmatic, problem-solving workshops focused on intergroup issues. -providing assistance to CSOs to promote intercommunal and interreligious reconciliation, such as the newly formed Iraq Council for Dialogue, Reconciliation, and Peace; training officials and civil society leaders in conflict management techniques and strategies; designing educational activities and programs to help the transition to democracy and reduce conflict; creation of Iraqi institutions committed to religious and ethnic coexistence; and support for projects promoting the rule of law. -seeking to support Iraqi women through targeted programs that will provide conflict resolution training and support their participation in civil society and the public arena. -In partnership with Coventry Cathedral, has contributed to the establishment of an Iraqi Center for Dialogue, Reconciliation and Peace. Key religious leaders in Iraq have indicated a willingness to participate in it. They have already played a role in some tense mediations in connection with kidnappings. -sponsoring seminars for high-ranking Iraqis to help in the design and set-up of an Iraqi Special Tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities under the former regime, including Saddam Hussein himself. The seminars bring together a broad range of international experts with Iraqi lawyers and judges, and focus on	

		the legal and practical aspects of establishing a tribunal. Technical assistance will be provided to Iraqis who will work on the tribunal. -In cooperation with the U.S. Army's Center for Peacekeeping and Stability Operations, identify the military police structures that will need to be created to integrate coalition military efforts with the growing Iraqi security forces. The program will also sponsor a series of discussions on Iraq and its neighbors to anticipate and prevent regional conflict. -curriculum "builds on the belief that educators are essential participants in disseminating information and knowledge of conflict resolution and peace building and that students constitute a necessary network of present and future beneficiaries of civic peace."	
USAID	http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/accomplishments/cap.html	Community Action Program	The Community Action Program (CAP) works in rural and urban communities across Iraq to promote democracy and prevent and mitigate conflict. Working directly through partner NGOs and in consultation with local government representatives, USAID is creating representative, participatory community groups to identify critical priorities and implement programs to address those needs.

	http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/iraq/progdesc.html	Office of Transition Initiatives	USAID's Office of Transition Initiatives supports critical activities that build and sustain Iraqi confidence in the development of a participatory, stable, and democratic Iraq. The Iraq Transition Initiative (ITI) worked closely with the Coalition Provisional Authority and after the transfer of sovereignty continues to work closely with the Iraqi Interim Government and the U.S. Embassy in Iraq. ITI identifies and fills crucial gaps in the U.S. Government's assistance efforts at national and local levels and increases public support for the Interim Government. Activities are primarily implemented through a contract with Development Alternatives Inc. that allows for fast and flexible disbursement of small grants to local Iraqi groups and institutions. Since April 2003, ITI has issued more than 1460 small grants totaling over $109 million. Initially, ITI's fast paced assistance met critical needs—providing short-term employment, restoring basic government and community services, increasing Iraqi access to information and communication, and encouraging protection of human rights. As the situation in Iraq evolves, ITI focuses on areas crucial to the development of Iraqi democracy e.g. civic education, civil society, media, women's participation, good governance, conflict mitigation, human rights and transitional justice. **Program Activities:** **Civil Society:** funds activities that support civil society development, civic education, and media outreach to expand citizen understanding of and participation in the establishment of Iraqi institutions. Groups targeted for ITI assistance include women's and youth groups, professional associations, and human rights organizations. At the national level, ITI collaborates with the U.S. and Iraqi governments on public information efforts related to the constitutional and electoral processes. At the local level, ITI supports programming that enhances citizen participation and engages communities and emerging Iraqi leaders in addressing local needs. **Good Governance/Transparency:** ITI is working to expand the capacity of the new Iraqi government at all levels by enhancing official skills, improving communications between political officials and constituents, developing positive links between local officials and national authorities, and increasing accountability for government decisions and processes. Initially, grant activities focused on ensuring that government entities had the proper facilities, equipment and supplies to carry out their functions and provide essential services to citizens. Currently ITI supports activities that help the Iraqi people learn about their rights and responsibilities in a democracy. By participating in ITI sponsored workshops, conferences, opinion polls, and town meetings, Iraqis have an opportunity to develop expectations for the new Iraqi government and express those

International Humanitarian Law Research Initiative		Monitoring IHL in Iraq	IHL Research Initiative portal offers access to academic and policy-oriented research material related to International Humanitarian Law

Jordan

Organization	**Source**	**Projects**	**General Info**
Arab Women's Federation	Al-Mahadin (2004)	No longer in operation	Established in 1954 as a representative for local and Arab women's concerns, disseminating to a wide sector of the community. Outlawed in 1956 due to political crackdowns following an attempted coup against King Hussein.
al-Afaf Charitable Society	Wiktorowicz & Farouki (2000)		Formed in 1993 to promote marriage and family formation as a means of encouraging reproduction and promote Islamic values, and fending off Western influences which are seen as a cause of Arab social ills. Activities include matching services, group weddings, interest free loans for marriage, and seminars and workshops relating to Islam and marriage.

Turkey

NGO	**Source**	**Projects**	**General Info**
Turkish Medical Association	Rubenstein & Amato, (2000)		Convened meeting on prison health and human rights (Oct.20, 2000). The conference was cancelled as the government objected and insisted on taping proceedings. Organization works to promote and protect health and human rights in Turkey
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey	Rubenstein & Amato, (2000)		
TÜSIAD	Gülap (2001) Önis (1997)		Turkish Industrialist and Businessmen's Association Founded in the 1970's by businessmen with political influence Members primarily located in Instanbul and surrounding Marmara region.

			Western political base – supports trade unions with Europe
MÜSIAD	Gülap (2001) Önis (1997)	Provision of business-related services to small/medium businesses	Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Voluntary organization founded in 1990 to unite small and medium-scale businesses Islamic political base – supports trade unions with other Islamic countries – also an important supporter of the Welfare Party President: Erol Yarar Membership throughout Turkey
Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği	Çinar & Arikan		Turkish Nationalists Union - extreme right organization
Aydinlar Kulübü	Çinar & Arikan		Intellectuals Club – extreme right organization
Türk Teşkilati	Çinar & Arikan		Patriotic Turkish Organization – extreme right organization
Komünimle Mücadele Dernekleri	Çinar & Arikan		Struggle Against Communist Clubs – extreme right organization
Turkish Hizbullah	Hermann (2003)		Islam extremist organization founded after the Iranian revolution in 1979, initially used by the state to help suppress Kurdish activists, but gained independence from the state in the 1990's and became a "jihādist terror group".
Amnesty International	White (1999)	Investigation of Anti-Terror Law, 1991	Noted that sections of the Law that had previously been used to persecute Kurds for separatism had been repealed, but that the new articles (Article 8) still allow lengthy imprisonment and fines for non-violent forms of political dissent. Also reported in 1995 on killings of hundreds of prisoners and civilians by the PKK
Mazlum Der	White (1999)		Conservative human rights organization, led by Ensaroğlu – argues that Turkish Constitutions are increasingly curbing human rights.
Ĭnan Haklari Derneği (IHD)	White (1999)		"Slightly left wing" Human Rights Association – led by Birdal Finds that the Constitution holds the state sacred above all else – including human rights.
Human Rights Watch/Helsinki	White (1999)		Human rights monitoring organization – also expresses concern with the use of torture, particularly in cases of Kurds held under the Anti Terror Law
International Donors			

Parliamentary Human Rights Group	White (1999)		British human rights monitoring organization – that reported in 1995 that although the Geneva convention was being ignored by the PKK's guerrilla actions, the situation was not as bad as portrayed by other organizations due to the selectivity of targets and suspect sources for accounts of terrorist activity
Helsinki Citizens' Assembly	http://www.hyd.org.tr/en/bulten.asp?bulten_id=20&yazi_id=58	'Strategic endeavours and projects' to enhance the rights to freedom of association and of public assembly in Turkey	Published a report entitled, "The Rights to Freedom of Association and of Expression in Turkey – A new Legal Framework" by Ali Turgan (lawyer), Drs. Ulku Azrak and Rona Serozan, and Oguz Esmer, activist of Cure-Is-You Movement (CareSiz Hareketi). Activities include training in campaigns and lobbying.

APPENDIX B: Regional Overview of Political and Governmental Mechanisms

PERSIAN GULF COUNTRIES

	Elections/suffrage	Political parties	Government/constitution/judiciary	Notes
Kuwait	Free elections; no suffrage for women (in 1999 parliament rejected the emir's proposal to allow women to vote) or bedouin	Parties operate informally but are weak; electoral system produces parliament of independents, some aligned with ruling family, others with liberal or Islamist groups.	Monarchy, with ruling family holding 'ministries of sovereignty' and enjoying wide support; 1962 constitution calls for a parliament but gives ruling family balance of power; Islamists are the single largest political tendency in government (they are united with liberals in wanting a parliament but have no other common ground).	Considered the freest of the Gulf states, with the most transparent gov't., though 2003 elections 'toppled' Kuwaiti liberals. A different electoral system could produce stronger political parties, though deep rifts between Islamists and liberals, Sunnis and Shi'ites, tribes and city are likely to persist (Herb 2002:45).
Bahrain	Only country in Gulf where women can vote in national elections	Political parties are banned	Constitution adopted in 1973, modeled on Kuwait's; provides for separation of powers but amir alone can appoint and remove PM and cabinet members; was revised in 2002 to further limit powers of parliament. Parliament is dominated by Islamists but deliberations focus on social issues rather than political.	Potential for democratization but as with other Gulf countries, progress is seen to be "painfully slow" (Kéchichian 2004:53).
Qatar	Popular suffrage for municipal elections; women ran in local elections in 1999 though none won.	Political parties are banned	2003 elections approved a new Constitution but it awaits Amir's approval. It calls for 30 elected and 15 appointed representatives; elections planned for 2005.	Movement toward liberalization are tactical on the part of the emir, expecting a parliament will firm up his rule.
Yemen	2003 held third parliamentary	3 main parties and 20 smaller parties	Constitution adopted in 1991, affirms freedom of association and	Absence of checks and balances on executive powers; much government

	elections	- ruling party: General People's Congress (GPC); Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP); and Islah main opposition (Islamist)	equality regardless of sex, colour, racial origin, language, occupation, social status or religion; Judiciary is only nominally independent and	corruption.
Oman	Right to vote extended to all adults but in practice only 3% of population has suffrage	Political parties are banned	Basic Law includes a Bill of Rights that guarantees freedom of the press, religious tolerance, equality of race and gender, and an independent judiciary	Pace of reform very slow, and changes so far may have resulted primarily from the 1994 coup d'état that shook the regime (Kéchichian 2004:44).
UAE	The UAE and Saudi Arabia remain the only two countries in the world that do not grant any voting rights.	Political parties are prohibited by the constitution. Historically, Dubai alone has a history of active political parties.	Provisional constitution of 1971 provides for a 40-member *majles* that the president can override. Members are appointed by the rulers of the seven principalities.	
Saudi Arabia	No suffrage; talk of gradual introduction of municipal elections, though excluding women's participation	Political parties are banned	Basic Law of Government promulgated in 1992	Some orchestrated public dialogue on issues of reform

MIDDLE EAST and TURKEY

	Elections (unlike in the Gulf, there is	Political parties	Government/constitution/judiciary	Notes

	universal suffrage)			
Palestine	Two previous presidential elections declared free and fair.	Varied parties and movements.	PLO, PA, PLC	
Lebanon	Opposition expecting to win a majority in the pending elections.	Parties are overwhelmingly sectarian based.	Government plunged into crisis after the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri.	
Jordan	1993 first multiparty parliamentary election since 1956.	Parties banned in 1957; martial law repealed in 1989 and parties allowed to function. Some 90 registered parties.	80 seat parliament;	Tribalism and regional identification presides over ideological or political/party affiliation. Despite protests by activists to the contrary, the 1993 elections are seen as heralding the consolidation of democracy in Jordan.
Syria	General elections to the People's Assembly held every 4 years since 1973	Ba'ath Party has dominated the Assembly; the National Progressive Front (formed by the Ba'ath regime and whose policy is determined by the Ba'ath Party according to the 1973 constitution) holds most of remaining seats in Assembly. In 1990, the Front accepted a regime-sponsored Islamic party into its fold to increase its legitimacy.	Martial law is in effect. 1973 constitution gives president wide powers; also gives the People's Assemby powers to veto or amend presidential decrees though this power has remained dormant.	Democratization is seen as unlikely.
Iran	Minimum age of suffrage is 15	Political parties, though numerous, have been	A theocratic republic with compromised independence of the	A politics of despair and growing popular sentiment that normal

		"ephemeral, fragile" structures, though some, including regional parties (representing Kurds and Azerbaijanis) have represented constituent interests; pressure groups are more influential (Tachau 1994:140-41).	judicial system. Conservative Islamists dominate the unicameral Islamic Consultative Assembly (or *majles).*	political processes are not effective or responsive to participation (Kazemi 2003:92).
Iraq	Elections in	Country in transition from one-party military dictatorship. Numerous parties, reflecting ideological as well as ethnic and regional distinctions	Liberal, democratic framework still not in place; Constitution drafted; Islam as source of legislation is a point of contention with clerics; constitution: see country profile	Seen as a test case of the 'reformability' of Muslim polities through external pressure.
Turkey		1967 Party Law regulates structure and features of parties (Marxism and advocacy of Shari'a law illegal). Under military rule all political parties banned in 1980; elections since 1987 several parties ran in parliamentary elections.	1982 constitutions established a 400 seat one-house parliament (later 450 seats).	Restrictive electoral laws curb party gains in elections.

NORTH AFRICA

	Elections	Political parties	Government/Constitution/judiciary	Notes
Tunisia	Free multiparty parliamentary elections in 1989.	Single party system from the 1950s; protests and repression in the 1970s were followed by political liberalization in the 1980s, with some political		'Electoral democracy' without democratization. Liberalization controlled from above as a means of gaining legitimacy.

		parties legalized. Islamic Tendency Movement (MTI) took up social protests in 1980s and established itself as the most important opposition organization (though did not win seats in elections) in 1989. The ruling party, Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), remains the dominant political party.		
Morocco	1993 elections resulted in significant gains for two main opposition parties, but the king's limited offer of participation led to the parties' boycott of the government and a government of technocrats with no party affiliation.	The activity, relative freedom and number of political parties is much greater than any other country in the region. Trend has been: increasing diversity but decreasing importance. Parties proliferated in 1970s	Uninterrupted parliament since 1977, though legislative power of parliament weak and electoral legislation favours parties loyal to the King.	One of the world's oldest royal dynasties, with the greatest number of people (24 million) living under monarchic rein and rule. The manipulation of politics by the king is seen as a major impediment to democratization.
Algeria	Flawed electoral process. 2004 elections won by Bouteflika as all other candidates withdrew the night before election.	Widespread riots and protests in 1988 were brutally suppressed but led to protection of freedom of association and assembly (Article 39), and the right to create political associations	Multipartyism consecrated in article 40 of 1989 constitutions but the Algerian presidency, which initiated the reforms, "had no intention of ceding power and did not initiate any serious negotiations with the new parties" (Tachau 1994:20).	There has been a decline in political violence in the last five years, with disappearances stopped. Amendments to penal code improve human rights but they still fall short of international standards.

		(Article 40), which allowed for a muilti-party system and the theoretical ending the FLN's monopoly (Salhi 2002:32). Parties based exclusively on religious, linguistic, or regional issues not allowed, but Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was not banned (Salhi 2003:32). List of parties below.	About 25 parties are registered but these have no social base whatsoever (Tachau 1994:21).	
Libya		Several parties formed in the 1940s after liberation; all were banned in 1952, though some worked underground until the 1969 revolution which brought the military to power. Only the ruling party was permitted and then that was abolished. The Muslim Brotherhood		
Egypt	Widespread electoral irregularities; government obstruction of campaigning and voting.	16 legal parties and the Muslim Brotherhood (which is illegal but tolerated as an opposition movement). It remains difficult for parties to function outside their own offices and they are excluded from policy making. Parties have little grassroots following, and elicit little popular enthusiasm (Tachau 1994:102).	Presidency has 'enormous' powers, in party through emergency law which enables it to circumvent the judiciary	

APPENDIX C – Country Profiles

ALGERIA

Postindependence Algeria is credited with being the most 'successful' example of the bureaucratic-authoritarian state. As mentioned in the introduction, a dynamic civil society coexisted in the 1970s and 1980s with closed political institutions (Entelis 1996:46). Both pre-revolutionary and postrevolutionary factors can account for that. Algeria won its independence in 1962 after 130 years as a French colony and *département d'outremer* (DOM) and after having drawn much from French notions of associational life and state-society relations (Entelis 1996:55).

The following discussion outlines recent political history, associational life, and women's activism in Algeria. Algeria's liberation war cost the country 1 million lives (Korany and Amrani 1998:11). The National Liberation Front (FLN) ruled as a one-party regime for more than a quarter-century. President Chadli Benjedid introduced a new constitution in 1989 that allowed independent political parties. Multiparty elections were held in January 1992, but an army-backed coup occurred once it was clear that the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) would win a majority in parliament (Human Rights Watch 2005). The FIS was then banned and its leaders arrested.

These events set off a bloody civil war that has resulted in between 100,000 to 200,000 deaths. Both radical Islamists and government-backed militias are accused of committing mass killings. And human rights groups have accused Algerian security forces of causing the "disappearance" of about 7000 Algerians between 1993 and 1997 (Human Rights Watch 2005).

There has been a decline in political violence in the last five years. The disappearances have reportedly stopped, and there are fewer security-related arrests and instances of torture being reported. But, assessments are hampered by the inability of international human rights organizations to gain access to Algeria (Human Rights Watch 2005). In October 2004, the Algerian parliament amended the penal code, which now criminalizes acts of torture. Human Rights Watch notes, though, that the amendment falls quite short of international standards (Human Rights Watch 2005).

The electoral process in Algeria is flawed. On the eve of the 1999 presidential election, all other candidates except Abdelaziz Bouteflika withdrew from the race, alleging fraud. Similarly, the 2004 presidential election was easily won by Bouteflika when all the other candidates withdrew the night before the election (Brown 2004)

Freedom of association

During Algeria's 25 years of one-party rule, civil society "was not allowed, for all intents and purposes, to exist" (Korany and Amrani 1998:27). Korany and Amrani note that associations did exist but they lacked autonomy and could not contest state policy or party views (Korany and Amrani 1998:27; see also Moussa and Beaudet 1995). John Entelis provides some context for this situation. Following Algeria's hard-won revolution, a "bargain" was struck

between the population and the leadership by which "the populace gave up its rights to independent political activity in return for the state's provision of social welfare" (Entelis 1996:45-46).

Women

The Algerian Family Code, which became law in 1984, proclaims women to be minors under the law, and defines them as daughters, mothers, or wives. Algerian women are demanding its repeal and challenging patriarchal values and Islamic fundamentalism.

Agerian women's active participation in the war of liberation, although widely lauded, was not sufficient to counter the denial of their basic civil rights. The 1976 constitution underlined women's political rights and the need for women to fight for their social rights through their deportment and struggle. In 1978, Chadli Bendjedid, head of the Islamo-ba'thist clan, came to power, won over the socialist modernists, and set about placing the country under sharia law. This entailed launching attacks against women, education, and the justice system (Salhi 2003:29). In 1980, a ministerial order prevented women from traveling unless accompanied by a male relative, thus breaking women's constitutional right to freedom of movement. After women's protests, it was repealed. But by 1981, a rollback of women's rights was effected in a new Family Code. Wide protests were not able to prevent it from passing into law in 1984.

The Family Code of 1984, based on the teachings of Shari'a law as well as a tradition of patriarchy and misogyny in Algeria, made all women minors in education, work, marriage, divorce, and inheritance, and legalized polynamy for men (Turshen 2002:6). Women are legally obliged to breastfeed their children and care for them until adulthood, though do not have the right to pass on their name, nationality, or religion to them (Salhi 2003:30). Women may obtain divorce only by giving up any claim to alimony. Men are not obliged to support their children after divorce, and since 1980, there are increasing numbers of destitute women and children.

On 5 October 1988, thousands of youths joined "bread riots" and protested in the streets of Algeirs against the structural adjustment program imposed by the World Bank and IMF (Turshen 2002:7). Protesters also demanded an end to corruption and oppression, including violence, torture, and arbitrary arrests by the state. The Algerian League for Human Rights and doctors formed the National Committee Against Torture. Other groups and organizations expressed their full support of the youth movement and called for the recognition of democratic liberties. (Salhi 2003:32). Islamists were silent on the issue of torture but demonstrated en mass. While the protests were brutally suppressed they did lead to gains, including a free press, the right to organize civil society, the creation of new political parties, and eventually the departure of President Chadli (Turshen 2002:8). Freedom of expression, association, and assembly (Article 39), and the right to create political associations, meaning political parties (Article 40), allowed for a muilti-party system and theoretically ending the FLN's monopoly (Salhi 2002:32).

A subsequent law on political associations was issued which prohibits the formation of parties based exclusively on religious, linguistic, or regional issues. Nonetheless, several

parties that should have been banned under this provision were recognized by the government, including the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) (Salhi 2003:32).

Women's organizations are legally recognized. Nonetheless, activists are harassed, particularly since 1992, when Islamic fundamentalists began a violent terrorist campaign in an attempt to enforce strict observance of Shari'a law with regard to how it affects women (Salhi 2003:33). Salhi notes that, "Harassment has been relentless and unbeArable, particularly for women who live alone or who refuse to wear the veil in the workplace" (Salhi 2003:33).

The discourse of the FIS regarding women is not very different from that of the FLN, with both ignoring the socio-economic changes, including the economic crisis of the 1980s that affected women as much as men (Salhi 2003:33). Aspects of the FIS platform included discouraging women from working outside the home. A 1994 FIS *fatwa* legalized the killing of girls and women not wearing the *hijab* (a scarf that hides the hair and neck and, in Algeria, a full-length robe) (Turshen 2002:9).

NGOs

In 1987 a law was passed authorizing the creation of NGOs, which greatly invigorated women's activism (Turshen 2002:7). There are now several dozen active new Algerian NGOs, including SOS femme en détress (SOS Women in Distress), which was founded in 1991 to help support women in psychological, medical, or legal difficulties. RACHDA (Collective against Denigration and for the Rights of Algerian Women) was founded in 1996. Women parliamentarians created a caucus to push for legislative reforms. Among other issues, women are calling for the government to recognize women raped by terrorists (2,029 women are believed to have survived rape by terrorists) as legal victims of terrorism, which would entitle them to an indemnity (Turshen 2002:15).

Projects

As of 2002, the SOS was carrying out a multidisciplinary project on violence and social change to survey suffering, institutional violence, family violence, and women's changed identity following the death of a husband and loss of status (Turshen 2002:18).

While the terrorist violence mounted in the 1990s, so did the Algerian women's movement. Women in demonstrations in the streets, female political leaders in Parliament and political groups, and women writers condemn and unmask the misogyny of the fundamentalists. They note that 80 percent of the 100,000 Algerian victims massacred during the 1990s were women and children, and call for the end to Algerian society's silence over the crime of systematic rape (Salhi 2003:34).

The most preoccupying women's issue in Algeria is the Family Code (Turshen 2002:15). The 1984 Family Code, argues Turshen, exposed secret negotiations between political and religious leaders, and the government's willingness to sacrifice women's rights in order to stay in power—a pattern that continued into the 1990s (Turshen 2002:16). Abdul Aziz Bouteflika's election as President at the end of the 1990s was massively supported by women

voters. Thus far, the president has made major compromises with Islamist terrorist groups, and has made no changes to the Family Code (Salhi 2003:33-34).

Women hold 5 of the 380 seats in the Algerian National Assembly (APN), and in 1999 held 2 of 40 ministerial posts (Turshen 2002:17). Turshen suggests both that amendments to the Family Code is just a matter of time and that the economy, currently undergoing rapid liberalization, will largely determine the fate of women and men (Turshen 2002:17).

Algerian political parties

Party	Principles and appeal
Islamic Salvation Front	Lead by 'Ali Benhadj. Draws on the teachings of medieval Syrian Sunni scholar Ibn Taymiyya, reworked in the 20th century by Egyptian Sayyid Qtub. Calls for stricter measures with regard to women toward total population control as a necessary step to seizing control of the state. Reformulated and reinvented memories of the war for independence; gives a positive new identity (by differentiating itself from the West). External support: part of a pan-Islamic movement; received training from Al Qaeda and financial support from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. The violent Islamist practices appear to have been imported from Afghanistan (Turshen 2002:18).
Workers Party	Led by Louisa Hanoune, the only woman to lead a political party. A relatively small party, it is one of the few groups in Parliament seen as a genuine opposition party. Hanoune is also seen as one of the few voices for reconciliation with the vanquished Islamists and for recognition of the vanished victims of the war (Brown 2004).
Rassemblement Constitutionelle Democratic (RND)	Nationalist Party, led by A. Bouteflika. Won the 2004 elections with 47.8 % of registered voters (Parks 2005:100).
An-Nahda/MSP	Islamist Party
Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN)	Nationalist, A. Benflis
Al-Islah	Islamist, A Djaballah
Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Democratie (RCD)	Berber-Rights, S. Sadi
Ahd 54	Nationalist, A. Rebaine

BAHRAIN, KUWAIT, and QATAR

Nathan Brown notes that the regimes of the Gulf have been "unabashedly autocratic":

> with the exception of short periods in Bahrain and much longer periods in Kuwait, liberal democratic institutions and practices have generally not even existed on a nominal level (Brown 1997:129).

There have, though, been some movements toward electoral and parliamentary politics. Gulf countries that have had parliamentary elections include Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman. Only in Bahrain has there been parliamentary elections with universal suffrage (though with the exception of the Bedouin who remain stateless). In Kuwait, only men vote in parliamentary elections and the electorate makes up only 17 percent of the population (Valenti 2003:1). In Qatar, there have only been municipal elections, with men and women voting in these. In Oman, parliamentary elections have been held with eligible male and female voters making up only 3 percent of the population (Valenti 2003:1).

Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar are the gulf states Full parliamentary democracy in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain will not be attained in the near future (Herb 2002:47). In fact, the Gulf region generally presents a situation in which the democratization of governments, in the form of popular elections, has produced illiberal policies. This disconnect between democratization and liberalization stems from the fact that the ruling families are generally more liberal than Islamists who stand to gain in electoral politics (Herb 2002:42).

In terms of the parliamentary processes underway in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, Herb concludes that the partial democratization will not lead to Islamist takeovers (Herb 2002; Carapico 1995) Rather, parliamentary elections in the Gulf indicate that Islamists have a stake in defending the rights of association and the liberal freedoms of parliamentary life (Herb 2002:47). Parliamentary life, notes Herb, "does seem to promote some degree of moderation among Islamists" (Herb 2002:42). Further, the ruling families in the Gulf are very deeply ensconced, leaving little possibility that Islamists would be a threat to their rule and—importantly—little possibility that parliamentary reform will translate into real legislative powers for elected bodies.

Bahrain

Bahrain provides a useful picture of this dynamic and is, additionally, seen as a bellwether for the political climate of the Gulf because of its long history of popular opposition and demands for political and economic reforms. Further, its civil society is the most complex and advanced of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (which includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the UAE, and Bahrain) (Bahry 2000:129)

Bahrain's first legislative elections since 1973 were held in October 2002. Political parties are banned in Bahrain, so opposition candidates ran as independents. Secular candidates secured 21 of the 40 seats. Half of the registered voters were women, and the overall turnout was 53 percent (Election Watch 2002). Bahrain is the only country in the Persian Gulf where women have been able to vote in national elections. Moreover, eight of the 170 candidates were women (Sengupta 2002a:7). Two women candidates made it to the second count. The

largest of the country's Shiite groups (and three other Shiite groups) sat out the elections, calling the new Parliament a sham as it does not have the power to legislate without consent of the other house, which is appointed by the King (Sengupta 2002b:3). The boycott had little effect, though, on the Shiite participation (Valenti 2003:1). The following sketch attempts to provide insight into the significance of these new electoral politics for Bahrain.

The context

There are four main social strata in Bahrain (see Table…) that mark divisions between rich and poor and the powerful and powerless. These divisions are more marked in Bahrain than elsewhere in the Gulf, partly because of Bahrain's lack of oil wealth and economic opportunities (Peterson 2001:9), but also due to Bahrain's historical rifts. Unlike Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, with Sunni majorities and Sunni ruling families, Bahrain has a Shi'ite majority that is presided over by the Sunni Al Khalifah family that took over Bahrain in 1783 and has since treated the Shi'ite population as a conquered people (Herb 2002:45).

The economic situation of Bahrain – almost-depleted oil fields, high unemployment (estimated at 16-30 percent), difficulty in attracting foreign investment, and a 'free visa' system which allows influential people to import foreign labour "by the hundreds"—has disproportionately impacted the Shi'ite population (Bahry 2000:138). In addition, Shi'ite exclusion from power has alienated the Shi'ite population and lead to demands for more political participation (Bahry 2002:133).

Constitutional framework

Although dated, J.E. Peterson's *The Arab Gulf States Steps Toward Political Participation* (1988) provides a brief overview of Bahraini governing bodies and legislation, including the Constitutional Assembly, the functions and principle issues of the brief the National Assembly (1973-75), and the *majlis*.

Briefly, the constitution provides for separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, with legislative power held jointly by the amir and the National Assembly. The constitution itself was written in consultation with Kuwait's constitutional expert. Like Kuwait, Bahrain is not a true parliamentary state, as the amir alone can appoint and remove the prime minister and other members of the cabinet. Additionally, only the amir can initiate, ratify and promulgate laws (Peterson 1988:72-73). Thus, while the constitution states that sovereignty resides in the people, as "the source of all powers," the same article designates the state as a hereditary monarchy (Peterson 1988:77). Succession falls to the king's eldest son. As noted below, recent changes to the constitution serve to bolster the power of the king.

The opposition

While unrest has been recurring in the last century in Bahrain, with sustained and organized dissidence, the last such period between 1994 and 1999 was marked by greater Shi'ite organization and domination of the opposition movement. Young, Iran-trained rural religious leaders led this last wave of opposition, making it both more populist and more Shi'ite in make-up and inspiration than previous dissent.

Since the success of the Iranian revolution in 1979, religious symbols were employed as political tools in opposition politics in Bahrain (Bahry 2002:131). Bahraini clerics, trained in Iran, began to use sermons and religion to mobilize the public.[7] Meanwhile, the aftermath of the first Gulf War spawned calls for political liberalization in Bahrain, by those who saw an opportunity to follow those in Kuwait demanding political reforms such as elections and the reestablishment of the parliament (disbanded there in 1986) (*Routine* 1997:23). For their part, the Al Khalifas were amenable to improving the legitimacy of the ruling family in Bahrain.

The goals of the opposition (increased economic opportunities, an end to discrimination, constitutional reform, including restoration of the National Assembly which had been suspended in 1975) were shared by much of the population. Nonetheless, the movement was exhausted by 1999, mostly by government repression (Peterson 2001:10). In 1999, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa acceded to the throne, pardoned dissidents, and pledged to address political concerns and adopt a modern charter (Kéchichian 2004:40).

In 2001, Shaikh Hamad freed almost 300 political prisoners, and held a referendum which resulted in 98% support for a National Charter with provisions for the independence of the judiciary, a bicameral legislative body by 2004 (Peterson 2002:10). Shaikh Hamad also decreed the repeal of the State Security Law of 1974, which allowed arbitrary and incommunicado detention and unfair trials.[8] A 40-member parliament and a 40-member appointed consultative council (*majlis al-shura*) was created; the parliament was elected with Islamist groups (both Sunni and Shia) dominating it, and Shaikh Hamad appointed five women, a Christian and a Jew to the Shura Council. These changes raised hopes as did the abolishment of the State Security Court, the departure of the British head of security, and an amnesty for all exiles (Peterson 2001:10).

Notably, though, parliamentary deliberations have focused on social issues rather than political affairs Kéchichian 2004:40). Moreover, the changes that were made to Bahrain's 1973 constitution actually limited the powers of parliament. The elected deputies have less power than they had under the 1973 Constitution. The consultative council is an advisory body with no legislative powers (Bahry 2000:133).

The attitude of the ruling family, then, remains paramount in terms of further reforms. As Herb noted in 2002,

> It is primarily the attitude of the ruling family that will determine the fate of the current opening; the family will have to make the concessions necessary to keep the moderate opposition engaged. Opposition leaders, for their part, will need to balance

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[7] Iran has historically laid claim to Bahrain as part of Iranian territory. The Bahrain government has repeatedly invoked the threat of Iranian subversion to rationalize its restrictions on civil and political rights in the country ("Routine Abuse" 1997:89).

[8] This initiative was among those recommended by Human Rights Watch in their 1997 report, "Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain." Human Rights Watch notes that many Bahraini rights defenders expressed the belief that this report and subsequent interventions and letters to U.N. and European Union officials, played an important role in support of their calls for political reform and the addressing of these systematic abuses by Bahraini authorities (see Human Rights Watch report, Progress in Bahrain, http://www.hrw.org/reports/1997/Bahrain/).

> their desire to keep the game going with their need to remain responsive to the demands of their constituents (Herb 2002:46).

The cabinet has eighteen members, including the prime minister, seven of which are from the ruling family. The remaining eleven ministers are divided between Sunni (five) and Shi'ite (six), though Shi'ites claim they are given secondary posts such as ministries of labour, commerce and health (rather than defense…) Bahry 2000:133. The Shi'ites, notes Bahry, do not have sufficient representation in either of the formal ruling institutions (the cabinet and the advisory consultative council); they are also not represented in the Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) or the police force, both of which have a high percentage of Sunnis from Pakistanis, Syrians, Yemenis, and Jordanians, who are given good salaries, legal residency, and housing. (Shi'ites charge serves the underlying goal of changing the demographic composition of the country and increasing the numbers of Sunnis in relation to Shi'ites) (Bahry 2000:133-34).

Further exclusion is effected by the requirement, for many jobs, of a certificate of 'good behaviour and conduct' which is only attainable if one has no previous police record or arrest for political reasons. Many Shi'ites have been arrested for protests, which continue and which perpetuate their exclusion (Bahry 2000:134). The most extreme exclusion is experienced by the seven percent, or 20-30,000 of the Shi'ite population who are Bedouin, and as such remain stateless, are denied political and social rights (such as passports, legal residency, schooling, and medical care) and variously deported to Iran, despite being third-generation residents of Bahrain. This situation further alienates Bahraini Shi'ites (Bahry 2000:135).

Human rights and freedom of association:

Human Rights Watch report, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain* (1997), reports that human rights abuses in Bahrain are wide-ranging. They fall into two categories: law enforcement and administration of justice issues, and the denial of fundamental political rights and civil liberties. The former include arbitrary detention, physical and psychological abuse of detainees, prohibiting access to legal counsel, and the denial of the right to a swift and impartial judicial hearing. The second area of human rights violations includes the denial of freedom of expression, freedom of association and assembly, and the right to participate in the conduct of public affairs (*Routine* 1997:1). It is unclear whether these have improved in the previous eight years.

The Bahraini government's exile of its citizens accounts for the expatriate location of human rights organizations such as the Copenhagen-based Bahrain Organization for Human Rights (BHRO), and the Damascus-based Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Bahrain (CDHRB). The Bahrain Centre for Human Rights (BCHR), headed by Abdul-Hadi al-Khawajah, a prominent Shia representative who returned from exile in 2001, along with the GOYS, Al-Uruba Club administrators and other intellectuals, has been barred from public gatherings after demanding a dialogue with the ruling family (Kéchichian 2004:41). Last September, the centre was closed down and its directed arrested after criticizing the country's economic problems and past human rights abuses (Human Rights News 2004).

A new labour union law went into effect in 2002, which requires trade unions to be associated with the Bahrain Trade Union Federation.

Civil society:

About 400 matams, or religious meeting places, serve the Shi'ite community. These are sites of religious commemoration and social and political gathering. Along with matams, charity funds play an important role in servicing and uniting the Shi'ite community (Bahry 2000:135). Two main newspapers toe the government's line but did offer space to opposition campaigners in the 2002 elections (Trofimov 2001:2).

Women's rights:

Bahrain has been quicker to accept wider social and economic roles for women than its neighbours, with many Bahraini women in the workforce, and a women ambassador to France (Brooks 2000). Since the early 1950s, women have organized charitable societies. In the early 1970s, voluntary women's societies with political orientations emerged (Saikaly 1994:419). In terms of women's legislative rights, it is not clear whether much has changed in the last decade when May Saikaly noted that, "women find themselves dependent on customs and traditions rather than on laws to protect their rights. The social standing, alliances and economic power of the woman's family protect her rights more effectively than the law does" (Saikaly 1994:424).

In trying to push for the promulgation of a personal status law, women lawyers, women's societies and nongovernmental organizations face opposition from religious institutions controlled by the *quda* (?) and from officials and fundamentalist groups (Saikaly 1994:424). Saikaly notes that,

> when reviewing cases brought to court, especially those dealing with personal and family disputes, judgment is most often passed in favor of the man, and the women are the losers. Religious law as translated by the *quda* reflects its conservative male bias and coercive power...There have been known cases when *quads* decide cases not on justice of the merit of the case but by ethnic and denominational biases (Saikaly 1994:424).

Political parties, Government bodies, Legislation

Social stratification	**Source**	**General Info**
Al Khalifah ruling family	Peterson 2001	-Kalifah bin Salman is the Prime Minister and part of one of the largest ruling families in the Gulf; enjoys a monopoly of political power at the top, supported by tribal allies originally from Saudi Arabia.
Hawla families		Second stratum; the principal economic elite; migrated from Iran but claim Saudi origin
Baharina		Original farming inhabitants; entirely Shi'i; villagers and urban poor, making up 60 – 70 percent of the population.
Persian		Fourth and bottom stratum; although Iran controlled Bahrain prior to the 18th century, nearly all Persians in Bahrain immigrated this century

Bedouin	Bahry 2002	Stateless, denied residency and basic civil rights

EGYPT

Context

The *infitah* (economic open door policy) that was introduced in 1974 and, in 1991, the adoption of an economic reform and structural adjustment program (ERSAP) have led some to conclude that Egypt is undergoing a successful democratization process (see, for example, Korany, Brynen and Nobel 1998). Others (Kassem 2004; see also Goodson and Radwan 1997), assert that Egypt illustrates a successful authoritarian regime that uses patronage, cooptation, exclusionary laws, and coercion to maintain "contained pluralism" and adopt the appearance of liberalization and democratization (Kassem 2004:3).

Kassem's study traces changes in the political regimes through Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak's governments, concluding that the authoritarian style of each was further reinforced, with Mubarak's multiparty system masking increasing centralization of power in the presidency (Kassem 2004). Kassem contends that Mubarak's presidencies have made Egypt of the most resilient personal authoritarian systems in the world. One of Kassem's central arguments is that the nature and functioning of Egypt's civil society is shaped by the political system in which it operates more so than by the sociocultural environment in which it exists (Kassem 2004:9). Similarly, she argues that the increasing exclusion of Islamist parties and the brutal tactics employed by the Egyptian state has led to the rise of political Islam and, in particular, its extremist form (Kassem 2004:9).

Similarly, Goodson and Radwan (1997) argue that despite recent economic and political liberalization, the Egyptian polity is dominated by the "enormous constitutional and legal authority" of the presidency (Goodson and Radwan 1997:3). Goodson and Radwan provide a useful synopsis of the roles of the Egyptian cabinet and bureaucracy, the People's Assembly, the judiciary, legislature, and the informal ties that connect them.

Kassem's study takes a historical view that outlines the shoring up of the powers of the presidency through Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak's terms in office. This process coincided with the emergence of a multiparty system. For example, after Sadat's introduction of a multiparty system, only 20 percent of bills passed were initiated by the legislature, the rest by the executive branch of government (Kassem 2004:24). During Mubarak's government, in 1987, 98.5 percent of legislative bills were initiated by the executive. This was the height of multiparty participation in the Egyptian government, as the opposition acquired a number parliamentary seats in the 1987 elections (which were lost in subsequent elections) (Kassem 2004:29-30).

Kassem notes that, "while signs of 'liberalization' were evident in the 1980s, the fundamental structure of the system was in reality unchanged" (Kassem 2004:30). This is largely because, as both Kassem (2004) and Goodson and Radwan (1997) underline, all important policies or projects must be endorsed by the president or by a government body affiliated with the presidential establishment. As Egypt is formally a parliamentary republic, so there should be close links between the cabinet headed by the prime minister and the legislature, but both are dominated by the president (Goodson and Radwan 1997:4).

Kassem identifies three means by which the presidency maintained its dominant role. Procedurally, Article 153 (see Table) enabled Mubarak to circumvent parliamentary procedures to have bills enacted into law. A second tactic is the manipulation of schedules, including the scheduling of sensitive laws on Saturday, when legislators are usually absent, or failing to include an item on the agenda altogether. A third tactic is the lifting of immunity on the part of members of parliament who, for example, refuse to be coopted into the National Democratic Party (NDP), the ruling party which independents are encouraged to join once they win their seats. Those who do overcome electoral impediments tend to play passive roles within the legislature (with 250 out of 454 members not participating in the legislative process in any way during the 1996-97 parliamentary session (Kassem 2004:31-35).

The presidency is responsible for appointing judges, including those of the Supreme Constitutional Court. The judiciary attempts to preserve its independence despite various governmental constraints, though "is forced to maintain a fine balance between its rulings and their political implications" (Kassem 2004:36). Ultimately, the president is able to circumvent rulings that are seen as obstructive to the regime's objectives (Kassem 2004:37).

Emergency law and political participation

A state of emergency, that has been in place in Egypt since the assassination of Sadat in 1981 and renewed every three years since, enables the government to control every level of political activity. The state of emergency differs from martial law in that the courts continue to function and the Constitution is not suspended. Emergency law does allow for censorship over political activity, ranging from monitoring political activity to limiting political expression. Further, individuals can be arrested for distributing political literature or gathering in groups of five or more people without government authorization, or on the basis of suspicion of political crimes (Kassem 2004:37). A person can be held in detention without a formal court hearing indefinitely. The president is also able to circumvent the civilian courts and refer any case to the military judiciary, which does not allow for appeal, including in sentences of death (Kassem 2004:37-38).

Emergency law makes it difficult for political parties to function outside their own offices. Campaign gatherings are not allowed without prior consent from the Ministry of Interior and the location of intended gatherings are determined (through Article 7 of Law 14 of 1923) by the Ministry. The police have the further right to attend and dissolve any meeting in session and to arrest individuals participating in legitimate activities such as legislative or syndicate elections (Kassem 2004:56, 38). Arrest and imprisonment is risked by candidates who advocate any changes to the basic principles of the constitution (see penal code articles in Table…). Kassem notes that the articles of the penal code enable broad interpretation and present constraints for political participation (Kassem 2004:57).

Prior to the 1995 legislative elections, the security forces arrested 54 Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Kassem contends that it was largely as a consequence of this that only one Islamist oriented candidate won his seat in the elections. Arrests were repeated before the 2000 elections, with one reporting commenting that, "Mass Brotherhood trials have become something of an election-year tradition in Egypt" (Kassem 2004:38). What is notable is the use of military courts to try civilians regardless of whether or not they fit the 'terrorist'

description; there are currently between 12,000 and 15,000 political prisoners in Egyptian prisons (Kassem 2004:40).

Kassem's study clearly indicates how emergency law was bolstered by the expanding of police responsibilities to include a prominent role in supervising voting and ballot counting in local and legislative elections (Kassem 2004:40, 41). The police have prevented voters from entering voting stations in constituencies with popular opposition candidates. At the same time, military and police personnel are prohibited from voting or joining political parties. In exchange, police and military are given subsidies and control over "huge projects" in the development of human resources and infrastructure, all of which have rendered the police and military very important backers of and sources of stability for the Mubarak regime (Kassem 2004:42-43). In short, emergency law has been employed not only to respond to suspected extremist activities, but also to control and contain legitimate political activities.

Governance

Nasser adopted a single party system in 1952 in which the party was seen by the government as a means of mobilizing political participation rather than as a vehicle for popular participation (Kassem 2004:51). Although opposition parties have been functioning legally in Egypt since 1976, liberalization of the political system that followed under Sadat was shaped more by economic and political interests than by a desire for democratization (Kassem 2004:53). Law 40 (see Table..) restricts the role of political parties is seen as testimony of this. The vagueness of the law means that it can be used to reject almost any attempt to create a new party (Kassem 2004:53). Only one of fifty applications to form a new political party has been approved during Mubarak's presidency and the Political Parties Committee has suspended seven political parties since 1998 (Kassem 2004:57-58). One example is the Social Labour Party, which changed its name to the Labour Party in its adoption of an increasingly Islamist orientation, whose status was suspended by the PPC over "party in-fighting and disputes over leadership of the party" (Kassem 2004:59). The NGO, Egypt: For Culture and Dialogue, applied for and obtained NGO status after numerous failed attempts to form as a political party (Kassem 2004:58).

Egypt has sixteen legal political parties and the Mulsim Brotherhood, which is an illegal but tolerated opposition movement. But the various constraints on party formation and participation, political parties in Egypt are weak and underdeveloped and, moreover, excluded from policymaking processes (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7; Kassem 2004:76). Opposition parties are weak and poorly organized, and have great difficulty building a base of support at the grassroots level toward challenging the current clientelist structure of Egyptian politics (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7; Kassem 2004:80). Kassem contends that, as a result, political parties "resemble little more than a conglomerate of personalities possessing their personal networks of supporters. It is not uncommon for party members to switch political affiliation to suit their personal interests or compete against each other in elections" (Kassem 2004:80-81). Because of the weakness of opposition parties, most independent candidates join Mubarak's governing party, the National Democratic Party (NDP) once they gain their seat (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7). For example, following the 2000 legislative elections, 217 independent parliamentary members joined the NDP (Kassem 2004:81).

There have been widespread electoral irregularies, which have bolstered NDP dominance of the People's Assembly (Goodson and Radwan 1997:7). Continually changing electoral laws, as well as covert and overt obstruction by the government and police during campaigning and voting (such as preventing voters from entering polling stations), constrain popular participation and grant the government the right to exclude independent candidates (Kassem 2004:60-76).

Civil society

Like the rest of the Arab world, civil society in Egypt has been hindered by the authoritarian nature of the Egyptian political system. Law 32, the take-over of the *Waqf* (Islamic public and private endowments) by the state served to incorporate associations into formal state structures or render them obsolete. Exceptions are trade unions and professional associations.

In 1952, there were about 500 trade unions with a membership of 150,000; within five years their numbers increased to 1350 unions with a membership of 430,000 (Kassem 2004:89-91). Another exception is human rights organizations, some of which remain legally unrecognized. Egyptian civil society is "more consenting than participating" (Goodson and Radwan 1997:8).

In 1999, Law 153 came into force and was invalidated in 2002. But, despite an NGO campaign, in June 2002, a revised, more restricted version of the law was passed by the People's Assembly by 426 out of 454 votes. It was seen as a response by the government to NGO criticism of the state, and was more restrictive than its predecessor, Law No. 32. Under law 153, all NGOs not officially registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs are illegal. Members of unauthorized organizations are deemed criminal offenders, and registered NGOs must fulfill numerous requirements, including joining a federation of NGOs, accept onto their board an official from the Ministry of Social Affairs, and refrain from all activities of a 'political nature.' Also, all external funds must go through the Ministry of Social Affairs before dispensed to NGOs (Grunert 2003:140).

Membership in organizations or networks outside the country is also prohibited without prior government permission, and donor institutions are required to register with the Egyptian government (Grunert 2003:141,148). This means, reports Grunert, that "the funding decisions of non-registered donor agencies depend completely on the goodwill of the ministries" (Grunert 2003:143). This recent legislation renders previous pronouncements that the nongovernmental sector in Egypt was increasingly able to operate "outside the long shadow historically cast by the dominant Egyptian state" (Goodson and Radwan 1997:8). This long shadow is outlined by Kassem (2004) and very briefly summarized below.

Labour Unions

The government established the General Federation of Egyptian Trade Unions (GFETU) in 1957, and the bestowing of worker protection and benefits is seen as part of the government's "pattern of enticing labor support while strengthing the policies of containment and control" which continued through the 1960s (Kassem 2004:92). The 1970s

brought Law 3, which introduced prison terms with hard labour for striking, and Law 35, which increased government control over the union structure (Kassem 2004:101-102). By the early 1980s, most of the 120 leftist union representatives were in prison (Kassem 2004:102).

In 1991, a comprehensive economic reform and structural adjustment program (ERSAP) was introduced which transferred public enterprises over to the private sector. This program necessitated the reduction of the labour force in order to increase sale prospects and included early retirement packages for 250,000 workers.

Professional Syndicates

Unlike labour, professional syndicates benefited from the ERSAP as they converted their revenues into private investments (Kassem 2004:103). Professional syndicates have also fallen under state control in various ways, in efforts to coopt them. The electoral victories of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Doctors Syndicate in 1992 was perceived as a threat to the government. This was quickly followed by the efficiency with which the Engineers Synicate responded to the 1992 earthquake that hit Cairo. The government responded with, amongst other measures, Law 100 which requires 50 percent turnout for syndicate elections and, if this turnout was not reached, the state appointment of board members. The supervision of syndicate elections, under this law, passed to the judiciary (Kassem 2004:114). Kassem contends that,

> regime interference was precisely intended to hinder democratic development in order to maintain the government's monopoly on power. The government did not pursue professional syndicates because of their Islamist affiliation, but rather because these entities were showing signs of independence and character. It would not have pursued the syndicates with any less vigor had there been a secular liberal group instead of an Islamist group at the forefront of these events (Kassem 2004:117).

Kassem's study is useful in that it focuses on particular instances and case studies that illustrate ways in which the authoritarian policies of the Egyptian government have hindered the emergence of autonomous organizations in Egypt and, moreover, have produced "abnormal and erratic patterns of behavior within civil society" (Kassem 2004:58). Some of these patterns are increased labour strikes and riots that reflect a despair of the labour force with union and formal channels of communication and protest. Another is the formation of associations by opposition parties unable to attain official registration (such as Egypt: For Culture and Dialogue) (Kassem 2004:58, 126). A more drastic result of the state's authoritarian measures is the increase in radical Islamist groups and support (discussed below).

Human rights organizations

On the part of the Egyptian government, international support for service-sector NGOs is welcome in as much as it alleviates its financial burden. Additionally, strengthening popular secular forums became a means of countering the increasing influence of Islamists, the most powerful opposition force confronting the state (Grunert 2003:139). Human rights organizations, on the other hand, are viewed with suspicion by the state. As one senior Egyptian government official noted,

> Human rights means having the right to pray, the right to your religion, the freedom of work, the freedom of movement… How can [human rights] organizations get involved with the politics of the state and say there is freedom or no freedom? This is none of their business (Kassem 2004:119).

The human rights movement in Egypt started at the end of the 1970s, with a politicized student movement and a degree of tolerance within Sadat's policy of *infitah* (a policy of political opening). Students of law pressed for the abolition of emergency laws and decrees passed under the Nasser government (Grunert 2003:135). The first two Egyptian human rights organizations were set up as mouthpieces of the government in the late 1970s; one of these, Partisans Association of Human Rights in Cairo (PAHRC) continues to issue press releases in response to accusations of human rights violations by other organizations (Kassem 2004:119).

By the mid-1980s, activists began to set up independent organizations. These attracted left-wing party members with the end of the cold war's ideological disorientation (Grunert 2003:135). The Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) and the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) were established in 1985 and 1987 respectively. Under Law 32, the government used the existence of PAHRC to refuse official recognition to the EOHR (Kassem 2004:119-120).

International donors and the promotion of civil society

On the basis of interviews with 23 nongovernmental human rights and donor organizations in Cairo in 2002, Grunert provides an important examination of the interests and expectations behind NGO and donor cooperation, and the impact of Law No. 153, the new 'Law of Associations' that has regulated the activities of NGOs and impacted NGO-donor relations since 1999.

Grunert notes that international support for civil organizations became acceptable to the state as donors made the development of a stable democracy a condition of financial assistance for Egypt's integration into the world market (Grunert 2003:138). With this leverage, international agencies could take on the role of patrons to Egyptian NGOs. The commitment of human rights organizations to international conventions and what was perceived to be western values, meant they were seen as 'partners' of the West. They were also seen as natural mediators between the state and civil society. By the mid-1990s, they received the bulk of international donor support to Egyptian NGOs (Grunert 2003:138-39).

More than 15 new human rights organizations have been established since the mid-1990s, the majority dependent on external funding. The context of the new NGOs differs from that of their emergence in the late 1970s in that they emerged in the midst of a general feeling of mistrust of the Egyptian state and as a direct response to increasing human rights violations. Many of the human rights violations taken up by human rights organizations involve Islamists. These violations are increasingly addressed by NGOs in projects that do not involve donors, so as to avoid compromising them in their necessary mediation between the state and the NGOs (Grunert 2003:138).

The 'Law of Associations,' Law 153 (its provisions are outlined above) has regulated the activities of NGOs and impacted NGO-donor relations since 1999. The law has also fractured NGO community, with some NGOs deciding to fall in with the regulations and others refusing to register and accept the controls (Grunert 2003:141). The Hisham Mubarak Law Centre split in two, with the Association for Human Rights to Legal Aid registering official, while the remaining Hisham Centre continuing as usual and, hence, considered illegal (Grunert 2003:141). A mutual distrust has grown between organizations who chose to register and those who have not, and cooperation such as exchange of information has ceased (Grunert 2003:142).

Interestingly, organizations that chose to register reported that they felt they could make this compromise only with the moral backing of their international partner organizations, which they counted on for support in potential crisis situations (Grunert 2003:142). Such a situation arose in the arrest of 28 employees of the Ibn Khaldun Centre in May 2001, and the sentencing of its chairman, Said ed-Din Ibrahim, to seven years in prison (charges were dropped but he was subsequently charged again and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in June 2002). The centre was charged with accepting funds for an EU-sponsored program to observe the parliamentary elections of 2000. Ibrahim holds dual American and Egyptian citizenship, hence his arrest is seen as a response to American criticism of human rights violations in Egypt (Grunert 2003:142).

The case points to the precarious legal framework of bilateral contracts between donors and Egyptian NGOs and the need for donors (when not registered with the appropriate ministry to make special arrangements and rely on the good will of contacts. This is especially the case with the German political foundations, which are considered by the Egyptian government to be neither state, nor private institutes (Grunert 2003:142, 143).

It also highlights the importance of the monitoring role that international donors play. Although, Grunert notes, this monitoring role was found to be too demanding for most of the donors and many shifted toward less politicized projects (Grunert 2003:144).

Following September 11, human rights organizations in Egypt which protested against the unlawful treatment of Islamists, who were arrested in large numbers without charges brought against them, lost both the financial as well as the moral backing of international donors. Without this moral backing, NGOs and activists faced greater risks and most opted to develop programs which would not entail confrontation with the Egyptian government (Grunert 2003145). NGOs also increasingly adopted the less politicized agendas of donors, including the promotion of inter-religious dialogue (Grunert 2003:145).

Some Egyptian human rights organizations have refused to register and are attempting to restructure their programs so they are not dependent on international donors and are more interlinked with other Arab human rights organizations outside the country. Others, have registered by fell under the suspicion and coersive practices of the Egyptian state nonetheless. One of these is the Group for Democratic Development (GDD). The GDD's Teachers for Democracy project, sponsored by the Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), aimed to provide teachers "with the necessary communication skills and training to disseminate democratic values among their pupils" (Kassem 2004:124). The GDD sent the program evaluation and findings to the Ministry of Education with an offer

to assist in the ministry's future teacher training programs. The minister of education responded by, among measures to discredit and alienate the DGG, issuing an order to deduct two week's salary from each of the 100 teachers' pay cheque, and having 30 of the participants arrested and interrogated by state security forces (Kassem 2003:125). Unable to contend with the hostile measures of the government, the GDD eventually voluntarily disbanded in 2002.

Islamists

Kassem outlines the emergence of political Islam in Egypt, noting its initial establishment in 1928 with the creation of the Muslim Brothers (Muslim Brotherhood) by Hassan al-Banna. Influenced by earlier Islamic thinkers and reformers, the Muslim Brotherhood did not initially reject the established political order (Kassem 2004:134-35). Beyond its goal of Islamic "moral and social" reform, its nationalist defense (with regard to Palestine, the Suez, and British evacuation) increased their legitimacy and respect beyond their sectarian focus (Kassem 2004:1235). Its prominent members competed in the 1942 legislative elections but all were defeated because of government manipulation. Kassem notes that "the tense and antagonistic relationships between the state and the Brotherhood increased in proportion to the latter's popularity and growth" (Kassem 2004:135). In 1948, they were dissolved and responded by assassinating the Egyptian prime minister. Kassem notes that their violent response was not an exclusively Islamist phenomenon but connected to the desperation cxreated by wider socioeconomic and political discontent (Kassem 2004:136). Al-Banna was subsequently ambushed and killed by the new prime minister.

Kassem notes that the state used both 'cooperative' and 'coercive' tactics with the Brotherhood, which proved useful in countering other opponents and external threats (such as the Arab Israeli conflict) (Kassem 2004:137). The Nasser government crushed the Brotherhood, which resulted in a reactionary Islamic ideology by the late 1960s, as reflected in the works of Sayyid Qutb (Kassem 2004:138-39). Qutb was "a very liberal writer" until he was sentenced to 15 years in prison during which time he was tortured and 21 of his prison mates massacred. He emerged with a belief in a radical political theology of violence and isolation (Kassem 2004:139). Sadat attempted a reconciliation with the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s, releasing prisoners and encouraging exiles to return. The organization remained illegal but was allowed to rebuild itself. In the meantime, two groups with younger members emerged, Al-Jama' al-Islamiya and Tamzim al-Jihad and later formed an alliance. Conflict between the state and Islamists reached a peak in September 1981 when Sadat arrested 1500 intellectual, religious and political individuals, most of whom were Islamists (Kassem 2004:144). Mubarak's regime "has produced an unprecedented expansion of politically motivated violence involving Islamists and an upsurge in the number of Islamist prisoners" which contributed to the movements move from religious fundamentalism to political terrorism (Kassem 2004:145). The movement was also making gains in formal politics, winning, respectively, eight and then 38 seats in the 1984 and 1987 legislative elections. Mass arrests just prior to the 1987 elections did not prevent the gains of the Brotherhood, which comprised nine percent of the vote, or more than half a million votes (Kassem 2004:148, 151).

Mass and indiscriminate arrests (including of female family members of the Muslim Brotherhood) reflect the government's assumption that wholesale repression would "solve

the matter once and for all"; but, as Kassem points out, such a coercive and ultimately unsuccessful strategy underlines the insecurity and fragility of authoritarian rule (Kassem 2004:152). Indeed, mounting state violence resulted in the emergence of violence against the security forces that was, interestingly, personally rather than politically motivated--as individuals reacted to the wrongs and humiliation they endured (Kassem 2004:153).

Kassem's study outlines this spiral of violence, noting how the state responded by amending the penal code to expand the application of the death penalty and the definition of terrorism to include "spreading panic" and "obstructing the work of authorities" (Kassem 2004:155). (These resulted in greater violence on the part of the Brotherhood. By 2001, there were an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 Islamist political prisoners (Kassem 2004:155-56).) In brief, the militant forms of political Islam did not emerge in a vacuum in Egypt; the role of the state, as well as general political disillusionment, poverty, unemployment, alienation, and other socioeconomic factors, have increased its appeal (Kassem 2004:163).

Kassem describes the effects of the post 9/11 environment on the international community's role. Specifically, its role has waned leaving human rights advocates are vulnerable. As one activist explained, "by simply defending human rights by taking a stand against torture or military trials for civilians, I am placed in the position where I am accused of defending terrorism" (Kassem 2004:182).

Summary findings of the literature:

While Egypt fairs better than the rest of the Arab world, with the exception of the Palestinian territories, civil liberties and political rights have worsened since 1990 (Goodson and Radwan 1997:10). The literature indicates that freedom of speech, freedom of religion, police control, freedom of association and the emergency law all represent areas in which there has been no or negative progress (Goodson and Radwan 1997:10).

The absence of organizational autonomy presents a challenge to donors, as does the combination of repression and cooptation that has served to weaken political parties and the multiparty system in Egypt. The government's strategy of containing and controlling popular participation in the political system has prevented a broad-based opposition from forming and contributed to the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood. In turn, state violence and repression has spawned greater extremism on the part of Islamists. The realm of civil society has become increasingly constrained since 9/11, and NGOs as well as donors are caught in a bind whereby the promotion of democratic ideals and practices can be perceived as a threat by the government.

The precarious legal framework for both donors and nongovernmental organizations points to the need to foster wider conditions for civil society development, and the importance of indirect and moral support to organizations.

Legislation	**Source**	**General Info**
Constitutions during	Kassem 2004:17	1953 – empowered the Revolutionary Central Command (RCC) to formulate national policy;

Nasser's presidency– 1953, 1956, 1958, 1962, 1964		1956 – replaced a parliamentary system with a presidential Republican system in which the president appoints and dismisses ministers (enabled Nasser to replace Free Officers with civilians) 1964 constitution established state security courts
1971 Constitution	Kassem 2004:25; Goodson and Radwan 1997:4	Remains in effect today and enshrines the preeminence of the presidency over legislative and judiciary branches of government; Article 93 gives the National Assembly authority to determine the validity of its elections and the credentials of its members, thus undermining the representative function of the legislature and maintaining NDP hegemony in parliament.
Article 88 of Constitution; Articles 24,25 of Law 73	Goodson and Radwan 1997:8	States voting should be supervised by the judiciary, but is undermined by Article 25 of Law 73 (1956) which limits judiciary supervision to the main voting locations and not subsidiary voting stations; Article 24 requires supervisors of subsidiary voting stations be appointed by the Ministry of Interior
Penal Code articles 98b, 102, 102b, and 194	Kassem 2004:57	Authorize imprisonment for "anyone in Egypt who advocates, in any way, the changing of basic principles of the constitution…who shouts or sings in public with the purpose of inciting dissent" or dissemination "false or instigating news, information, or rumors that disturb the public peace, frighten people, or harm the public interest."
Article 153 of the rules and procedures of the People's Assembly	Kassem 2004:30-31	allows, in urgent cases, a vote to be put to a final vote at the same sitting in which it was approved. Was used to pass 55.7 percent of all bills enacted into law during the 1997-1998 legislative session.
Law 46 (1972)	Kassem 2004:36	Gives the presidency responsibility for appointing and promoting judges, including Supreme Constitutional Court judges, and appointing the public prosecutor, attorney generals, and Court of Cassation judges. The president also presides over
Law 81 (1969)	Kassem 2004:19	Provided for an independent judicial body (Supreme Constitutional Court) to supervise the constitutionality of laws, though stipulated that SCC judges be appointed directly by the president
Labour Legislation		
Law 3 (1977)	Kassem 2004:102	Increased the penalty for striking to imprisonment with hard labour
Law 12 (1991)	Kassem 2004:109	Further weakened the link between workers and unions; served to secure the union positions of co-opted union leaders
Law 12 (2003)	Kassem 2004:110	Unified labour law, includes the right to strike (though only if approved by the GFETU; shortened paid holiday and maternity leave; greater ability of employer to hire and fire employees; and pay increases linked to market profits.
Law 35 (1976, 1981)	Kassem 2004:101	Reinforced government control over the union structure, including alienating union officials from their constituents and increasing their dependence on government
Civil Society Legislation		
Law 32 (1964)	Kassem	Requires civil associations to register with the Ministry of Social Affairs,

	2004:88-89	not engage in political activities; they can be prohibited if its founding is "not in accord with security measures" or if its work duplicates the services of another association. Seen as a mechanism for the Ministry to exclude unwanted organizations from civil participation.
Law 84	Kassem 2004:122	Not yet ratified; "a carbon copy of Law 153" passed via the formal channels that had proclaimed Law 153 unconstitutional
Law 93	Kassem 2004:31	Passed in 1995, provides for harsh penalties and prison sentences for the publication of false or malicious news
Law 153 (1999; invalidated in 2002)	Grunert 2003:140; Kassem 2004:122	Stipulates all NGOs not officially registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs are illegal. Members of unauthorized organizations are deemed criminal offenders, and registered NGOs must fulfill requirements such as join a federation of NGOs, accept onto their board an official from the Ministry of Social Affairs, and refrain from all activities of a 'political nature.' Also, external funds must go through the Ministry of Social Affairs before dispensed to NGOs. Proclaimed unconstitutional in 2002, hence government reverted to Law 32 with regard to the denial of EOHR's and other organizations' legal recognition
Electoral and Political Party Legislation		
Law 40 (1977)	Kassem 2004:53; Goodson and Radwan 1997:7	Political parties can only be established if their goals, principles and programs do not conflict with *shari'a* principles, national unity, and public order and are distinct from those of other parties. Political parties and their leaders are forbidden from having links to organizations abroad. Also prevents religious parties, including the Muslim Brotherhood or Coptic political organizations from legally fielding candidates under their labels.
Law 114 (1983)	Kassem 2004:59	Electoral system changed from individual candidacy to party-list (and from first past the post to proportional representation); constituencies changed from 176 to 48; and a minimum requirement of 8 percent of the nationwide vote for a party to attain representation in the People's Assembly

IRAN

The state of freedom of association in Iran remains precarious and in the grip of both institutional and existential crises. Iran remains a post-revolutionary society with high popular expectations that the state must be more answerable to the population. The state, meanwhile, has institutionally protected itself against wider accountability. Low voter turnout in recent elections are seen as a harbinger of both popular disaffection and increasing state fragility. Women and youth are seen as critical catalysts of any future pro-democracy movement. Last year's election brought in a conservative parliament that promptly rejected reform proposals and introduced new restrictions. The following discussion outlines political and social institutions and fissures in Iran that impact on civil society and political activism.

Freedom of association and expression

Amnesty International reports that freedom of expression and association in Iran is curtailed by legal restrictions and by structural flaws in the judicial system, including compromised independence of the judicial system. The result has been extensive unfair trials and imprisonment of prisoners of conscience (http://web.amnesty.org/web/content.nsf/pages/gbr_Iran_freedom).

Iran's Constitution guarantees freedom of belief, yet restrictions on freedom of expression and association in Iranian law serve to side step both the Iranian Constitution and international human rights treaties which Iran has signed onto. Restrictive, contradictory and vaguely worded provisions contained in the Penal Code, as well as the Theologicans' Law, a body of law that deals with offences committed by clerics, and the Public and Revolutionary Courts' Procedural Law also undermine the right to freedom of expression, including the prohibition of a range of activities connected with journalism or public discourse which do not amount to criminal offences.

Reportedly, efforts by Iran's judiciary to curtail freedom of expression and association are now increasingly encroaching on human rights defenders and civil society activists. Last November, Mahboubeh Abbasgholizadeh, the editor of Farzaneh, a women's rights journal was arrested at her home on 2 November 2004 (http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE130452004?open&of=ENG-IRN).

Governing bodies

In 1979, a revolution led by the Ayatollah Khomeini established a theocratic Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) by popular vote. This was followed by destructive Iran-Iraq war was waged between 1980 and 1988. A year later, revisions to the constitution expanded the powers of the presidency and eliminated the prime ministership. The constitution codifies Islamic principles of government. Political parties have not been permitted since 1988. The following table illustrates relationships of governing bodies to each other and is followed by descriptions of each in turn (the table is found at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/Iran_power/html/president.stm).



The **electorate** is comprised of people over the age of 15, including women, but their choice is limited by the fact that the theocratic structure of the state predetermines who can stand for elections. Women and young people were the main bloc of voters who elected reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1997. In the recent elections in March 2005, voter turnout dropped significantly (according to Khameini, to 50%) ("Political Islam" 2004).

The **president** is elected for four years and can serve no more than two consecutive terms, and serves as the second-highest ranking official in the country. He heads the executive branch of power and is responsible for the government's adherence to the constitution. In practice, the president, currently Ali Mohammad Khatami-Ardakani (since 3 August 1997), is constrained by clerics and conservatives and the authority of the Supreme Leader.

The **cabinet**, or Council of Ministers, are chosen by the president and approved by parliament, which can also impeach them. Members' decisions are heavily monitored by conservatives watching for any deviation from their strict Islamic line.

Members of the *majlis*, **parliament**, or consultative assembly are elected by popular vote every four years. The parliament has 290 seats, and can introduce and pass laws, as well as to summon and impeach ministers or the president. However, all its bills must pass approval by the conservative Guardian Council. Further, all candidates are vetted by the Guardian Council before being able to stand for parliamentary elections. While the February 2000 elections saw reformists gain a majority, the February 2004 elections were effectively boycotted by the reformists and resulted in conservatives dominating the parliament. Prior to the elections, 2000 candidates were excluded ("Political Islam" 2004).

The regime's control over who can stand for election is effected through two 'tests': candidates have to be (and presumably demonstrate they are) committed to the Islamic state, and further be in agreement with the policies of the ruling group (Kazemi 1996:139). Kazemi rightly points out that these to restrictions need to be eliminated if parliament were to develop into an institution that could facilitate civil society (Kasemi 1996:139). The February 2004 elections resulted in a conservative dominated parliament that promptly moved to reject proposals to expand women's rights and adopt a UN convention on women's rights (Fathi 2004:17).

The **Guardian Council** is the most influential body and is currently controlled by conservatives. It is responsible for ensuring parliament does not pass laws that are deemd out of step with Shi'a-Islamic precepts. In practice, it has used its power to veto laws not in the interests of the state (Kazemi 2003:87). It has six theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists nominated by the judiciary and approved by parliament. Members are elected for six years and approve all bills passed by parliament, ensuring they conform to the constitution and Islamic law. The council, as mentioned above, also vets all candidates in elections to parliament, the presidency and the Assembly of Experts. Reformists have attempted to reduce its vetting power. Kazemi contends that the Guardian Council has "become a most significant institutional barrier to the emergence of a counter-elite in Iranian politics. Its chief function has been to preserve the clerical rule and the dominant status quo power arrangements" (Kazemi 2003:87).

The **Assembly of Experts** appoints the Supreme Leader, monitors his performance and can remove him if he is deemed incapable of fulfilling his duties. Only clerics can join the assembly and candidates for election are vetted by the Guardian Council. The assembly is dominated by conservatives.

The **Supreme Leader** is elected by the clerics of the Assembly of Experts and serves for life. Currently Ayatollah Ali Hoseini-Khamenei (since 4 June 1989), the supreme leader appoints the head of the judiciary, six of the members of the powerful Guardian Council, the commanders of all the armed forces, Friday prayer leaders and the head of radio and TV. He also confirms the president's election. Periodic tension between the office of the leader (head of state) and the office of the president (head of government) has often been a source of political instability and reflects deeper tensions between religious rule and the democratic aspirations of most Iranians.

The **armed forces,** comprising the Revolutionary Guard and the regular forces, are appointed by and answerable to the supreme leader. The Revolutionary Guard also has a powerful presence in other institutions, and controls volunteer militias with branches in every town. Until early last century, the Iranian **judiciary** was controlled by the clergy. The system was later secularised, but after the revolution the Supreme Court revoked all previous laws that were deemed un-Islamic and replaced with Sharia laws. The head of the judiciary also reports to the supreme leader.

Its members appointed by the supreme leader, the **Expediency Council** (or Discretionary Council) is an advisory body for the Leader with adjudicating power in disputes over legislation between the parliament and the Guardian Council. It was created by Khomeini in 1988 to resolve disputes between the Guardian Council, parliament, and the executive branch. It is seen as a "safety valve for protecting the clerical system's integrity and viability" and "further ensures that divisions in the ruling class do not spill into the public domain" (Kazemi 2003:87).

State-society relations

Under the Shah, Kazemi notes, the Iranian state functioned with a high degree of autonomy in the 1960s and 70s, operating without social input through such mechanisms as political parties, popularly elected legislatures, a free press and local political activity (Kazemi

1996:121). The scope of civil society activities was restricted. A tradition of religious institutional and economic autonomy persisted, though, with religious institutions eventually becoming an important factor in the Shah's demise (Kazemi 1996:122).

The Islamic revolution brought together divers social groupings in a large coalition that eventually toppled the Iranian monarchy. The state became the main arm of the Islamic nation and debates ensued as to the meaning of an Islamic state and the relationship of the state and judiciary to the Islamic society (Kazemi 1996:123). These debates were 'solved' when, in 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the state to be paramount to the community. Khomeini introduce the Sunni concept of *maslaha* which provides for the unconditional authority of the Islamic state in all matters concerning the Islamic community. He also created the Expediency Council (sometimes referred to as the Discretionary Council) to resolve disputes among government bodies.

Political and religious authority is in the person of the supreme leader and the state is able to bypass constitutional safeguards as well as the Guardian Council (Kazemi 1996:133-34). Kazemi notes that the effect is that the state is able to violate citizens' rights for the sake of common good (Kazemi 1996:124-25). Further, the concept of citizenship becomes a matter of religiosity and conditional on an individual's level of support to the state. This puts in peril individual rights and ensures "at least potentially for intermittent or systematic violation of individual rights when they are perceived to serve the larger purposes of a well-defined community" (Kazemi 1996:125).

Constraints on individual freedoms in Iran have been well documented and highlight the fact that the legal framework itself provides no recourse for individuals. The rights of religious minorities (in particular the Baha'is, which are the largest religious minority) and women are further particularly constrained by formal and informal restrictions—as well as by the Islamic identity of the state. Iran is characterized by a particularly stark divide between private and public spheres, whereby the population's adherence to the dictates of the state are elaborately policed, while an increasingly disaffected population eschews these controls in private spaces in favour of 'Western' cultural liberties.

Voices of protest are heard from both disadvantaged religious minorities and women, as well as from those who believe in an Islamic order but do not support the rule of the clerics (Kazemi 2003:94). Kazemi states, also, that:

> …in spite of sustained efforts, the regime has failed to fully Islamize Iranian society. The implication of this failure is potentially quite severe, as more and more of the youth and others become disenchanted with the place of Islam in the social order. This may well turn out to be the regime's Achilles heel with strong negative implications for its future (Kazemi 2003:94).

Women

There is an extensive literature on women in Iran.[9] The following discussion summarizes the context of women's rights and highlights the question of strategic alliances between secular and nonsecular women's movements.

The Family Protection Law of 1967 (modified in 1975) restricted polygyny and reformed divorce and custody laws; it also increased the role of civil courts which served also to marginalize the role of the clergy. These reforms resulted in a vocal Islamist opposition (Shahidian 2002a:69). The revolution that ensued (between 1977 and 1979) was widely supported by women (see Moghadam 2004). Following the revolution, many laws which offered some protection to women were repealed. The Family Protection Law was abrogated. The age of marriage was lowered to nine for girls, temporary marriage was reinstituted along with men's ability to unilaterally divorce, family planning was abolished, and women were barred from several professions (such as attorney and judge) and fields of study. The *hejab*, the most visible form of the state's control over women's bodies, was variously imposed (Shahidian 2002a:112; Moghadam 2004:460-62).

Mehrdad Khonsari, leader of the constitutionalist Movement of Iran, notes also that the rates of prostitution and drug abuse by women are high and rising; a woman's testimony is worth half of that of a man's; women lose guardianship of their children to their husband's family upon the death of their husbands; and women are not allowed to go abroad to study (Women in Iran 2001:132) (although the last restriction has been challenged by women and the law now states that women can go abroad but require the permission of their fathers).

Hammed Shahidian's two volumes (*Women in Iran: Gender Politics in the Islamic* Republic and Women *in Iran: Emerging Voices in the Women's Movement*, both 2002) discuss gender relations in Iran from the 1960s and women's strategies of resistance. Drawing on sociological theories of culture, patriarchy and conflict, he focuses on state-level politics, the women's movement, and the Iranian left. Shahidian contends the Islamic government is seeking "to revive private patriarchy in all its tyrannical forms" (Shahidian 2002a:3).

Shahidian's books provide a critical analysis of the politics of gender and sexuality in Iran, and examine discourses of Islamic and secular feminism. His conclusion, though, is problematic. Shehadian argues that Islam is essentially patriarchal and that Islamic feminists perpetuate Islamic patriarchy and undermine the efforts of secular feminists. His assessment is that Islamic feminists and reformists engage in a defeatist politics of compromise rather than cultural innovation. He proposes, instead, "clean ruptures from much of our cultural and social past" (Shehidian 2002b:166). Fatemeh Ebtehaj, in her review of Shehadian's two volumes, makes an important point that would indicate that activists can both draw on and help change cultural contexts. Ebtehaj states,

> …secular forces, instead of being weakened by Islamic feminists as Shahidian argues, can in fact draw on their arguments to question the absolutist base of religious rulings and to highlight the limitations of a legal system based in religion. They can also point to the factional differences within the Islamic republic and use these as evidence that political power undermines the authority and legitimacy of religion, thereby strengthening their demands for the separation of religion from the state, and for equal rights for all citizens, regardless of religious belief (Ebthaj 2005:118).

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[9] These include: Afsaneh Najmabadi (1991), "Hazards of modernity and morality: women and morality; women state and ideology in contemporary Iran," in *Women, Islam, and the State*, edited by D. Kandiyoti. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; Nesta Ramazani (1993), "Women in Iran: the revolutionary ebb and flow," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 47 (Summer):409-428).

As Kazemi rightly points out, the Islamic identity of the state (which has been bolstered by Khomeini) severely restricts the space allowed for women and leaves open the possibility that gains can easily be lost when the state reinvigorates its divine message (Kazemi 1996:133). The precarious nature of women's gains was underlined last June, when the recently elected parliament convened. As mentioned above, the parliament moved to reject proposals to expand Iranian women's inheritance rights and to adopt the United nations convention banning discrimination against women. Instead, it introduced new restrictive measures (Fathi 2004:17). Nonetheless, as the parliament moved against reforms, an Iranian political analyst, Haleh Anvari, asserted that,

> The general trend in this country is moving towards reforms. These restrictions are like putting a little stone in front of a huge storm that is going for reform (Fathi 2004:17).

Previous developments, perhaps, will shore up women's activism. For example, in the previous parliamentary elections of 1995 and 2000, speeches by women parliamentarians attested, argues Moghadam, "to changing and more assertive attitudes, with language that is less specifically Islamic and more compatible with what may be called 'global feminism' (Moghadam 2004:462). Perhaps more prescient is the fact that women's affairs offices were established in each ministry and government agency and women's activism led to the formation of numerous NGOs addressing women's concerns. Additionally, a "lively" women's press contributed to public discourse on women's issues through books, magazines, and women's studies journals. These, notes Moghadam, have been taking on important poltical, cultural, religious and social issues (Moghadam 2004:462). Moghadam's comparative analysis of state, society and gender politics in Iran and Afghanistan also notes activism by Iranian legal analysts, academics, and 'Islamic feminists' in contesting institutional privileges of men over women (Moghadam 2004:449-67).

The wider context of civil society will be a crucial element in how and whether women and other reformists will be able to effect changes in legislation and political accountability.

Civil society

Iran has long had a strong civil society, with a plethora of informal and formal groups, organizations, and associations characterized by patron-client relations. Notably, while the power of the state loomed large, both its autonomy from society and its arbitrary exercise of power have historically provided fertile ground for unequal reciprocity between civil society organizations and their 'clients' (Kazemi 1996:118).

Kazemi situates the emergence of and relations between civil society and political and religious institutions within a historical framework. He also provides helpful sketch of semi-autonomous organizations, comprising foundations, guilds, Islamic Committees, and professional associations, on which the following discussion draws heavily (Kazemi 1996:141-150). Foundations in Iran are non-profit *bonyads*, or endowments established by nongovernment bodies for nonprofit activities. Islamic charitable endowments (*waqf*) also play a key role. Private foundations also function as a link between the state and society. Guilds also have a long history in Iranian civil society. The Tehran Council of the Chamber

of Guilds struggled to maintain its autonomy from the state after the revolution and managed "some degree of limited autonomy" (Kazemi 1996:149).

'Factory committees' or *shuras* that emerged in the months after the revolution managed a good deal of autonomy though did not manage to organize across industries or survive the regime's purging of their leftist members (Kazemi 1996:149-50). Tolerated by the government, these and other semi-autonomous organizations are currently able to put moderate pressure on the government, but do not function as an opposing voice (Kazemi 1996:150).

A 'new generation' of NGOs emerged recently that address women's concerns, the environment, children, health, and training. Their work is variously informative, educational, service oriented, or in production and training. Reportedly, there are over 2,500 NGOs in Iran; Sayyah reports, though, that most of these have ceased to be active or affective soon after their initial formation due to a lack of expertise and absence of well defined goals (Sayyah 2003).

In terms of its discursive weight, civil society has been the focus of numerous seminars, conferences, and publications since the beginning of Khatami presidency (Banuazizi 2001). Ali Banuazizi notes that the idea of civil society has also penetrated day-to-day politics in the slogans and promises of candidates for various offices. The following discussion draws on his online article.

Three positions have emerged in debates on civil society in Iran. The first, promulgated by hard-line conservatives, is the notion that civil society is antithetical to the basic values and ideals of an Islamic society and state. These proponents are in the most powerful positions in Iran's political establishment, controlling the means of violence as well as much of the economic power.

The second group wants to Islamicize the idea of civil society, to make it compatible with the norms and values of the present order. An "Islamic civil society" would be clearly distinguishable from its secular, Western counterparts. Third are those who see the concept as ideologically neutral but a useful mean of structuring state-society relations and protecting the autonomy and freedom of citizens and associations. This group also wants to promote a more tolerant, pluralist, and democratic order. Banuazizi contends that this group was behind Khatami's overwhelming election victory and is seen to be clearly in the majority among the electorate. They have "extolled the virtues of political toleration, the compatibility between Islam and democracy, the normalization of the country's foreign policy, and above all, the vital importance of the rule of law" (Banuazizi 2001).

The wider political context has a direct bearing on the fate of reform in Iran and, consequently, on the efficacy of civil society. Farhad Kazemi provides an excellent analysis of ideological and factional divides in Iran following the revolution and their institutional context. Kazemi notes that fissures in the Iranian political system are problematic, and that the battle between supporters and detractors of reform continues. He suggests that,

> In spite of all the regime attempts to control civil society and undermine institutions of reform, the final outcome is not necessarily determined. The harsh onslaught on

> reformers has done significant damage to their progressive agenda and has led to widespread disenchantment with politics (Kazemi 2003:92).

More ominously, Kazemi notes that "politics of despair" is emerging that reflects "a growing popular sentiment that normal political processes are not effective since they do not respond to legitimate demands for participation in the system" (Kazemi 2003:92). This is particularly marked among the youth which are seen as an, albeit unorganized, pro-democracy force that is openly questioning the "religious straightjacket" imposed on them (Kazemi 2003:93).

A vibrant civil society in Iran faces a reform movement that is, since the last elections, institutionally weaker and a clerical regime that is unpopular but stronger. The large middle class and the fact that women are increasingly educated will, perhaps, continue to be salient factors in Iran's civil society and reform movements (see Moghadam 2004:464). The following list of civil society organizations and donors draws on Sayyah's brief note on NGOs in Iran (at http://www.payvand.com/news/03/jan/1114.html):

Rayhanato Nabi Charity Institute

Kahrizak Charity Foundation
www.mahak-charity.org

Green Front of Iran
www.greenfront.org

The Society for the Protection of Handicapped Children & Youth
www.tavanyab.org

Association for Protection of Women

Women & Social Development Association

Women Organization Against Environment Pollution

Hamyaran NGO Resource Center
www.Iranngos.org

Noavaran Innovation Group

Mother & Child's House Group

Institute for Women's Studies & Research

Zeinab Kobra Charity Organization

Khatamonabbiyin Charity

Civil Society's Youth Association

Center for Women Participation

Qom's Commission for Women's Affairs

Family Planning Association of Iran

Roshdieh Charity Association

Iran's Green Society

Women Association

Women's Cultural Association

Azahra Institute

Payam Hajar Cooperative

Hazrate Mehdi Association

Association for Supporting the Socially Vulnerable

Imam Sadegh's Philanthropic Foundation

Women's Society against Environmental Pollution

Convention on the Right of the Child

International Agencies in Iran

FAO (Food & Agriculture Organization)

UNDP (UN Development Progamm)

UNDCO (UN International Drug Control)

UNFPA (UN Population Fund)

UNICEF (UN Children Fund)

WHO (World Health Organization)

IOM (The International Organization for Migration)

UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees)

UNIC (UN Information Center)

WFP (World Food Program)

Oxfam

Ockenden International

Green Front of Iran (Green Peace)

IRAQ

Government

Parliamentary elections took place on January 30, 2005 (suffrage is universal in Iraq and the minimum voting age is 18). The legislative branch of government, the National Assembly, is to consist of 275 members. The Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period states that the judiciary is independent, and "it shall in no way be administered by the executive authority, including the Ministry of Justice," as it had been before the war. Instead, a Higher Juridical Council consisting of various judges is to supervise the federal judiciary and shall administer its budget. The Iraqi court system comprises Civil Courts, Courts of Personal Status, and Criminal Courts. Jurors of the Courts of Personal Status are either qadis, or religious judges, or judges from civil courts.

Constitution

A provisional constitution went into effect in 1970. A new interim constitution was adopted in 1990. Following the war, the Iraqi 1990 Constitution is no longer in force. The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) unanimously approved an interim constitution, or Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) on 8 March 2004, which is to be in effect until 2005 when a permanent constitution will be adopted. The Law is to be followed by an addendum which will include provisions for non-direct elections of an interim representative government for the transfer of administrative power in 2005 (http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/iz__indx.html). The Law establishes a parliamentary system, with legislative powers in an elected National Assembly. The presidency will have more than symbolic powers. Nathan J. Brown, professor of political science and international affairs at George Washington University provides an analysis of various articles at: http://www.geocities.com/ nathanbrown1/interimiraqiconstitution.html.

Islam as source of legislation –

Brown notes that Article 7 had provoked international and domestic controversy in that it attempts to represent a compromise between those wanting Islam as the primary source of legislation and those wishing it to be "a source." Brown notes that absent any provisions for establishing who would have authority to interpret sharia, it is unclear whether the article would have legal binding. He notes,

> Providing that Islam is "a source" of legislation is vague indeed. Other Arab constitutions refer to "the principles of Islamic law," but the Iraqi Law refers only to Islam. More important, the clause would seem to be an injunction to legislators to consult Islamic law but not to bind them to it, much less to any particular interpretation (url as above).

Shi'ite clerics are pushing for Islam to be recognized as the guiding principle of the new constitution, with marriage, divorce, and family inheritance falling under Sharia law (for example, daughters would receive half the inheritance of sons) (Wong 2005:1).

Gender provisions –

As a goal (rather than a quota), 25% of the national assembly seats are to be reserved for women (Art. 30) (http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/iz__indx.html). Regarding Article 11, Brown notes that a provision in an earlier draft, that grants both fathers and mothers the right to pass on Iraqi citizenship, has been removed in this one (url as above). Juan Cole and Shahin Cole have written a general analysis on gender issues for the Los Angeles Times (available through access to their archives, pending; url or ref. pending). Brown notes that, in Article 12, the provisions for gender equality is "very generous." He states,

> Indeed, it is far more generous than in the United States (where an equal rights amendment to the constitution was never ratified). However, other Arab countries with similar provisions (such as Kuwait) have not always implemented them fully. Kuwait bars women from voting in a manner that almost certainly violates its constitution. Yet it took over three decades for a court case to be raised challenging the ban, and the Kuwaiti courts have thus far escaped from ruling on the manner because of technical deficiencies in the cases that have been raised (http://www.geocities.com/nathanbrown1/interimiraqiconstitution.html).

Protection of rights –

Wide claims that the interim constitution provides for a bill of rights that is unparalleled in the region are seen as an exaggeration by Brown. Rather, Brown notes:

> by the standards of the Arab world, the rights provisions are not particularly extensive. What is innovative is the number of rights that are absolute, not depending on implementing legislation. The language here is often quite carefully drafted to close loopholes…However, the reliance on implementing legislation in the Iraqi case may raise significant problems [as] no formula is included insisting that a right cannot be limited in the guise of defining it (url as above).

Article 15 addresses provisions for searches, detentions, and trials. Brown notes that this article is "unusually detailed," and "particularly air-tight" in comparison to other constitutions in the region. Interestingly, Brown notes that,

> The prohibition of trials of civilians in military courts and the ban on exceptional courts is also quite unusual for the region (though not wholly unprecedented). However, this wording is flatly contradicted by Article 48, which provides for an exceptional court that is to act wholly outside the constitutional framework (url as above).

NGOs –

There is a law governing NGOs, and a provision within the interim constitution to protect those working with international NGOs (Article 21), deemed "innovative" by Brown. Article 21 states:

> Neither the Iraqi Transitional Government nor the governments and administrations of the regions, governorates, and municipalities, nor local administrations may interfere with the right of the Iraqi people to develop the institutions of civil society, whether in cooperation with international civil society organizations or otherwise (http://www.geocities.com/nathanbrown1/interimiraqiconstitution.html).

Labour rights –

The TAL confirms the right to join trade unions and the right to strike and demonstrate, along with more general rights to freedom of assembly, of expression and protection from discrimination on the basis of race, gender, religion etc., according to a report of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) (found at: http://www.tuc.org.uk/international/tuc-7859-f0.cfm).

YEMEN

The two Yemens united in May 1990, with the two parties of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) or North Yemen and the People's Democratic Republic (PDRY) or South Yemen, agreeing to share power in the transition parliament. In 1991, a constitution was adopted in a popular referendum which affirmed freedom of association "inasmuch as it was not contrary to the constitution," along with other rights and "equal treatment" regardless of sex, colour, racial origin, language, occupation, social status, or religious beliefs (Carapico 1995:243).

Sheila Carapico's piece in Korany, et al. notes that the Parties and Political Organizations Law guaranteed ballot secrecy and the right of all adults to run for political office or join political parties (Carapico 1998:243). A number of parties and candidates campaigned in the 1993 and 1997 parliamentary elections, and fifty women ran for parliament in 1993 (Carapico 1995:248). Nonetheless, as Carapico notes, a number of issues remained undefined by the constitution. These included, among others, the nature of executive authority and the relationship of legislated law to religious law (Carapico 1995:243).

The unity agreements were disregarded by the leadership, who had "the least to gain and the most to lose from democratic governance" (Carapico 1995:243). In response, a National Dialogue Committee of Political Forces, "armed with resolutions from scores of local and scholarly conferences," produced an Accord of Contract and Agreement that was signed by the president, vice president, and parliamentary speaker in 1994 (Carapico 1995:224). This accord set limitations on executive powers and greater independence of the judiciary, and reflected the emerging pro-democracy movement. Civil war in the summer of 1994 and political repression intervened though (Carapico 1995:244).

There are three main political parties and an additional 40 that formed after unification. The main parties are:

- Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) dominated the bureaucracy and armed services and gained a following among peasants and students in the1970s in favour of unification (Carapico 1995:245).
- General People's Congress (GPC), founded in the 1980s as an umbrella organization within the regime and formed as a party during unification (Carapico 1995:244).
- Islah, Northern-based reform party, also formed as a party during unification and is described by Carapico as "stridently 'fundamentalist,'" and a "thoroughly modern" party (Carapico 1995:246-47). It is anticommunist, supports private property, family values, capital punishment and gun ownership. It is also, interestingly, critical of many Yemeni religious traditions and thus does not represent the whole spectrum of Islamist movement in Yemen.

For the 1993 elections, Islah conducted the first nationwide voter-registration drive for women (Carapico 1995:247, 249).

Yemeni Ba'th Socialist Party, and pan-Arabism, traditionalist Islamist groups are included among the 40 smaller parties. An opposition coalition formed in parliament that, together with independents, has held most seats of parliament.

The two Yemens also provide interesting examples of different ways in which civil society and the state are intertwined. In south Yemen, the emerging socialist state was fostered from within civil society--unions, clubs, Islamic movements--which played a direct role in political mobilization against the British and Yemeni sultans. The new socialist state incorporated the associations through the accord mentioned above. This gave associations a voice and benefits and resulted in 'law and order' that was lacking in north Yemen (Raymond Hinnebusch 1999:n.p.). Another aspect of civil society discussed in the literature with regard to Yemen is the difficulty of merging civil societies in the secular, socialist North Yemen with those in the South after unification. LDAs (traditional local development associations called *ta'awuns*) played important roles in the development of Yemen but the process of unification brought their demise as local councils were created (Carapico 1999).

As mentioned in the recommendations below, Yemen presents a case of a dialectical and complex interrelation between the state and civil society (Hinnebusch 1999:n.p.). The long and strong support in Yemen for socialist or social democratic programs, and for women's rights, trade unionism, and cooperatives warrants further investigation into how these sectors can be supported.

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A Saudi-owned London newspaper on Jan. 13, 2003 leaked a portion of Crown Prince Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud 's proposal for a new "Arab Charter," which calls for "internal reform and enhanced political participation in the Arab countries." With so many other problems in the Middle Bast, however, it has been difficult to move the reform project along. Other proposed reforms include local and regional elections, an independent judiciary, and royal guarantees of freedom of expression, association, assembly, the right to vote and to participate, and of all other human rights. The reform debate also showed clearly that the influential Saudi business community, which enthusiastically backed the proposed reforms, seems certain that the country will start moving again, after a long period of relative economic uncertainty. At the time of the first Gulf war, an abortive attempt at reform began when Saudi women, all of whom can drive when abroad, showed up behind the wheel of their cars for a day.

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Reports that human-rights agencies and academic associations presented an open letter to Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, calling for an end to pattern of attacks against

academics. Organizations involved in the effort; Contents of the letter; How the attacks started from the imprisonment of human rights activist Moncef Marzouki in December 2000.

Desrues, T., & Moyano, E. (2001). Social change and political transition in Morocco. *Mediterranean Politics, 6*(1) 21.
Analyzes the process of political change in Morocco and its transition towards the consolidation of a democratic regime. Problem of governability in Morocco; Features of the Moroccan state and its political system; Issue of civil society.

Deyo, F. C., & Agartan, K. (2003). Markets, workers and economic reforms: Reconstructing east asian labor systems. *Journal of International Affairs, 57*(1) 55-79.
Assesses the experiences of market-oriented reform and restructuring in East and Southeast Asia, with particular emphasis on Thailand, South Korea and China. Information on reforming the Asian labor systems; Implications of the social and institutional tensions of reform; Discussion on addressing the tensions of labor reform.

Divine, D. R. (2001). Book reviews. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33*(2) 307.
Reviews the book `Fertility Policy in Israel: The Politics of Religion, Gender, and Nation,' by Jacqueline Portugese.

Doornbos, M. (2003). "Good governance": The metamorphosis of a policy metaphor. *Journal of International Affairs, 57*(1) 3-17.
Focuses on the conditions under which the criterion of good governance first became adopted as a donor policy metaphor that seems to be transformed in favor of selectivity. Background on the development of the concept of good governance; Discussion on the pliability of the governance concept; Information on successive shifts in relevant policy thinking of the World Bank.

Dresch, P., & Haykel, B. (1995). Stereotypes and political styles: Islamists and tribesfolk in yemen. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 27*(4) 405.
Discusses the formative factors that contributed to the historical progress of the Yemeni political party Islah. Public identity of Islah; Stereotyped image of the party; Political profile of the general adviser of Islah Abd Al-Majid Al-Zindani.

Ebtehaj, F. (2005). Theorizing Iranian women: Femisism, Islam and critical scholarship. *European Journal of Women's Studies, 12*(1) 114-118.
Reviews of *Women in Iran: Gender Politics in the Islamic Republic*, by Hammed Shahidian and *Women in Iran: Emerging Voices in the Women's Movement*, by Hammed Shahidian.

Egypt the government springs surprise new legislation on the NGO movement (2002). *MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL*, (677) 16-16.

el khazen, F. (2003). Political parties in postwar Lebanon: Parties in search in search of partisans. *Middle East Journal, 57*(4) 605-624.
Examines the performance of political parties in postwar Lebanon against the benchmark of parties in the prewar period. Parties turned into militias during Lebanon's fifteen-year war and reverted to their party status with the ending of the war in 1990. In postwar Lebanon parties face several problems partly generated by their inability to recover from wartime practices and partly because of the built-in limitations in the political system inhibiting competitive politics. Some parties are banned; others have access to political and financial rewards and thus have a

stake in preserving the status quo. In this sense, parties are performing functions similar to those performed by parties in authoritarian regimes.

Election Watch (2003). *Journal of Democracy, 14*(1) 178.
Reveals election results held in various countries between September and December 2002. First legislative elections in Bahrain since 1973; Contest for three seats in Bosnia's collegial presidency; Presidential runoff elections in Brazil.

Ertürk, Y. (1991). Convergence and divergence in the status of Moslem women: The cases of turkey and saudi Arabia. *International Sociology, 6*(3) 307-320.
The theoretical concern underlying this article is to explore the possibilities of developing an alternative perspective to overcome the inadequacies of both universal (but ethnocentric) and relativist (but legitimising) accounts of culture-specific analysis. The problem addressed is the status of women in Turkey and Saudi Arabia -- two Moslem societies representing significantly different models of national transformation. While the cultural and structural variability is illustrated, by focusing on such diverse examples it is also argued that it is not Islam per se (i.e. the implementation of the Sharia) that accounts for the sex segregated structure of society, which places women in a subordinate position to different extents, but rather that it is the religious-political tradition of the 'corporate identity' which is so profoundly embedded in the intimate levels of consciousness and gender relations. It is therefore concluded that the liberation of women in Moslem societies is not a religious problem but essentially one of political consciousness and struggle.

Esim, S., & Cindoglu, D. (1999). Women's organizations in 1990s Turkey: Predicaments and prospects. *Middle Eastern Studies, 35*(1) 178.
Analyzes the nature and structure of women's organizations in Turkey in the 1990s. Political and social issues affecting women's organizations; Inclusion of gender in the study of non-governmental organizations; History of women's organizations in Turkey; Common characteristics among women's groups; Feminists' resolution of women's strategic gender needs.

Esposito, John L. (2001). "Islam and democracy," *Humanities*, Vol. 22(6) (Nov/Dec):n.p.

Execution stirs protests in Bahrain (1996). *New York Times, 145*(50379) A3.
Reports on protest demonstrations in Bahrain following the execution of a dissident who was convicted of killing a police officer. Fighting between protesters and police; Allegation of human rights violations.

Fandy, M. (1996). Serious threats to Saudi Arabia's stability. *Christian Science Monitor, 88*(37) 19.
Reports that the problems of the Saudi Arabian monarchy need to be resolved in order to avoid unnecessary civil unrest and political violence plaguing Egypt and Algeria. Problem of succession; Tension from the Sudairi branch of family; Monitoring of the Saudi regime by Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR); Threat of Islamic challenge.

Faqir, F. (1997). Engendering democracy and Islam in the Arab world. *Third World Quarterly, 18*(1) 165-174.
Examines the position of women and Islamic revivalism in the establishment of democracy in the Arab world. Interconnection among women's liberation, equality and democracy; Correlation between political participation and socio-economic status; Establishment Islam's intolerance of women's self-determination, democratization and the pursuit of freedom of speech.

Fathi, N. (2004). Iran moves to roll back rights won by women. *New York Times, 154*(52977) 17.
Reports that the Parliament of Iran rejected proposals to expand the inheritance right of Iranian women and to adopt the United Nations convention that bans discrimination against women. Gender equality; Arrest of Iranian women for wearing unIslamic dress; Decision of women legislators to keep a low profile.

Fergany, Nader (2002). "Draft: The Institutional context of Human Development in the Arab world." Available at: www.almishkat.org/engdoc02/Institutional/ Institutional%20context%20-Princeton.pdf

Fisher, J. (2003). Local and global: International governance and civil society. *Journal of International Affairs, 57*(1) 19-39.
Focuses on the implications of the relationship of civil society and the state on the enhancement of stability, democracy and living condition in the international arena. Discussion on the contrasting policies between developing and developed countries toward non-governmental organizations (NGO); Factors defining the national political context that influence policies toward NGO; Information on the indirect impact of political context on NGO proliferation; Accountability and autonomy of NGO.

Fluehr-Lobban, C. (1998). Review of *Gender Politics in Sudan: Islamism, Socialism and the State*, by Sondra Hale. Book reviews. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 30*(1) 133.

Foreword (2003). *Journal of International Affairs, 57*(1) 3-3.
Focuses on the relationship between economic liberalization and democracy. Implication of the experiences of several nations on the link between democracy and economic development; Discussion on the shared experience of political and economic factors that impede progress; Capability of state governments on preventing and creating crises.

Gallagher, S. K. (2003). . Review of *Women of Jordan: Islam, Labor and the Law*, by Amira El-Azhary Sonbol. *H-Net Reviews in the Humanities & Social Sciences,*

Gelb, J. (1997). Book reviews: Comparative politics. *American Political Science Review, 91*(4) 986.
Reviews a number of books. `Daughters of Palestine,' by Amal Kawar; `Gender Bias and the State: Symbolic Reform at Work in Fifth Republic France,' by Amy G. Mazur; `Comparative State Feminism,' by Dorothy McBride Stetson and Amy G. Mazur.

Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East (1996). *Middle East Report, 26* 4-16+.
Examines women's civic roles and legal status; includes Israel, Turkey, and Algeria; 9 articles.; Topics include gender and citizenship, women's court in Beirut, Lebanon, the women's equal rights law in Israel, women's organizations in Kuwait; and the personal status law in Iran.

Ghejam, A. M. (1990). Mass communications in the libyan jamahiriya. *Journal of Black Studies, 20*(3) 324.
Analyzes mass communication according to the ideology of the Libyan Jamahiriya. Three aspects of freedom of communications; Includes freedom of the individual, of association and of the society; Promotion of democracy through the mass media.

Ghorayshi, P. (1996). Women, paid-work and the family: In the Islamic republic of Iran. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 27*(3) 453-466.
There is an impressive volume of research on gender issues in developing countries. This expanding literature rightly stresses the centrality of multiple roles of women in developing

societies. Despite a growing number of empirical studies on women, work and the family in developing countries, the writings on women in Iran do not appear to have, taken cognizance of these studies. The enhanced interest in the study of women in Iran after the Islamic Revolution focuses mainly on the impact of Islamic ideology on the social, economic, political and legal position of women. Government remains the main employer of women. After the Islamic Revolution, many jobs were eliminated, but, overall, with the expansion of state bureaucracies, new jobs were created. Women filled many of these new positions. Wage working women are concentrated in certain types of occupations. In the government sector, the overwhelming majority of women are employed in teaching, health services and various types of low-skilled, low-paid office and sales work.

Gillespie, R., & Whitehead, L. (2002). European democracy promotion in North Africa: Limits and prospects. *Democratization, 9*(1) 192.
Focuses on the European Union's (EU) democracy promotion in North Africa. Information on the multilateral framework for EU democracy promotion; Background of the Barcelona Conference; Effect of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. on Europe's relationship with Arab countries.

Gorvett, J. (2005). Following december's EU summit, turkey forced to reassess issue of "minorities". *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 24*(2) 48-49.
The article discusses condition of ethnic and religious minorities as it is on the verge of beginning the European Union (EU) membership talks. It informs that a whole string of tough issues still waits to be resolved--and with nothing guaranteed on any side. Yet while the difficulty of Turkey's relationship with Cyprus grabbed most of the worry--along with a skillfully obscured question mark over the status of any" permanent" conditions on Turkey's membership, such as freedom of movement--one of the thorniest issues in the year ahead is likely to be that of minorities.

Graham, M., & Khosravi, S. (2002). Reordering public and private in Iranian cyberspace: Identity, politics, and mobilization. *Identities, 9*(2) 219.
Examines some of the ways in which cyberspace has contributed to redrawing the boundaries between public and private and some of the consequences of this for people, things and ideas in Iran and the Iranian diaspora. Description of the public sphere; Details on the Iranian disapora; Information on Internet access in Iran and the disapora; Conclusion.

Graham-Brown, S. (1994). Women and politics in the Middle East. *Women in Action,* (1) 28-31.

Gunes-Ayata, A. (2002). The republican people's party. *Turkish Studies, 3*(1) 102.
Focuses on the historical background of the Republican Peoples Party (RPP), the oldest party of the Turkish Republic. Effect of the party's failure to restructure its ideology and organizational structure; Criticism against RPP ideology; Information on the organizational framework of the party.

Guney, A. (2002). The people's democracy party. *Turkish Studies, 3*(1) 122.
Focuses on the People's Democracy Party (PDP) in Turkey. Historical background of the political party; Percentage of votes garnered by PDP in the 1995 national elections; Complaints of the party in the 1999 national elections; Suggested solution to the Kurdish problem.

Gutierrez, F. (2003). Institutionalizing global wars: State transformations in columbia, 1978-2002. *Journal of International Affairs, 57*(1) 135-152.
Focuses on the role of global variables in the coexistence of democracy and war in Colombia

from 1978 to 2002. Discussion on three possible explanations on the effects of global variables in Colombian government during the two decades; Information on the Colombian civil war and the war on drugs; Details of how the government responded to the challenges of the wars.

Hamzeh, A. N. (1994). Qatar: The duality of the legal system. *Middle Eastern Studies, 30*(1) 79.
Focuses on Qatar's legal system based on the background of its legal development, the organization of the judiciary and the implications of dualism. Institutional and jurisdictional division of the sharia court; Adlia courts; Conclusions on the significance of dualism in Qatar's legal system.

Hamzeh, A. N., & Dekmejian, R. H. (1993). The Islamic spectrum of Lebanese politics. *Middle East Reporter Weekly, 71* 7-9.
Analyzes major Islamic groups and institutions and their interaction and role in the evolving political system.

Hann, C. (2000). Problems with the (de)privatization of religion. *Anthropology Today, 16*(6) 14.
Explores the application of the decentralized model of market economics to the field of religion in Poland and Turkey. Adoption of constitutional religion; Dimensions of secularization; Role of civil society and anthropologists in transgressing the boundaries of liberal modernity; Role of religion in political mobilization; Privatization of religion; Association of civil society to civil religion.

Harb, I. (1999). "Book review: Nazih Richani, *Dilemmas of Democracy and Political Partisan Sectarian Societies: The Case of the Progressive Socialist Party of ebanon, 1949-1996*. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 31*(3) 467.

Hasan Hassanin, A. H. (1998). Timothy mitchell, democracy and the state in the Arab world. *MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, 32*(1) 97-97.

Hatem, M. (1985). Conservative patriarchal modernization in the Arabian Gulf. *Contemporary Marxism,* 96-109.
Limited labor force participation of women in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates.

Hatem, M. F. (1994). Egyptian discourses on gender and political liberalization: Do secularist and Islamist views. *Middle East Journal, 48*(4) 661.
Discusses the feminist perspectives on liberalism and gender in the Egyptian society. Impact of Egypt's neo-liberalism on the position of women in the society; Feminist critique of liberalism; Description of the secularist neo-liberal discourse of the state; Islamist discourse on liberalization; Emphasis on the centrality of domesticity as part of the definition of femininity.

Haya Al Mughni (2000). *Women in Kuwait The Politics of Gender*. London: Saqi Books.

Hegland, M. (1993). Book reviews: Social conditions. *Middle East Journal, 47*(1) 148.
Reviews the book `Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society,' by Nancy Tapper.

Heper, M. (2002). The consolidation of democracy versus democratization in turkey. *Turkish Studies, 3*(1) 138.
Discusses political issues in Turkey. Effects of democratization on the increased political

participation in the country; Implications of the rift between the state elites and political elites; Information on the political legitimacy crises in Turkey.

Herb, M. (2002). Emirs and parliaments in the Gulf. *Journal of Democracy, 13*(no 4) 41-47.
Discusses how democracy and monarchy could reside in Persian Gulf states, focusing on partial democratization, elections, and parliament; Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar.

Hertel, S. (2003). The private side of global governance. *Journal of International Affairs, 57*(1) 41-50.
Analyzes the role of business and civil society actors in global economic governance. Importance of the issues on representation , legitimacy, accountability and transparency on the companies that play significant role on the process of globalization; Discussion on how international organizations traditionally managed their changing relations with the private sector; Information on the changes on the role of civil society in globalization; Possible framework for decision-making on the private side of international organization.

Hicks, E. S. (1996). *Power versus choice: Human rights and parliamentary elections in the Islamic republic of Iran*Human Rights Watch.from http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pnh&an=1996-0314780
Examines human rights dimension of the political process, in particular the guarantees and restraints placed upon international standards of freedom of expression, association, and assembly; in light of elections for the parliament, or Majles, Mar. 8, 1996.

Hinnebusch, Raymond (1999). Review article of *Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World*, edited by Elisabeth Ozdalga and Sune Persson (in this bibliography 1997) and *Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia*, by Sheila Carapico (in this bibliography 1998), *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* Vol. 26(2), n.p.

Homayra, Ziad (2003). "Bush adventure expensive political science experiment," *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Vol. 22(5) (June):n.p.

Hudson, Michael (1988). "Democratization and the problem of Legitimacy in Middle East Politics," *MESA Bulletin*, Vol. 22.

Human rights in the Arab world (1990). *Arab Studies Quarterly, 12*(3/4) 103.
Provides information about the human rights situation at the international and Arab levels. Reason why the human rights situation in Arab nations in 1989 is different from other countries; Constitutional and legal framework; The right to life; The right to liberty and security of person; The right to a fair hearing; Freedom of political association and the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs; The rights of the Palestinian people; More.

Human Rights News (2005). "Human rights in Algeria: Testimony by Tom Malinowski to the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, March 4, 2005."

Human Rights News (2004). "Bahrain: Rights Center Closed as Crackdown Expands," September 30.

Human Rights Watch (1996). *Iran: Power Versus Choice: Human Rights and Parliamentary Elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran.* Human Rights Watch, Vol. 8, No. 1 (E).

Inclusion can deflate Islamic populism (1993). *NPQ: New Perspectives Quarterly, 10*(3) 50.
Presents the views of Augustus Richard Norton, a United States Army's top expert on the Middle East, on the global trend toward more open political systems including in Islamic countries. Difference between governments wrought of revolution and of reform; Skeptics' argument of the `non-resonance' of democracy; Question on the effect of democratization experiments on populist Islamic movements; Suggestion to encourage rulers to widen political avenues.

Iran: Clerics reject un women's rights treaty--CEDAW (2003). *Women's International Network News, 29*(4) 43-43.
Reports on the decision of Iran's Guardian Council to reject the Iranian participation in the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in October 2003. Reason behind the move; Background on the ratification of CEDAW by Iran; Efforts of Iranian President Mohammad Khatami for a democratic reform.

Iran: Since the revolution (2000). *Social Research,* 67(2) 283-640.
Examines the social, political, and economic conditions since the Islamic fundamentalist revolution of 1979, in context of the election of the reformist President Mohammed Khatami in May 1997; 13 articles.; Contents: Civil society and the rule of law in the constitutional politics of Iran under Khatami, by Saïd Amir Arjomand; Illusion and reality of civil society in Iran: an ideological debate, by Ladan Boroumand and Roya Boroumand; The idea of civil liberties and the problem of institutional government in Iran, by Youssef S. Aliabadi; Political decentralization and the creation of local government in Iran: consolidation or transformation of the theocratic state? by Kian Tajbakhsh; Women in Iran since 1979, by Nikki R. Keddie and Appendix: chronology of events regarding women in Iran since the revolution of 1979, by Elham Gheytanchi; Gender, Islam, and politics, by Farhad Kazemi; The end of Islamic ideology, by Hamid Dabashi; The universality of human rights: lessons from the Islamic Republic of Iran, by Ann Elizabeth Mayer; The Baha'is in Iran: twenty years of repression, by Firuz Kazemzadeh; Veiled voice and vision in Iranian cinema: the evolution of Rakhshan Banietedmad's films, by Hamid Naficy; Domestic political reforms and private sector activity in Iran, by Bijan Khajehpour-Khouei; Demographic factors in Iran's economic development, by Djavad Salehi-Isfahani; The Islamic revolution and the management of the Iranian economy, by Akbar Karbassian.

Iran: Women may gain full inheritance rights (2004). *Off our Backs, 34*(7/8) 4-4.
Reports on the approval by the Iranian parliament of a bill that would allow married women to inherit the entirety of their deceased husbands' estate in the absence of other heirs. Comments of lawyers and women's rights activists on the legislation; Need for bill to be approved by constitutional watchdog Guardian Council.

Jobbins, D. (2004). 12 saudi liberals arrested. *Times Higher Education Supplement,* (1634) 12-12.
Reports on the apprehension of five college teachers in a countrywide purge of liberals in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

John, R. B. S. (1998). John P. Entelis, ed., Islam, democracy, and the state of North Africa. *MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, 32*(2) 234-234.

Johnson, P., & Kuttab, E. (2001). Where have all the women (and men) gone? reflections on gender and the second palestinian intifada. *Feminist Review,* (69) 21-43.
The authors ground their reflections on gender and the complex realities of the second

Palestinian intifada against Israeli occupation in the political processes unleashed by the signing of the Israeli–Palestinian rule, noting that the profound inequalities between Israel and Palestine during the interim period produced inequalities among Palestinians. The apartheid logic of the Oslo period – made explicit in Israel's policies of separation, seige and confinement of the Palestinian population during the intifada and before it – is shown to shape the forms, sites and levels of resistance which are highly restricted by gender and age. In addition, the authors argue that the Palestinian Authority and leadership have solved the contradictions and crisis of Palestinian nationalism in this period through a form of rule that the authors term 'authoritarian populism', that tends to disallow democractic politics and participation. The seeming absence of women and civil society from the highly unequal and violent confrontations is contrasted with the first Palestinian intifada (1987–91), that occurred in a context of more than a decade of democratic activism and the growth of mass-based organizations, including the Palestinian women's movement. The authors explore three linked crises in gender roles emerging from the conditions of the second intifada: a crisis in masculinity, a crisis in paternity and a crisis in maternity.

Kadioglu, A. (2005). Civil society, Islam and democracy in turkey: A study of three Islamic non-governmental organizations. *Muslim World, 95*(1) 23-41.
Discusses the Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGO) in Turkey in terms of their contributions to the process of democratization of the country. Discussion on the theoretical debates on the relationship between civil society, Islam and democracy; Explanation of the agendas and views of the Islamic NGO in turkey; Analysis of the limitations of mutually exclusive conceptions of state and civil society.

Khalaf, A.H. (2000). "The New Amir of Bahrain: Marching Sideways," *civil society*, Vol. 9, No. 100 (April):6-13. [not ordered]

Kalaycioglu, E. (2002). The motherland party: The challenge of institutionalization in a charismatic leader party. *Turkish Studies, 3*(1) 40.
Focuses on Motherland Party (MP), a political movement established by Turgut Ö zal in 1983. Information on the ideological and organizational structure of the party; Historical background of the Motherland Party; Statistical data on the MP votes in Turkish elections.

Kalaycioglu., E. (1994). Elections and party preferences in turkey. *Comparative Political Studies, 27*(3) 402.
Analyzes party preferences of Turkish voters by reference to a series of socioeconomic politico-cultural factors. Importance of gender as women become more active; Critical role of formal education; Role of religiosity; Moderation of ideological tendencies of 75% of the voters.

Kawar, A. (1993). National mobilization, war conditions, and gender consciousness. *Arab Studies Quarterly, 15*(2) 53.
Expounds on the origins of the General Union of Palestinian Women and its relationship with the Palestinian Liberation Organization's male leadership. Opportunities for women's participation in the Palestinian Liberation Movement; Mobilizing women for national liberation; Effects of war conditions on women's political work; Women's participation in social welfare programs.

Kazemi, Farhad (1996). "Civil society and Iranian Politics." In *Civil Society in the Middle East, Volume Two*, edited by Augustus Richard Norton. New York: E.J. Brill, pp. 119-152.

Kazemzadeh, Masoud (2002). *Islamic Fundamentalism, Feminism, and Gender Inequality in Iran Under Khomeini*. New York and Oxford: University Press of America.

Keddie, N. R. (2004). A woman's place: Democratization in the Middle East. *Current History, 103*(669) 25-30.
Highlights the struggle of the Middle Eastern women for human and women's rights. Connection between the status of women and the prospects for democracy; Interpretation of a true Islam; Need for improvement of women's legal status.

Khan, Mushtaq Husain, George Giacaman and Inge Amundsen (eds) (2004). *State Formation in Palestine: Viability and Governance during a Social Transformation*. Challenges the widely prevalent view that the Palestinian Authority collapsed because of its internal governance failures, its lack of commitment to democracy, and corruption. It argues that the analytical framework of 'good governance' is not appropriate for assessing state performance in developing countries, and is especially inappropriate in conflict and post-conflict situations. An alternative framework is proposed for assessing state performance in a context of economic and social transformation. This is applied in detail to different aspects of state formation in Palestine, showing that the institutional architecture set up by the Oslo agreements that governed relationships between Israel and the Palestinians, especially the asymmetric control over the Palestinian state which followed from this, was responsible for many of the serious failures of governance in this first period of state formation.

Kian, A. (1997). Women and politics in post-Islamist Iran: The gender conscious drive to change. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 24*(1) 75.
Focuses on gender-conscious Islamist women involved in politics in post-Islamist Iran. When these women became involved in politics; Women parliamentarians during the Iraq-Iran War; How they attempted to change Islamic laws and the reading of the Islam; Outcome of the women's mobilization.

Kian-Thiébaut, A. (2005). From motherhood to equal rights advocates: The weakening of patriarchal order. *Iranian Studies, 38*(1) 45-66.
Examines the weakening of patriarchal order and male domination in both public and private spheres in Iran. Rejection of traditional values by women; Increased presence of women in the public sphere; Establishment of new relationship with children.

Kinawy, K. H. (2002). AZZA M. KARAM, women, Islamisms, and the state: Contemporary feminisms in Egypt. *MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, 36*(PART 2) 250-250.

Kiniklioglu, S. (2002). The democratic left party: Kapikulu politics par excellence. *Turkish Studies, 3*(1) 4.
Focuses on the Democratic Left Party's (DLP) success in the 1999 general election that became the largest political party in the Turkish parliament. Description of the civil society of Turkey; Importance of the party caucus; Contributions of DLP to the economic stability of the country.

Korany, Bahgat, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble (eds) (1998). *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World*. Vol. 2. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Examines institutionalization of civil and political freedoms, degree of citizen participation, and accountability and turnover of governing elites; Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian National Authority, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen.

Korany, Bahgat and Saad Amrani (1998). "Explosive civil society and democratization from below," in *Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, Volume 2: Comparative Experiences*, edited by B. Korany, R. Brynen, and P. Noble. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 11-38.

Kuwait: Women's suffrage a possibility (2004). *Off our Backs, 34*(7/8) 5-5.
Reports on the Kuwait Council of Ministers' approval of a bill giving women the right to vote and run for parliamentary election in May 2004. Kuwaiti women's efforts to gain the right to vote; Sunni Muslim parliamentary majority's rejection of women's political rights; Parliament's promise of greater freedoms for women following the Gulf War of 1990.

Lancaster, P., & Khan, A. (1992). The gender weapon. *Middle East,* 5-10.
Increasing incidence of rape and sexual abuse of women detained by government agents, soldiers, and policemen; highlights of Amnesty International's plan to prevent and reverse the ill treatment of women in custody; Middle East countries, chiefly; 2 articles.; Includes some international comparisons; issues of human rights and treatment of civilians in war.

Lancaster, P., & Khan, A. (1992). The gender weapon. *Middle East,* 5-10.
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Langman, L. (2005). The dialectic of unenlightenment: Toward a critical theory of Islamic fundamentalism. *Critical Sociology, 31*(1/2) 243-279.
The foundational critique of modernity, (DoE), showed how the quest for domination, rooted in the Greek pursuit of control over nature, articulated in the emancipatory promise of Enlightenment based rationality, indeed led to new forms of totalitarian thought and practice. While the (il)logic of capital and the erosion of meaning disposed WWII and its final solution, contemporary global capitalism has fostered wide spread anti-modernist, reactionary movements throughout the Islamic world. Understanding Islamisms is by aided Critical Theory's Marxian understanding of the role of political economy, mediated through Weberian insights into the "elective affinity" between political economy and religious ideologies, and Freudian psychodynamics. Islam emerged as a trader's religion that would enable a vast, flourishing empire to flourish. But a seamless web between Sharia law (kadi justice) and commercial practices would limit the rationalization of commerce, forestall a Reformation, and dispose the relative demise of Islamic hegemony in face of ascendant Christendom. Between indigenous barriers to rationality, and the interventions of capitalist imperialism, globalization has bypassed the Middle East. A powerful ressentiment has taken root among the marginal, disenfranchised and otherwise powerless who are disposed to religious understandings of social problems, with religious based remedial actions to achieve redemption. Fundamentalist doctrines of salvation and renewal preach authoritarian submission, hatred to outsiders (infidels), and demands for death. The fusion of 8th century doctrines and 21st century technologies, portend greater human suffering. The logic of the Frankfurt school remains as relevant as when the world faced its darkest moments.

Leggett, K. (2004). Women win new rights in Morocco by invoking Islam. *Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition, 244*(28) B1-B2.
Discusses how Muslim women in Morocco can now divorce their husbands, collect alimony, and receive some types of inheritance due to legislation advanced under the umbrella of Islamic law. Abolishment of practices such as polygamy; Efforts of women's rights advocates such as

Nouzha Skalli to transform society by working within the religious traditions; Opposition to the new laws from extremists who are dissatisfied with the law because of its lack of conformity to the beliefs of the Prophet Mohammad; Use of Islamic teachings by Skalli to convince others that the religion espouses values that protect women.

Leggett, K. (2004). Women win new rights in Morocco by invoking Islam. *Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition, 244*(28) B1-B2.
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MacMaster, N. (2004). Torture: From algiers to abu ghraib. *Race & Class, 46*(2) 1-21.
Focuses on the practice of torture to the detainees at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Publication of a massive body of evidence on the systematic use of torture by the army and police; Debates on the damage done by counter-insurgency to the victims and to the individuals and regimes deploying the troop; Impact of the planned invasion of U.S. President George W. Bush's administration on leading to a renewed interest in French theories of revolutionary warfare.

Mahdavi, S. (2003). Women in Iran: Gender politics in the Islamic republic\ women in Iran: Emerging voices in the women's movement (book). *Middle East Journal, 57*(4) 695-698.
Reviews the books "Women in Iran: Gender Politics in the Islamic Republic" and "Women in Iran: Emerging Voices in the Women's Movement" by Hammed Shahidian.

Mahdavi, S. (2003). Women in Iran: Gender politics in the Islamic republic\ women in Iran: Emerging voices in the women's movement (book). *Middle East Journal, 57*(4) 695-698.

Mednicoff, D. M. (2003). Think locally -- act globally? cultural framing and human rights movements in Tunisia and Morocco. *International Journal of Human Rights, 7*(3) 72-102.
This article applies a concept from the political science and sociological theory of social movements to the comparative study of indigenous human rights activism in two North African countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Specifically, the idea of cultural framing is used to explicate why social mobilisation around the rhetoric of human rights was most successful in Tunisia and Morocco during a particular period. Drawing on interviews, documents and secondary material about a prominent human rights movement in each society, the study argues that transnational human rights norms were adapted for local use in these two Arab Islamic societies with fairly little difficulty. The article concludes with discussion of the connection of human rights activism in each country and the divergent path each has taken with respect to contemporary political liberalisation.

Moghissi, H. (1999). Away from home: Iranian women, displacement cultural resistance and change. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 30*(2) 207-217.
The article focuses on cultural resistance in Iranian women. Any community whose sense of identity is collectively denigrated by the structural racism of the larger society feel the need to mute dissenting voices which challenge its sense of homogeneity, common fate and common cause. This resistance to change is more profound in the area of women's rights and gender relations. Women's demands challenge men's prerogatives in the family which is often the only stronghold of men's power in exile-where men can still feel in control and enjoy the sense of

empowerment which gender power arrangements secure for them. In this way, racism further marginalizes women of color and their interests and needs. They are pressured to suppress their commitment to gender equity in favor of `racial' solidarity. The younger generation within the Iranian diaspora may yet get the community to face racism and, instead of taking refuge in its own culture, get it to join anti-racist battles and collective struggles in the host country for the elimination of racist and patriarchal structures and relations.

Mojab, S. (2001). Theorizing the politics of 'Islamic feminism'. *Feminist Review,* (69) 124-146.
This article examines developments in 'Islamic feminism', and offers a critique of feminist theories, which construct it as an authentic and indigenous emancipatory alternative to secular feminisms. Focusing on Iranian theocracy, I argue that the Islamization of gender relations has created an oppressive patriarchy that cannot be replaced through legal reforms. While many women in Iran resist this religious and patriarchal regime, and an increasing number of Iranian intellectuals and activists, including Islamists, call for the separation of state and religion, feminists of a cultural relativist and postmodernist persuasion do not acknowledge the failure of the Islamic project. I argue that western feminist theory, in spite of its advances, is in a state of crisis since (a) it is challenged by the continuation of patriarchal domination in the West in the wake of legal equality between genders, (b) suspicious of the universality of patriarchy, it overlooks oppressive gender relations in non-western societies and (c) rejecting Eurocentrism and racism, it endorses the fragmentation of women of the world into religious, national, ethnic, racial and cultural entities with particularist agendas.

Mojab, S. (2000). The feminist project in cyberspace and civil society. *Convergence, 33*(1/2) 106.
Focuses on the critique of the civil society concept in the context of the West and the Middle East from a feminist point of view. Concepts of the civil society; Description of cyberspace as a civil society; Discussion on the feminist mobilization effort; Connection between cyberspace and the real space.

Molavi, A. (1997). Cracking a men-only culture. (cover story). *Christian Science Monitor, 89*(248) 1.
Discusses the role that women are beginning to play in the politics of Oman in the late 1990s. Women like Shukoor al-Ghammary, president of the Omani Women's Association and a member of Majlis As-Shura; Comments from Sultan Qaboos bin Sa'id; How Oman compares to other Arab countries; The power wielded by Fatima Kheroussi, the finance manager of Petroleum Development Oman.

Moussa, Rathiba Hadj and Pierre Beaudet (1995). *Démocratie et movement associatifs en Algérie*. Montreal: CEAD.

Norton, A. R., & Singerman, D. (1997). Gender, politics and the state: What do Middle Eastern women want? *Middle East Policy, 5*(3) 155.
Focuses on the role of women in the political arena in the Middle East. Political constituents in Egyptian political life; Fight for women's liberation in the Middle Eastern society; Creation of a political space by women in an existing national authority.

Ozdalga, Elisabeth and Sune Persson (eds) (1997). *Civil Society, Democracy and the Muslim World.* Richmond: Curzon Press. – Have not obtained.

Ozel, I. (2003). Beyond the orthodox paradox: The breakup of state-business coalitions in 1980s turkey. *Journal of International Affairs, 57*(1) 97-112.
Focuses on the breakdown of market reform coalition between the state and business actors in Turkey during the late 1980's. Examination of market reform coalitions between business and

state in developing countries by focusing on coalition sustainability; Background on the launching of market reforms in Turkey; Discussion on the Orthodox Paradox and the protracted crisis.

Özyürek, E. (2005). Islamist mobilization in turkey: A study in vernacular politics. *Comparative Studies in Society & History, 47*(1) 228-229.
Reviews the book "Islamist Mobilization in Turkey: A Study in Vernacular Politics," by Jenny White.

Parks, Robert P. (2005). "An Unexpected Mandate? The April 8, 2004 Algerian Presidential Elections," *Middle East Journal*, Vol 59(1).

Peterson, J. E. (2004). Oman: Three and a half decades of change andc development. *Middle East Policy, 11*(2) 125-137.
Discusses the changes and developments in Oman from 1970 to 2004. Obstacles faced by Aabus bin Said Al Said during his term in 1970; Factors that pave the way for Oman's admission to the Arab League and the United Nations; Focus of the development during the 1980s; Problems encountered during the 21st century.

Peterson, J. E. (1988). *The Arab Gulf states: Steps toward political participation; foreword by majid khadduri* Praeger Pub. Analysis of the role of national councils in six countries.

Poe, S. C., Wendel-Blunt, D., & Ho, K. (1997). Global patterns in the achievement of women's human rights to equality. *Human Rights Quarterly, 19*(4) 813-835.
The article presents a study conducted to explain cross-national variations in the realization of women's human rights and the search for works relevant for efforts. This would encourage future research on this unexplored topic. A set of standards has been developed and countries have been placed in different categories. The result has been a four point ordinal scale measuring women's achievement of economic equality, and a five category ordinal scale measuring the degree to which political equality has been won by women. Descriptive analyses of the two measures showed that very few of the world's countries approached anything nearing the full realization of women's right to equality. The results obtained with the two scales were similar due to the moderately high correlation between the two measures. Many of the countries achieving the lowest possible scores with both measures were the predominantly Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Countries from this part of the world also achieved the lowest mean scores of any of the regions of the world.

Povey, E. R. (2001). Feminist contestations of institutional domains in Iran. *Feminist Review,* (69) 44-72.
Iranian Feminists outside Iran are divided on women's positions in Iran under the Islamic state. Some have argued that the process of Islamization has marginalized women. Others have argued that the dynamic nature of Shari'a interpretation and the debate among religious scholars in Iran have shaped the indigenous forms of feminist consciousness, feminisms and women's involvement in the process of change. This paper, based on field research, is challenging both views. It will be argued that the contradictions of the Islamic state and institutions led to the process of feminist consciousness. In the period 1990-2000, Muslim and secular feminists in Iran have found their own ways of coming together, making demands and pressurizing the State and institutions to reform laws and regulations in favour of women's rights. But women are divided by the nature of their diversity. As their alliance has challenged the limitation of the Islamic state, the breakdown of their alliance (2000-2001), could have a great impact not only on gender relations, but also on the process of democratization and secularization.

Quandt, W. B. (1995). Civil society in the Middle East, vol 1. *Foreign Affairs, 74*(5) 180-180.
Reviews the book `Civil Society in the Middle East, Vol. 1,' edited by Augustus Richard Norton.

Ramazani, N. (1985). Arab women in the Gulf. *Middle East Journal, 39* 258-276.
Status of women in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Reducing gender inequity in laws on marriage and divorce: Morocco, Egypt (2000). *Reproductive Health Matters, 8*(16) 186.
Focuses on issues related to marriage and divorce law for women in Morocco.

Rubenstein, L., & Amato, Z. (2000). The Turkish government's crackdown on freedom of expression. *Lancet, 356*(9247) 2094.
Reports on the Turkish government, which has a record of harassing physicians and charging them with criminal wrongdoing for upholding their professional obligations. Cancellation of a meeting on prison health and human rights convened by the Turkish Medical Association because of governmental objections; Appeal to the European community, NATO and the United States to rebuke the Turkish government for these human rights violations.

Rubin, B. (2002). Turkey's political parties: A remarkably important issue. *Turkish Studies, 3*(1) 1.
Discusses the Turkish political party system that stands as a key issue in the country's strange mixture of successes and failures. Description of the civil society of Turkey; Role of Turkish armed forces in stabilization of the country's sovereignty.

Rutherford, B. (1998). Nathan J. brown, the rule of law in the Arab world: Courts in Egypt and the Gulf. *MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, 32*(1) 37-37.

Sabir, A. (2004). New liberties for moroccan women. *Humanist, 64*(4) 35-36.
Discusses several reforms made by King Mohamed VI of Morocco to the family code legislating the status of women in Moroccan society in 2004. Information on the demands of women and human rights organizations; Objectives of a plan introduced by Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi in 1999 regarding the integration of women into economic development; Impact of the reforms in Morocco.

Sachs, S. (2004). Turkey's law overhaul overwhelms courts and citizens. *New York Times, 154*(53012) 3-3.
Assesses the newly established family courts in Turkey. Rights of women for equality in marriage; Transformation of the legal system; Aim of the government to meet the eligibility criteria for starting membership talks with the European Union.

Sada, Mkhaimar S. Abu (1998). "Party identification and political attitudes in an emerging democracy: a summary," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 42(2):712-16. Examines relationship between party identification and political attitudes toward peace negotiations with Israel. The author concludes that party affiliation in Palestine affects political attitudes in the same ways as in advanced democracies. Link to article:
http://search.epnet.com.ezproxy.idrc.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=348505

Salem, R., Ibrahim, B., & Brady, M. (2003). Negotiating leadership roles. *Women's Studies Quarterly, 31*(3/4) 174-191.
Examines ethnographic literature of community power dynamics to address leadership roles of young women in Egypt. Entry of the young women into public roles; Evidence of double bind of age and gender disparities; Mobilization of patriarchal relationships.

Salhi, Z. S. (2003). Algerian women, citizenship, and the 'family code'. *Gender & Development, 11*(3) 27-35.
Women's struggle for both equality and national liberation are crucial to democracy: if a democratic state is one in which citizens have the right to participate in society and the way it is governed, women must, automatically, be included in the equation. Yet in many so-called democratic states, women lack full citizenship. This article traces Algerian women's struggle for full citizenship after the national liberation struggle ended in 1962. The Algerian Family Code, which became law in 1984, proclaims women to be minors under the law, and defines them as existing only in so far as they are daughters, mothers, or wives. Algerian women are demanding that the government repeal the Family Code; challenging patriarchal values that prevail in Algerian society; and resisting and fighting Islamic fundamentalism.

Sanasarian, E. (1992). The politics of gender and development in the Islamic republic of Iran. *JOURNAL OF DEVELOPING SOCIETIES, 8*(2) 56-56.

Seikaly, M. (1994). Women and social change in Bahrain. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26*(3) 415.
Discusses the effect social change in the status and role of women in Bahrain. Effects of economic development and modernization on Bahrain's class differences; Education and employment opportunities for women; Involvement of women in politics and government; Cultural, economic and political restrictions on the role of women.

Seikaly, M. (1994). Women and social change in Bahrain. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 26*(3) 415.

Sengupta, S. (2002). Bahrain's women take a step toward political power. *New York Times, 152*(52281) A3.
Reports on the candidacy of a woman for a seat at the legislature of Bahrain in its October 2002 election.

Shahidian, H. (2002a). *Women in Iran: Emerging Voices in the Women's Movement*. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press.

Shahidian, H. (2002b) . *Women in Iran: Gender Politics in the Islamic Republic*. Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood Press.

Shahidian, H. (1997). Women and clandestine politics in Iran, 1970-1985. *Feminist Studies, 23*(1) 7.
Focuses on the clandestine political mobilization of women in Iran from 1970 to 1985. Periodization of women's participation in clandestine politics; Social factors affecting women's political involvement; Sex roles, socialization and political activism; Organizational life.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2003). Liberating voices: The political implications of palestinian mothers narrating their loss. *Women's Studies International Forum, 26*(5) 391.
This article juxtaposes the different threads of the history and reality of the Palestinian nation under occupation, with women's own narratives to the effect of such a history and reality on coping with losses emanating from such occupation. The article explores the effect of trauma and victimization of women in areas of political conflict as revealed through the voices of mothers of martyrs in Palestine who participated in an empowerment group that was termed "voice therapy" and their narratives were gradually unveiled. The study aims to reflect these mothers' visions in coping with the agony of losing a child. In doing so, it shows how the common law of gender shapes the life and life choices of women. The mothers' narratives have

political and ideological implications, which highlight the need to re-examine the analytical framework with which to explain the conditions and reactions of women to trauma. In addition, they have theoretical, therapeutic implications; they reveal that we must pay more attention to the hidden casualties of armed conflicts and to the importance of building intervention programs that first and foremost acknowledge the muted voices of such casualties.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2002). Femicide and the palestinian criminal justice system: Seeds of change in the context of state building? (cover story). *Law & Society Review, 36*(3) 577.
Presents information on a study that discussed how Palestinian society and its criminal justice system, during a politically formative period of state building, relates to femicide. Research method; Results and discussion on study. Despite the criminalization of abuses inflicted upon women, laws are still considered major sources of women's oppression. This article discusses how Palestinian society and its criminal justice system, during a politically formative period of state building, relates to "femicide." Femicide in this study pertains to the murder of girls or women for allegedly committing "crimes of family honor." Official statistics, Cassation Court rulings, and six documented cases were analyzed in depth to determine the role played by the penal code, the legal system, and the external sociocultural context in exonerating the perpetrator of femicide and placing the victim on trial. The data reflect a silent masculine conspiracy that empowers sexist and gender-biased legal policies. The article concludes by challenging Palestinian legislators to fight legal discrimination against women. It argues that state-building periods can be a "window of hope," offering societies such as Palestine's the unique opportunity to reexamine and reconstruct their laws from a gender-sensitive position.

Shalhoub-Kevorkian, N. (2002). Femicide and the palestinian criminal justice system: Seeds of change in the context of state building? (cover story). *Law & Society Review, 36*(3) 577.
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Shami, S. (1990). *Women in Arab society: Work patterns and gender relations in Egypt, jordan and sudan*Berg Pub; St Martin's.from http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pnh&an=1991-0607893
Compares participation in both rural and urban settings.; Prepared by the Division of Human Rights and Peace, Sector of Social and Human Sciences, UNESCO.; Impact of the oil economy and the effect which radical social and economic changes have had on patterns of women's work and on value systems concerning their position in society.

Shukrallah, H. (1994). The impact of the Islamic movement in Egypt. *Feminist Review,* (47) 15-32.
Women's changing role in Islamic political movement

Simon, Karla W. (1999). "The role of law in encouraging civil society." Unpublished paper written for the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (previously available at: http://www.icnl.org/gendocs/Arabconf.htm; hard copy on file at IDRC).

Slattery, B. (2003). Development without equality: An interview with raul domingos. *Journal of International Affairs, 57*(1) 129-134.
Interviews Raul Domingos, leader of the Institute for Peace and Democracy, on the existence of economic development and inequality in Mozambique. Importance of political stability on Mozabique; Discussion on how the 11% economic growth rate in the country is being distributed; Information on the role of the third party in the improvement of the lives of Mozambicans.

Smith, B. (2003). "If I do these things, they will throw me out": Economic reform and the collapse of indonesia's new order. *Journal of International Affairs, 57*(1) 113-128.
Focuses on the economic reform in Indonesia and the collapse of the New Order government of Prime Minister Makam Suharto. Discussion on the economic problems experienced by Indonesia from 1997 to 1998; Information on the collapse of the Suharto regime; Factors that weaken his political regime; Comparative lessons in the study of economic transition and authoritarian breakdown resulting from the collapse of the regime.

Smith, J. I. (1996). Book reviews. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 28*(2) 255.
Reviews the book `Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past. The Legacy of Aisha Bint Abi Bakr,' by D.A. Spellberg. Description of specific scenes and characters; How this can be beneficial to histographers.

Stacher, J. A. (2004). Parties over: The demise of Egypt's opposition parties. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 31*(2) 215-233.
Heeding Eberhard Kienle's deliberalisation argument and Maye Kassem's work on legislative, elections in Egypt, the article explores the government's tactics in causing fragmentation in Egypt's legalised political parties. In this vein, it extends both arguments applying them to opposition parties in Egypt Since 1998, the Political Parties Committee (PPC) has closed seven of the sixteen legal opposition parties. The government is not only stifling group development, but also preventing prominent independent members of parliament (MPs) from using already existing parties to challenge the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). By examining the government's tactics towards opposition parties, this article shows that a re-entrenchment of authoritarianism has emerged, and argues that Egypt's democratisation process has ended.

Stein, R. A. (2004). Taking the initiative. *ABA Journal, 90*(3) 69-69.
Focuses on the efforts of ABA-Africa, a technical legal assistance program of the American Bar Association (ABA), to strengthen the legal systems in African countries. Information on a training program for U.S. lawyers and judges regarding the criminal procedure code in Morocco; Designation of an anti-corruption adviser in Kenya; Details of a program supporting access to justice in Rwanda.

Stork, J. (1997). *Routine abuse, routine denial: Civil rights and the political crisis in Bahrain*Human Rights Watch.from http://search.epnet.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=pnh&an=1997-0809760
Examines long-standing denial of political rights and freedoms, and contemporary treatment of political dissenters and prisoners; focus on incidents of torture and abuse during civil unrest beginning in 1994, sectarian conflict between the majority Shi'a population and the Sunni ruling family and military political establishment.; With recommendations for specific responses from other Arab nations, Iran, the US, and the international community.

Tamari, Reema (n.d.). "The PNA versus Hamas: the situation of dual power in a context of state building without sovereignty," for IDS Civil Society and Governance Programme. Available at: http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/civsoc/final/palestine/pal1.html

Tamari, S. (2002). Who rules palestine? *Journal of Palestine Studies, 31*(4) 102.
Reviews three essays about the Arab-Israeli conflict. 'Here and There: Toward an Analysis of the Relationship Between the Palestinian Diaspora and the Center,' by Sari Hanafi; 'The Formation of the Palestinian Elite: From the Emergence of the National Movement to the Establishment of the National Authority,' by Jamil Hilal; 'Young Guard, Old Guard,' by Khalil Shikaki.

Tessler, M., & Warriner, I. (1997). Gender, feminism, and attitudes toward international conflict. *World Politics, 49*(2) 250.
Assesses the utility of both gender and attitudes pertaining to the circumstances of women in the Middle East countries accounting for variance in views about international conflict. Comparative analysis of women in Israel, Egypt, Palestine and Kuwait; Impact of political systems on the individual.

Testas, A. (2004). Economic and political explanations of algeria's human rights violations. *International Journal of Human Rights, 8*(4) 399-411.
This article examines the impact of economic and political variables, namely economic development, democratisation and civil violence, on the extent to which the Algerian government has violated human rights in the post-independence era. The emerging evidence is such that reversal in the country's economic fortunes since the 1986 world oil price collapse, political liberalisation in the second half of the 1980s and civil violence throughout the 1990s explain to a large extent the country's decline in human rights provision since the October riots of 1988.

Tetreault, M. A. (2001). A state of two minds: State cultures, women, and politics in kuwait. *International Journal of Middle East Studies, 33*(2) 203.
Explores the democratization of gender relations and political life in Kuwait, focusing on the pronouncements and policies regarding women. Overview of the Kuwaiti constitution and its civil-liberties guarantees; Modernization and Islamization in the country; Demands of desertization and feminization.

Tetreault, M. A. (2000). Women's rights in kuwait: Bringing in the last bedouins? *Current History, 99*(633) 27.
Focuses on the complex role of women's rights and gender issues in Kuwaiti politics. Parliament's defeat in November 1999 of two proposals that will confer full political rights on Kuwaiti women; Two political discourses that intersects the women's rights question; Secularism and the Kuwait variant of political Islam; Traditional forces and proponents of democratization. INSET: Enhancing the political landscape.

Tetreault, M. A. (1995). Book reviews: Women. *Middle East Journal, 49*(3) 530.
Reviews the book `Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past: The Legacy of `A'isha Bint Abi Bakr,' by D.A. Spellberg.

Tetreault, M. A., & al-Mughni, H. (1995). Modernization and its discontents: State and gender in kuwait. *Middle East Journal, 49*(3) 403.
Examines various aspects of Kuwait's population policy, entitlement programs, employment and housing patterns and family life. Analysis of motives and strategies for maintaining

traditional values in the context of development imperatives; Complexity of dilemmas facing Kuwaiti leaders.

The committee for human rights defense in Bahrain (2000). *Development and Socioeconomic Progress* (PART 1):75-92.

Trofimov, Y. (2001). Bahrain's bold rebuff to its Islamic rebels: Democracy and rights. *Wall Street Journal - Eastern Edition, 238*(82) A1.
Reports on the country of Bahrain, an island nation in the Persian Gulf. How the Islamic nation has used an approach of democracy and human rights to dissipate radical elements of Islam; Reforms in the police forces and judicial system; Political dissidents allowed to return to their homes; Emir Sheikh Hamad al Khalifa's promise to hold municipal elections and elections to a new parliament.

Turshen, M. (2002). Algerian women in the liberation struggle and the civil war: From active participants to passive victims? *Social Research, 69*(3) 889.
Examines the shift on the status of Algerian women from active participants in the war for independence from France in 1954-1962 to passive victims of the civil war in the 1990s. Trends on women's participation in the Algerian war; Social and political conditions of women after the Algerian war; Details on how Algerian women responded to the legalization of the Islamic Salvation Front whose platforms include the curtailment of women's rights.

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Usher, Graham (2004). "Hamas takes the high road," *New Statesman*, Vol. 133(4696) 7/12/2004. At: http://search.epnet.com.ezproxy.idrc.ca/login.aspx?direct=true&db=aph&an=13713373

Vesely, M. (2004). Www.Irantopsites.com. *Middle East,* (350) 24-26.
The article focuses on Iranian government's efforts to sensor Internet. This year over seven million Iranians are expected to log on to the Internet. The government in Tehran also estimates that up to 15 million Iranians out of a total population of some 70 million will be logging on to the Web by the end of 2006 and this figure looks to be on track, given the proliferation of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) setting up business, mainly in the major cities. Considering that censorship of the media is so widespread in Iran, this dramatic increase in Web usage was bound to attract attention sooner or later. What is surprising about Internet usage in Iran is that few of the popular homegrown web sites are focused on politics, social issues being among the main interests of the growing numbers of more modern Iranian youth.

Iranian ISPs are now being ordered to block not just sites originating from outside deemed to be pornographic or anti-Islamic, but also some political blogs originating from within Iran itself.

Watenpaugh, K. (2004). "Opening the doors" one year later: Reflections on the iraq war and the Middle East studies community. *MIDDLE EAST STUDIES ASSOCIATION BULLETIN, 38*(PART 1) 16-23.

Weismann, I. (2005). The invention of a populist Islamic leader: Badr al-dìn al-hasanì, the religious educational movement and the great syrian revolt. *Arabica, 52*(1) 109-139.
Badr al-Dìn al-Hasanì (1850-1935) appears in the biographical literature of Syria as its foremost man of religion from World War I to the Great Revolt. This article examines his life and work within the context of the gradual shift of the Syrian ulema of his day from the older "politics of notables" to a new strategy of popular mobilization. It argues that Badr al-Dìn's image was "invented" during the early Mandate by disciples in search of legitimization for their populist agendas of an Islamic educational system and agitation against French rule. They accordingly presented him as a self-standing scholar who transcended all religious divisions, reprimanded "unjust" rulers and supported the Arab cause. This "romantic" image of Badr al-Dìn was to prevail over the alternative image of him as an accommodating religious notable which emerges from the French sources.

"Women in Iran: An online discussion" (2001). *Middle East Policy, 8*(no 4) 128-143.
Examines hejab, or mandatory wearing by women of clothing deemed appropriately modest by the religious authorities, how gender relations and women's political activities have been affected, and human rights issues; forum conducted in early 2001 as part of the Gulf/2000 project at Columbia University.

Women in the United Arab Emirates--UAE (1996). *Women's International Network News, 22*(1) 39.
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